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Abstract 
 
 
	 6 
‘To explore the rule is to be emancipated from it by becoming the master of its 
potential for surprise’ (Bök 2001: 71). The oppositional rule, established upon the 
philosophical traditions of binarism and dialecticism, situates the two protagonists in 
this research as antithetical systems. This discourse proposes a disruption to a 
metaphysical dichotomy between the noetic authorial text and the poetic paratext.  
 
The non-oppositional premise of collaborative dialogue is proposed as a method to 
resist the oppositional logic of dialecticism and the homogenous ‘third hand’ of 
collaboration theory. Michel Serres’ assertion that to ‘hold a dialogue is to suppose a 
third man and seek to exclude him’ positions the ‘third man’ of communication as a 
disruptive force (Serres 1982: 67). The excluded third is a noise in the background of 
ideological unity, the ‘potential for surprise’, an intervallic exception in a 
paradigmatic order.  
 
This collaborative game breaks the rule of opposition and subsequently generates a 
third space where the indeterminate relation between the scholastic text and 
matthews and allen’s paratext performs disruption in the authorial system. ‘The 
exception explicates the rule, testing its limits, defying its fields,* forsaking the 
nomic work of one paradigm for the ludic risk of another paralogy’ (Bök 2001: 71). 
 	
 
 	
 													
 	
*  
Because half a dozen grasshoppers under a fern make the 
field ring with their importunate chink, whilst thousands 
of great cattle, reposed beneath the shadow of the 
British oak, chew the cud and are silent, pray do not 
imagine that those who make noise are the only 
inhabitants of the field.  
 
(Burke, E., 1981, The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, (New 
Edition), London: Book Club Associations: 111) 
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Intercession is a form of positive dissonance, made possible through 
an openness to interferences that disturb one’s regular harmonic 
vibrations. (Bogue 2007: 14)  
 
Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule proposes 
disruption to the stasis of unitary phenomena, dialectical consensus and stable 
oppositions. The protagonists in this research, the academic author and the artistic 
collaboration matthews and allen, introduce a fluid third space that is resistant to the 
hegemonic principles of the monograph. ‘Academia with its need to identify and 
quantify and its notion of original contributions to knowledge lags behind the 
critiques of authorship and origin’ (Warr 2008). The metaphysical oppositions implicit 
in academic writing (author/reader, one/many, noetic/poetic, theory/practice, 
serious/non-serious) operate as a paradigmatic standard from which an indeterminate 
third space is proposed.  
 
We should seek our instruction [… not from] any singular form of 
understanding, but should rather seek to occupy the spaces of 
transformation which lie between - neither one nor the other but 
[a]‘third space’ (Brown 2002: 12) 
 
Philosophical tradition characterizes the third term as a site of stability where 
the triadic structure of the dialectic (thesis, antithesis and synthesis) effects 
consensus. A comparable condition is performed within a binary logic, predicated 
upon the construction and maintenance of stable oppositions. Binarism operates as a 
hierarchical system where one term is privileged over its other, thus the traditional 
relation between author and reader operates within a binary paradigm. The artistic 
author is traditionally perceived as the sole custodian of meaning, a perspective 
established upon the legacy and idealism of authorial expression, situating the reader 
as the subordinated other. 
This discourse proposes an intervallic disruption to the oppositional relation 
between author and reader, adopting the proliferative characteristics of ‘the 
clinamen, the parasite, the crowd, [… background noise,] and the collapsed tower of 
Babel, all of which function as tropes gesturing toward […] the multiple’ (Abbas 2005: 
145). The multiplicity of language generated through intervallic disruption is 
theorized in relation to the Derridean concept of différance (inferring both difference 
and deferral) where unitary meaning is situated as an unstable hypothesis.  
The collaborative double matthews and allen will seize control of the footnotes in 
this text as a means to perform the concept of différance and a proliferation of 
meaning (consequently the academic text will adopt a parenthetical citation system). 
matthews and allen adopt a satirical approach to citation wherein the rules of 
referencing are intermittently performed and discarded; ‘There are no preexisting 
rules; each move invents its own rules; it bears upon its own rule’ (Deleuze  2004[b]: 
70). 
The paratextual space of the academic footnote is proposed as a site of 
potentiality where anecdotal, speculative, conjectural, digressive and unofficial 
narratives may interrupt the autocracy of the authorial text.  
 
Ostensibly outside the text that both contains and is framed by it, with 
a subservient role that nonetheless possesses an authority to trump 
the text that would seem to master it’ (Dworkin 2005: 9) 
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Footnotes, prefaces, prologues and epilogues are anomalous paratextual apparatus 
within the supposed linearity of the monograph, operating as ‘excesses that replace 
what they augment, operating against but within the limits of the system that must 
exclude them. The anomalos is the repressed part of a rule which ensures that the 
rule does not work.’ (Bök 2001: 38). Comparable to the concept of parasitism, 
paratextual and prefatory writing is both within and peripheral to the limits of the text 
and as such articulates a ‘problematic limit between an inside and an outside that is 
always threatened by graft and by parasite.’ (Derrida 1991: 196).  
The parasitic operations of matthews and allen’s footnotes endeavour to 
unsettle the notion of a stable denotative meaning. These paratextual asides position 
the reader as an active participant in the proposition to generate multiplicity. The 
paratext serves as a method to punctuate and interrupt the reader’s consumption of 
the authorial text. To read this text as a linear narrative is to misunderstand the 
premise of the research. matthews and allen’s paratextual system compels the reader 
to turn from the determinism of the authorial discourse toward other phenomena. 
matthews and allen’s footnotes, akin to the disruptive character of background noise, 
interrupt the striated trajectory of the authorial text and subsequently introduce an 
anomalous multiplicity. The relation between text and paratext compels the reader to 
traverse the territories within and between narratives thus disrupting the hegemony 
of a traditional authorial system.  
 
the reader's body is put into motion: the eye moves, the head tilts, the 
hands and fingers work the pages, the arms and torso shift as the 
book is handled and manipulated. (Dworkin 2005: 16) 
 
In the act of turning from the noetic academic text to the poetic paratext, the reader 
effects an indeterminate third space and subsequently performs disruption in a 
system arguably predicated upon the language of opposition. The third space is 
proposed as an anomalous multiplicity, a site of chaos, and thus any inclination 
toward ‘the order of logical dependency’ should be resisted (Derrida 1988: 90). Both 
heritage and historicism suggest that ‘we must begin with the ‘standard’, the 
‘serious’, the ‘normal’, etc., and we must begin by excluding the ‘non-standard’, the 
non-serious’, the ‘abnormal’, the parasitical.’ (Derrida 1988: 90). This text attempts to 
generate a culture of equivalence between the ‘standard’ and the ‘non-standard’, the 
noetic and the poetic, performing a resistance to the language of oppositional stasis 
and dialectical synthesis. The inclusion of both an academic preface and a prologue 
written by matthews and allen (a literary device commonly associated with poetic 
writing) gestures toward an equivalence between noetic and poetic narratives. 
matthews and allen’s concept of ‘equivalence facilitates the development and 
dissemination of organized absurdities.’ (McCaffery 2012: 179). 
The philosophical voice of the academic author and the art practice of 
matthews and allen (situated in the annotational space of the footnote) are 
distinguishable by a variation in typeface; this island of order is situated in an ocean 
of proliferative disorder. ‘Disorder is the end of systems, and their beginning’ (Serres 
2005: 13). This rhetoric of digression is augmented by its digital configuration and the 
possibilities generated by the implementation of textual hyperlinks. The digital 
hyperlink offers pragmatic potential for disruption to authorial linearity. The 
hyperlink suggests a system of digression and deferral and is ‘a quasi-scientific 
system for displaying the vicissitudes of textual transmission’ (Tribble 1977: 229-30). 
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The hyperlink generates a system wherein a theoretical and physical link may be 
established with Two is company: Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double. 
This text, authored by Helen Matthews, functions as both a physical appendix and a 
theoretical paratext to Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional 
rule, exceeding the boundaries of the text, proliferating beyond the unifying logic of 
traditional authorialism. This potential literature ‘must convolve both writer and 
reader in a tangle beyond the potency of an epistemic unwinding’ (McCaffery 2001: 
206). 
 
 
 
 
 
	 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prologue 
 
 
 
 
	 14 
						
Introduction 
 
 
	 15 
Since each of us was several, there was 
already quite a crowd   
(Deleuze & Guattari 2004[a]: 3)  
 
The title Three is a crowd: a potential exception to an oppositional rule 
references the colloquial language of the idiom ‘two is company, three is a crowd’. 
The counterpart to the partial phrase ‘three is a crowd’ is located in the text Two is 
company: Dialogic interplay AND1 the collaborative double by Helen Matthews. 
This idiom implies that duality may be destabilized by the actions of a third 
character, a character analogous to the excluded third man of Serresean philosophy. 
The ‘third’ conceived as an anomalous crowd infers both a homogenous mass and, 
paradoxically, an indefinite multiplicity. The concept of the crowd is introduced in a 
Deleuzoguattarian reflection on collaboration where each man is posited as a 
multiplicity. The aforementioned ‘Deleuzoguattarian’ contraction is effectively the 
performance of linguistic homogeneity, a third unitary term, collapsing the Deleuze 
and Guattari signatures into ‘a third authorial identity effacing the individual artists 
themselves’; its modernist genealogy effecting critique within the authorial system 
(Green 2001: x).  
Collaboration may be perceievd as that which operates within all 
philosophies, their histories and potentialities, as such ‘collaboration cannot simply  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
annex, affix, super add, supplement, subjoin, superpose, 
throw in, clap on, tack to, append, tag, engraft, saddle 
on, saddle with, sprinkle, super induce, introduce, work 
in, furthermore, and also, and else, besides, to boot… 
and so forth… 
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be opposed to solo or individual practice […] since the solo artist or author was 
never self-present or self-identical in the first place.’ (Cull 2012: 10). The proffering of 
‘individual’ practice as that which harbours the multiple suggests the Bakhtinian 
theory of dialogism. The ‘solo author’ in this research acknowledges the 
impossibility of a ‘self-present’ authorial voice through the purposeful 
interdiscursive play of multiple and diverse voices. This ‘[diversity] of voices and 
heterglossia enter the [text] and organize themselves […] into a structured artistic 
system.’ (Bakhtin 1981: 300). This discourse acknowledges Bakhtinian dialogism as 
implicit in all language systems, whilst simultaneously, and perhaps paradoxically, 
recognizing the pervasive traditions and culturally entrenched concept of the 
individual author.  
 
if we extend the concept of 
collaboration to include individual 
practice and to include the ways we 
work with nonhuman others, then 
collaboration becomes a vacuous term, 
a placeholder2 for everything and 
nothing. (Cull 2012: 11) 
 
 This narrative reflects upon the language of consensus associated with 
collaborative practice and the theoretical formation of ‘a third artistic identity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
The phrase "Tom, Dick and Harry" is a placeholder for 
multiple unspecified people; "Tom, Dick or Harry" plays 
the same role for one unspecified person. The phrase most 
commonly occurs as "every Tom, Dick and Harry", meaning 
everyone, and "any Tom, Dick or Harry", meaning anyone, 
although Brewer defines the term to specify "a set of 
nobodies; persons of no note". (wiki.org accessed 25.02.2014) 
 
* matthews and allen are every Tom, Dick and Harry. 
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superimposed over and exceeding […] individual artists’ (Green 2001: 179). This 
conflated third identity arguably performs a reiteration of traditional authorship, thus 
maintaining the language of autocracy implicit in metaphysical authorialism. The 
gesture of authorialism within a metaphysical paradigm establishes a binary relation 
between the characters of author and reader. Metaphysical duality presupposes a 
culture of stable oppositions where one term assumes greater authority. A traditional 
reading of this text presupposes the language of opposition: noetic/poetic, 
theory/practice, author/reader, one/multiple, order/chaos, serious/non-serious,3 
stoic/ludic. This research attempts to unsettle the dominant discourse of opposition 
and subsequently reposition the third as a site of potentiality ‘embodying the idea of 
opposites as equivalent.’ (Hugill 2012: 11) 
In an act of resistance to the homogenizing principles of collaboration theory 
(a theory positioning the collaborative double as a synthesized ‘third force’) the 
protagonists matthews and allen adopt the non-oppositional process of collaborative 
dialogue. The Serresean assertion that ‘to hold a dialogue is to suppose a third man 
and seek to exclude him’ positions the ‘third’ in communication as a disruptive force 
(Serres 1982: 67). The process of collaborative dialogue arguably resists the clamour of 
dialectical perspectives and as such may hold the potential to include the Serresean 
‘third man’. This discourse situates the excluded third of Serresean philosophy as a 
site of potentiality, a potential that ‘generates a new process rather than an old  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
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product’ (Bök 2001: 71). In the refutation of the ‘old metaphysical product’ (opposition 
and/or consensus), poststructuralism posits meaning as that which is deferred and 
always in process, and thus ‘rejects the search for origins, stable meaning, universal 
truth and the ‘direction’ of history.’ (Barker 2004: 161).  
 
If thought searches, it is less in the 
manner of someone who possesses a 
method than that of a dog4 that seems to 
be making uncoordinated leaps.  
(Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 55) 
 
The proposed disruption to hegemonic order situates this discourse within a 
constructivist paradigm where ‘knowledge’ is constructed (as opposed to discovered) 
as the result of an interpretive, perspectival response. ‘Constructionism accepts that 
there are multiple knowledges, and that knowledge is highly contingent on time and 
cultural location’ (Potter 2006: 81). The paradigms for inquiry in this research facilitate 
an exploration of potentiality, rather than a summative ‘or an enclosing process’ 
(Sullivan 2010: 31). The traditions of research position the paradigm as a set of general 
theoretical principles. This research is interpreted within a qualitative approach to 
research positing ‘knowledge’ as proliferative phenomena and is thus resistant to the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
	 19 
measured and systematic empiricism of quantitative research. Qualitative research 
permits the implementation of diverse theoretical, methodological and 
epistemological strategies. A quintessential characteristic of qualitative inquiry is a 
resistance to the generalizations and universalities that arguably limit potentiality. 
Poststructuralist qualitative research suggests that a universal foundation for 
knowledge is impossible. 
 
Post-structuralist qualitative researchers deny that there is a 
knowable and objective social world or that it is possible to 
unproblematically represent that world in a text. (Brewer & Miller 2003: 
241) 
 
This discourse adopts a poststructuralist qualitative research paradigm wherein 
essentialist and privileged perspectives are resisted. If structuralism5 is understood to 
be the philosophical practice of systems and conventions, then poststructuralism may 
be characterized as a practice seeking to deconstruct those systems, thus, within a 
poststructuralist paradigm universal epistemology is untenable.  
‘The concept of praxis involves a deconstruction of the binary pair of theory 
and practice involving recognition that each belongs to and in each other.’ (Barker 
2004: 166). This research adopts the principles of praxis where research is performed 
in the interplay between theory and practice. The term praxis, introduced by  
 
 
5 
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Aristotle, seeks to collapse hierarchical distinctions between theory and practice. The 
collaborative practice of matthews and allen is embedded in the philosophical 
document in order to establish a culture of equivalence between these historically 
opposed modes of inquiry. This discourse proposes the collapse of oppositional 
thought and as such the concept of praxis-based research offers a potential 
equivalence between6 noetic (the academic author) and poetic phenomena (the 
practice of matthews and allen). ‘By using the principle of equivalents as its point of 
departure, the game is free: the situation can completely construct itself.’ (Jorn 1961). 
The interrelation between the noetic and poetic phenomena in this text effects 
disruption in the authorial system and unsettles the conventions that constitute 
traditional research and as such may perform a ‘new paradigm’ for inquiry. 
This discourse is characteristically poststructural, performative and 
proliferative and as such generates disruption in empiricist systems by means of a 
postparadigmatic inquiry into potentialities and the ‘vagaries that diverge from what 
directs them, escaping the events of the system that controls them.’ (Bök 2001: 43).  
The research paradigm is posited as a diagram mapping a site of proliferative 
potentiality. ‘The diagram is not precise, or representational, but charts the relation 
of forces that can be utilized or made’ (Zdebik 2012: 7). A proliferative approach to 
research attempts to generate conditions whereby multiplicity and potentialities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
between a rock and a hard place and between the devil and 
the deep blue sea: In a very difficult position; facing a 
hard decision. I couldn't make up my mind. I was caught 
between a rock and a hard place. He had a dilemma on his 
hands. He was clearly between the devil and the deep blue 
sea. 
 
(idioms.thefreedictionary.com)
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operate without determination and conclusion. Etymologically the term paradigm is 
taken from the Latin paradigma and the Greek paradeigma derived from 
paradeiknunai meaning ‘what shows itself beside’. The etymology of the paradigm 
suggests that which is situated beside7 what is shown, beside the dominant ideology 
of a given system. That which ‘shows itself beside’ the academic monograph 
manifests as a paratextual practice, the performance of intervallic background noise.  
A ‘significant means of disclaiming validity is to remove the single voice of 
omniscience and to relativize it by including multiple voices within the research.’ 
(Denzin & Lincoln 2000: 1028). The Deleuzian assertion that each of us is several gives 
credence to a principle of multivocality. A multivocal approach to research extends 
beyond an acknowledgment of heteroglossia to ‘the active management of voicing in  
the text’ (Yancey 1994: 159). This discourse operates within a multivocal research 
paradigm where the centrality of the authorial voice is unsettled by the citational 
practice of matthews and allen.   
 
Performativity is the writing and rewriting of meanings that 
continually disrupts the authority of texts. Resistance is a kind of 
performance that holds up for critique hegemonic texts that have 
become privileged stories told and retold. (Finley 2005: 687)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
B side. The other 
song that isn’t 
the ‘hit’ (A 
side) on a 45 
(7inch) vinyl. 
Less popular 
second choice. 
Also known as the 
flipside. 
 
(urbandictionary.com 
accessed 08.10.2013) 
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In the practice of academic writing citation is used as a method to substantiate the 
author’s conceptual position, essentially an affirming gesture, and as a strategy to 
differentiate the authorial text from existing scholarship. The paratextual practice of 
matthews and allen is generated almost entirely from existent phenomena and as 
such the concept of citationality is adopted as a method to question the romanticized 
notion of artistic inspiration and autonomy. Citationality has the potential to liberate 
the artist from the servitude of artistic expression and effectively disrupt the 
anticipated centrality of artistic authorship. matthews and allen’s use of citation 
adopts the concepts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, where established 
configurations are unsettled. In the context of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy 
deterritorialization is that which breaks or fractures the established system and 
reterritorialization is that which stabilizes a new configuration. The principles of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization operate under the precondition that a 
territory is never fixed and is rather a ‘malleable site of passage. As an assemblage, 
it exists in a state of process whereby it continually passes into something else’ 
(Message 2005: 275). 
matthews and allen’s use of the concepts deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization is developed as a poststructuralist challenge to the homogeneity of 
traditional authorialism. This poststructuralist paradigm8 is effectively a site of  
 
 
8 
          9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  The Two Ronnies, 1983, The Confusing Library 
 
 
9 
 
B B C  G r e e n  B o o k  
The Green Book was a pamphlet produced internally by the BBC 
in 1949 and circulated amongst its scriptwriters and 
performers. It contained guidelines on what was and what was 
not permissible subject matter for BBC broadcasting - still 
primarily radio-based at that date. The rules, which were 
considered by their intended audience to be stuffy and pompous 
even when they were issued, now appear antiquated and a futile 
attempt to overprotect the BBC's listeners.  
 
 
	 23 
multiplicity wherein phenomena may resist fixed designation and context specific 
determinism. 
Since meaning is negotiated between and across subjects and through 
language, it can never be fully secured: meaning comes to be 
understood as a negotiated domain, in flux and contingent on social 
[…] investments and contexts. (Jones & Stephenson 1999: 2) 
 
The proposition that ‘meaning is negotiated between and across subjects’ 
situates the protagonists in this research as perspectival qualitative researchers. 
Nietzsche’s philosophical perspectivism implies that there can be no definitive view, 
only a myriad of perspectives. Perspectival thought is analogous to Wallace Stevens’ 
poem Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird wherein there can be no single 
narrative relating to the blackbird,10 no single representation and no intrinsic 
characteristic. Each imagining of the Blackbird unsettles the concept of resolute 
meaning, appearing in green light and in shadow, both in flight and sat in cedar-
limbs.  
 
One perspective’s subversiveness may be another’s aesthetic 
decadence; incompetence from a certain viewpoint may be a refusal 
of the established codes from another, and so on. (Baldwin, Harrison & 
Ramsden 2006: 194)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
  
 
David Shrigley, This Is Me, This Is Also Me 
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Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule performs one 
perspective11 (albeit that the one harbours the multiple) on the subject of 
collaborative dialogue as a site of potentiality, and Helen Matthews’ text Two is 
company: Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double performs another. The 
two intersecting theses serve as a metaphor to articulate a resistance to consensual 
thought and epistemological prerequisites.  
The multitude of voices and perspectives in this discourse are performed 
through digital methods of dissemination. The Twenty-First Century researcher 
invariably employs digital methods of research; however, a thesis is 
characteristically disseminated by means of a printed document. The conventional 
printed thesis ‘necessitates a linear, largely monomodal medium for the presentation 
of the research.’ (Andrews 2012: 32). Within this research digression and multiplicity 
are fore-grounded and as such the confines of the printed page limit the potential for 
meaning to proliferate. Digital dissemination ‘offers insight into reading and writing 
practices that do not yield a finite production of cultural artifacts but become part of 
an interanimating relationship’ [sic.] (Andrews 2012: 233). The use of hypertext-
applications generates a temporal and fluid text that effectively situates the reader as 
a participant in the performance of digression. The digital thesis effects an 
interlacing of perspectives and performs a proposed resistance to stable oppositions 
and unified phenomena. The digital methods employed in this text perform, as  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Father Ted, 1996, Hell, series 2, episode 1 
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opposed to simply theorise, the digressive and multiple character of the praxis thesis. 
Thus, a comprehensive understanding of the research may not be attained without 
engaging with the relation between the traditional philosophical writing and the 
paratextual art practice. This research adopts an active reader12 paradigm that 
recognizes ‘the capability of ‘readers’ to be dynamic creators of significance rather 
then being understood as simple receptors of textual meaning’ (Barker 2004: 1). 
In an act of resistance to the grand narrative and totalizing metanarratives that 
seek to categorize and unify thought, this discourse operates as a proliferative and 
temporal praxis. Lyotard proposed that the metanarrative should give way to ‘petits 
récits’, or ‘small narratives’. The ‘petits récits’ are the exception to a metanarrative 
rule and as such serve to disrupt the totalizing principles of the grand narrative. It 
may be suggested that the noetic academic text operates as a metanarrative, offering 
explanation and legitimation, whereas matthews and allen’s paratextual practice 
operates as a Lyotardian ‘petits récit’. matthews and allen’s ‘small narratives’ 
manifest as a paralanguage of idioms, colloquialisms, old wives tales, image, verse 
and NOISE. These ‘small narratives’ function as catalysts for the destabilization of a 
grand authorial narrative. 
This discourse considers six philosophical perspectives relating to the third 
position as a space of both metaphysical tradition and poststructural proliferation. 
The Third Term and The Excluded Third situate this research within the metaphysical  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
a person who reads written matter; a person who is able 
to read, one who reads the work in hand 
 
expressed in due literary form 
 
conveyed a thought or feeling in words 
 
an idea or opinion produced by thinking, or occurring 
suddenly in the mind 
 
a view or judgement formed about something, not 
necessarily based on fact or knowledge 
 
a particular way of considering or regarding something 
 
a thing that is unspecified or unknown 
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traditions of oppositional stasis and consensus, thus establishing a cultural canon 
from which this discourse takes its departure. The ‘Pataphysical Third introduces the 
clinamen as an element of fluctuation in a system predicated upon the language of 
stable oppositions: noetic/poetic, theory/practice, author/reader, one/multiplicity, 
order/chaos, serious/non-serious, stoic/ludic. The clinamen, Lucretius’ term for the 
indeterminate swerve13 of the atom, serves as a metaphor in the proposition to 
unsettle presupposed dualities in academic writing.  
 The philosophical narratives contained within The ‘Pataphysical Third and The 
Parasitic Third align the clinamen with the concept of background noise. Noise is 
commonly perceived as an irritant in the process of communication and 
characterized as the excluded other, an incomprehensible, homogenous mass: a 
crowd. This discourse seeks to unsettle a metaphysical heritage situating difference 
as negation and thus resist the homogenization of noise into the oppositional other of 
communication. In the proposition to destabilize this binary paradigm, noise is 
repositioned as a productive force, an agent of chaotic and anomalous multiplicity.  
 The Parapoetic Third proposes matthews and allen’s paratextual practice as a 
generative machine. This ‘diagrammatic or abstract machine does not function to 
represent’ but rather ‘plays a piloting role’ (Deleuze & Guattari 2004[a]: 157). matthews 
and allen’s parapoetic machine is conceived as a dysfunctional device generating 
new sequences, continually bifurcating through the inclusion of noise. In the context  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
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of a parapoetic discourse noise and anomaly are reconsidered as a means to unsettle 
linear and determinist phenomena: ‘forsaking the nomic work of one paradigm for 
the ludic risk of another paralogy.’ (Bök 2001: 71). The Parapoetic Third is proposed 
as a Jarry-esque solution to the question of how the dichotomous relation between an 
official noetic discourse and an unofficial poetic discourse may be unsettled to 
generate a culture of potentiality.  
 The Potential Third examines a systematic production of possibility. ‘How do 
we create knowledge and theory that explores what is possible? Rather than seeing 
inquiry merely as a linear14 procedure, or an enclosing process’ (Sullivan 2010: 31). 
Potentiality is proposed as a process resistant to the language of representation and as 
such situates a potential work as ‘a work which is not limited to its appearances’ 
(Motte 1998: 65). The Potential Third adopts a machinic attitude to confound the 
metaphysics of authorship. matthews and allen implement a quasi-scientific system 
where ludic rules displace the hegemonic principles of authorialism. 
  
The repetition of a past constraint (the 
regress) swerves into the intimation of a 
future potential (the digressus).  
(Bök 2001: 80)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14
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The protagonists in this research propose potentiality as a proliferative and 
indeterminate third space wherein the ‘resulting structure is a complex fabric, 
without center,15 hierarchy, or single organizing principle’ [sic.] (Abbas 2005: 6).                   
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The Third Term 
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‘To explore the rule is to be emancipated from it by becoming the master of 
its potential for surprise, whereas to ignore the rule is to be imprisoned in it by 
becoming the slave to the reprise of its intention.’ (Bök 2001: 71). The rule of 
traditional western metaphysics is effectively established upon the logic of 
opposition. This oppositional discourse arguably persists within contemporary 
culture: author/reader, one/many, theory/practice, serious/non-serious, noetic/poetic. 
A cultural perception of the noetic (the ‘science of the intellect’) and the poetic (that 
which is ‘of or like poetry’) suggests a binary order and consequently hierarchical 
positioning through the maintenance of an oppositional logic (Pearsall & Trumble 1995).  
Opposition quintessentially serves to eliminate anomaly and difference16 from those 
systems predicated upon the homogeneity of master narratives. The oppositional 
language of binarism and dialecticism effectively subsumes anomaly and exception 
(difference) into unity. Theoretical perspectives associated with binarism and 
dialecticism are frequently and arguably inaccurately considered to be 
indistinguishable; however, binarism operates through the maintenance of stable 
oppositions whereas dialecticism seeks to synthesize contraries into a unified third 
term. The language of duality permeates this discourse wherein two narrative 
constructs and two collaborative protagonists appear to simultaneously reference and 
unsettle metaphysical dualisms (being neither opposed nor unified).  
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The associative relation between unity and opposition appears paradoxical; 
however, the binary machine operates via a process of mutual affirmation. This 
mutuality is where two interrelated concepts are effectively defined through their 
reciprocal relation.  
 
Oh no it isn’t 
Oh yes it is 
 
The relation between the stereotypical characters in a comedy double act, the 
straightman and the funnyman, appear ostensibly oppositional; however, the 
straightman and funnyman are effectively simultaneously contributing to one 
narrative field. Thus, the serious is not in opposition to the non-serious but in relation 
to it.  
 
We are constantly told: to respect the order of logical dependency we 
must begin with the ‘standard’, the ‘serious’, the ‘normal’.  
(Derrida 1988: 90) 
 
It is in binarism that the concept of hierarchy is perhaps most overtly 
demonstrated, where one concept is privileged over its other, the serious over the 
non-serious. In the lexicon17 of Jacques Derrida this binary logic is a logocentric  
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LEXIPHANIC - Given to the use of pretentious terminology, 
such as the word lexiphanic.  
 
(Bowler, P., 2009, The Completely Superior Person’s Book of Words, 
Bloomsbury: 182) 
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theory.  Logocentrism is the belief that God (the word) or some other authority is the 
foundation for ‘meaning’18 and subsequently the dominant ideology of a binary 
relation. Perhaps the most explicit manifestation of binarism is in language, where 
one of two interrelated terms is afforded greater significance. Logocentrism is used 
to validate a system that privileges present phenomena and thus a ‘system structured 
by a valorization of speech over writing, immediacy over distance, identity over 
difference, and (self-) presence over all forms of absence, ambiguity, simulation, 
substitution’ (Derrida 2004[a]: 44). The logos may be said to produce a culture that 
performs from the binary positions of centre/margin, major/minor, author/reader, 
one/many, theory/practice, serious/non-serious, noetic/poetic. In the proposition to 
resist hierarchical positioning, this discourse considers the significance of a cultural 
heritage that articulates meaning through an oppositional logic and thus situates 
logocentrism as that which homogenizes exception and anomaly (reductio ad 
absurdum).  
 
[A] minor literature does not occur ‘elsewhere’ or ‘apart from’ a major 
literature (this is not a dialectic) but on the contrary operates from 
within, using the same elements as it were, but in a different manner. 
(O’Sullivan 2005)  
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that cannot be refuted …………………………………………………………………………………  
 
(Pearsall, J., Trumble, B., [Eds.], 1995, Oxford English Reference 
Dictionary, (2nd Edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
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In a cursory tale of major and minor terminology privilege is given to the major 
language; however, it is in the parasitic operations of the minor literature that the 
stasis of an oppositional logic is arguably opened to an anomalous multiplicity. 
‘What defines majority is a model you have to conform to […] A minority, on the 
other hand, has no model’  (Deleuze 1995: 173). If a minor literature operates from 
within the major system, then the implication is that a minoritarian holds the 
potential to generate disruption to the illusory stasis of a major ideology (matthews 
and allen perform a minoritarian discourse). 
 ‘I hear two speaking together, but are they in agreement or tenaciously 
contradicting each other?’ (Lomax 2004: 13). A critique of oppositional thought 
commonly manifests itself in the sublation of contraries into a third term (sublation is 
a dialectical method where existing principles, rather than being countered19 and 
erased, become part of a ‘new’ ideology). The construction of a third term leads to a 
consideration of classical dialectics and Platonic philosophy. Traditionally, the 
dialectic is conceived as a process of argumentation seeking resolution; this 
perspective presupposes a synthesis between opposing perspectives. Plato’s 
dialectical model is considered to operate in contrast to Plato’s eristic where 
participants engaged in dialogue seek victory over their opponent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
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Can’t! Don’t! Shan’t! Won’t! Pass it along the line! 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
(Kipling, R., Parade-Song of the Camp Animals, IN, The Oxford 
Dictionary of Quotations, (2nd Edition), London) 
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Man:  Is this the right room for an argument? 
Other Man:   I've told you once. 
Man:     No you haven't! 
Other Man:   Yes I have. 
Man:     When? 
Other Man:   Just now. 
Man:     No you didn't! 
Other Man:   Yes I did! 
Man:     You didn't! 
Other Man:   I did! 
Man:     You didn't! 
Other Man:   I'm telling you, I did! 
Man:     You did not! 
 
(Monty Python, 1972, The Money Programme) 
 
The Platonic dialectic is a system of argument and counter-argument, and serves as a 
method to establish the culturally desirable condition of unity. The foundational 
principle of Platonic dialectics is the ‘reasoned’ argument of opposing hypotheses 
with a view to establishing unity (unity in Platonic terms is established as ‘truth’).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
18 cont. 
 
A fine line between two things: there is no clear and 
easy-to-define distinction between two things. ………………………  
 
(Hinds-Howell, D., 2002, Penguin Dictionary of Idioms, (2nd Edition), 
Penguin) 
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The Hegelian dialectic is understood as the stating of a thesis proceeded by the 
antithesis and subsequent synthesis. The operative terms in Hegel’s philosophy of 
dialectics are contradiction and sublation.20 The process of contradiction is integral to 
our understanding of Hegelian dialectics, where a thesis gives rise to contradiction or 
antithesis and, ideologically, the tension between these polarities sublate into 
synthesis. Sublation is a translation of the German word aufheben and is a dialectical 
principle that resists the displacement of one concept by another through its 
duplicitous inference. Sublation etymologically refers to both cessation and 
preservation. Dialectic sublation suggests that synthesis may be attained through the 
movement between dialectically opposed positions. The dual concepts of thesis and 
antithesis are invariably altered through the principle of sublation and thus cease to 
exist in their original context, yet are arguably preserved within the sublated third 
term. The paradoxical etymology of the term sublation, meaning to preserve and to 
end, contains a third inference, to elevate. This ‘lifting up’ suggests that synthesis is 
elevated beyond presuppositions toward a ‘higher meaning’. The Hegelian theory of 
sublation effectively produces a synthesized third term and consequently perpetuates 
the ideology of unitary stasis.  
 The binary oppositions of thesis and antithesis permeate the language of 
philosophy from the Cartesian dualities of mind and body to the Socratic method. 
The Socratic method may be considered to operate in a culture of negation where a  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
18 cont. 
 
But if he does really think there is no distinction 
between virtue and vice, why, Sir when he leaves our 
houses let us count our spoons.……………………………………………………………  
 
(Johnson, IN, The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, (3rd Edition), 
Book Club Associates: 275) 
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series of questions are formulated to eliminate hypotheses that reveal contradictions. 
The premise of the Socratic method is to test hypotheses through argument and 
opposition in order to reveal a consensual ‘truth’. The privilege awarded to unity and 
consensus in classical philosophy suggests a cultural heritage that resists multiplicity, 
heterogeneity and anomaly. Lyotard states that dialectical consensus in classical 
philosophy ‘does violence to the heterogeneity of language games’ (Lyotard 1995: 28). 
A Lyotardian resistance to dialectical methods situates unity as an illusory condition 
and further questions the oppositional relation of thesis and antithesis by suggesting 
that ‘consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value’ (Lyotard 1995: 37). 
 A ‘propensity for hierarchy, fixity and stasis (or simply representation) with 
which we are all involved’ suggests a cultural inclination toward determined 
phenomena (O’Sullivan 2006: 12). How can a philosophical inheritance of opposition 
and consensus be disrupted? A search for disruption is essentially a gesture that 
seeks escape from the stasis and fixity of a unitary system. Perhaps it is in the word 
stasis that this discourse begins to turn.21 In its general usage stasis refers to a 
motionless state, a standing still. Thucydides, an historian of ancient Greece, 
proposed stasis as a complex condition in which diametrically opposed forces enter 
into stasis whilst retaining ‘internal disturbances’. 
 
stasis  inactivity; stagnation; a state of equilibrium. (Pearsall & Trumble 
1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 ‘The Lady’s not for turning’ 
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the Vice, a stock character in medieval morality plays; 
he is a cynical kind of fool in the service of the Devil, 
and tries to tempt others in a comical but often sinister 
manner.…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
(Baldick, C., 2008, Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms, (3rd 
Edition), Oxford University Press: 351) 
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Stasis is where ‘thinking comes to a standstill in a constellation saturated with 
tensions - there the dialectical image appears. It is the caesura in the movement of 
thought. Its position is naturally not an arbitrary one. It is to be found, in a word, 
where the tension between dialectical opposites is greatest.’ (Benjamin 1999: 475). 
Walter Benjamin’s ‘dialectics at a standstill’ may be articulated in terms of a 
momentary constellation where dichotomies enter into a state of reciprocal 
contention. This conception of dialectics may be said to generate confusion with 
regard to traditionally distinguishable dichotomies.  
 Historically, dialectical reason is proposed as a culture of conflict and 
resolution; however, Benjamin’s perspective is resistant to a progression from 
argument to conciliation and alternatively suggests a constellation of forces. 
Benjamin utilises the supposedly dichotomous relation of history and the present to 
articulate the appearance of a dialectical image ‘in the now of its recognizability’. 
The ‘now’ that Benjamin refers to is a temporality that ‘in the next moment is 
already irretrievably lost.’ (Benjamin 1999: 473). Tiedemann suggests that ‘dialectics at 
a standstill’ attempts to temporarily ‘halt the flow of […] movement, to group each 
becoming as being.’ (Tiedemann 1999: 943). Benjamin’s perception of dialectical stasis 
suggests the possibility for disruption in the reciprocal language of dualisms, a 
disruption that operates from inside the dialectical system; a system saturated with 
tensions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 cont. 
 
A fools paradise. A state of entertainment or happiness 
founded on unreal, fanciful or insecure foundations.  
 
(Rockwood, C., 2009, Brewers Dictionary of Phrase and Fable, (18th 
Edition), Chambers: 513) 
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there is something else involved that 
ceaselessly escapes the mastery of 
understanding and the logic of binary 
opposition (Lomax 2000: 149) 
 
 ‘Perhaps what is happening here is that the binary tale turns into a 
Derridean tale of oscillation and undecidability’, a movement that attempts to resist 
the oppositional logic informing western thought (Lomax 2000: 64). Derrida’s writing 
on the aporias of meaning proposes a culture of ‘undecidable situations’22 that 
‘interrupt and suspend all established programmes’ (Wortham 2010: 15). The aporetic 
language of Derridean philosophy performs an indeterminacy and undecidability in 
meaning and consequently resists traditional philosophical methods of 
homogenization. This concept of undecidability operates within the ‘verbal 
properties (nominal or semantic) that can no longer be included within philosophical 
(binary) opposition, resisting and disorganizing it, without ever constituting a third 
term, without ever leaving room for a solution in the form of speculative dialectics’ 
(Derrida 2004[b]: 40). (matthews and allen’s paratextual practice attempts to resist and 
disorganize the traditional oppositions between text and footnote, noetic and poetic, 
theory and practice, author and reader, without reaching a consensual condition).  
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‘There are multiplicities which constantly go beyond binary machines’ (Deleuze & 
Parnet 2007: 19). In the text Pharmacy Derrida deconstructs the Greek word 
pharmakon, meaning both poison and remedy, to demonstrate the multiplicity of 
language. In the Derridean lexicon of undecidable words the pharmakon, being 
neither good nor evil, serves to unsettle the binary paradigm. 
 Derrida’s resistance to homogenized third terms gives rise to the question of 
how the concept of a third term may be reconfigured. The oscillating space of 
Derridean undecidability serves to unsettle the stable oppositions in a binary system 
and, in broader terms, may be understood as dismantling Platonism (the belief that 
consensual ‘truth’ is structured in terms of oppositions). Derrida’s undecidable terms 
(pharmakon, supplement, trace, différance, et al.) gesture toward the deferral of 
meaning and resistance to homogenized third terms. Derridean undecidability is not 
the paralyzing of decision (as implied by its common usage) but rather the play of 
tensions and contradictions within the language of opposition.  
 In its overt resistance to the traditions of metaphysics, Derridean undecidability 
finds an alliance with the ‘pataphysical laughter of Alfred Jarry. 'Pataphysics, a 
pseudoscience, observes the laws governing exceptions and subsequently challenges 
the metaphysical conceptions of unity and consensus. ‘Pataphysical laughter may be 
considered to be both dual and unitary: ‘Pronounced slowly, it is the idea of duality’; 
‘ha’ ‘ha’;23 however, when ‘[p]ronounced quickly […] it is the idea of unity’, ‘haha’ 
(Jarry 1965: 228). ‘Pataphysical laughter is thus a Derridean undecidable, being neither  
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dual nor unitary yet both, it ‘is able to slide through that dimension of reasoning 
which everyday logic reductively conceives of as a single immobile point.’ (Daumal 
2012: 8). 
 The traditional doctrines of dialecticism, duality and binarism provide a 
contextual framework for a proposed disruption to oppositional logic. ‘The static 
classification of dual oppositions and of third terms’ articulates a philosophical 
propensity toward finite cultures, stable oppositions and unities (Derrida 2004[a]: 19). A 
culture of opposition and the constitution of third terms establishes a major ideology 
from which matthews and allen may perform disruption and digression. Within a 
binary paradigm the academic author is afforded a logocentric position (the serious) 
wherein a reference to Monty Python (the non-serious) proffers an exception to the 
logic of an oppositional rule (serious/non-serious).  
 
The exception explicates the rule, 
testing its limits, defying its fields, 
forsaking the nomic work of one 
paradigm for the ludic risk of another 
paralogy. (Bök 2001: 71) 
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The Excluded Third 
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Critical theory relating to the collaboration between artists generally focuses 
upon the construction of a third term and as such sustains the propensity toward unity 
established by the dialectic tradition. This cultural inclination toward unified third 
terms arguably persists in the formation of artist-to-artist collaboration. ‘Another 
entity emerges in artistic collaboration […] a third artistic identity super imposed 
over and exceeding the individual artists.’ (Green 2001: 179). The third artistic identity 
proffered by Green echoes the Hegelian concept of sublation, inferring that a 
synthesized third term exceeds its constituent parts. The collaborative lexicon 
includes reference to a third hand, a third force and a third mind, all of which situate 
collaborative identity as a homogenous force. This perceived homogenization or 
synthesisation appears explicit in relation to the artistic ‘double act’ Gilbert & 
George where two identities are unified through a deliberate mirroring of behaviour 
and dress. In 2011, during an interview at the Hay Festival, George stated that; “we 
are two people, but one artist”. This declaration suggests that the collaborative 
double actively work on homogenizing their two physical and metaphoric bodies into 
a third identity. The decision to ‘have no friends’24 affirms Gilbert & George’s 
closed, and arguably insular, collaborative methods and affirms the unified third 
character of the artist. Gilbert & George emerge as a series of considered 
communications and gestures that resist reference to their ‘individual’ parts. This 
carefully rehearsed persona proposes the collaboration between artists as a single 
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matthews and allen, 2009, Waiting for Friends 
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unit, a notion reiterated by the collective label ‘Gilbert & George’ which effectively 
performs a third term.25 This label (‘Gilbert & George’) does not reference individual 
components connected by a grammatical conjunctive (&) but alternatively operates 
as a single homogenous machine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gilbert & George, 2008, Manifesto Marathon, Serpentine Gallery 
Pavilion  
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The homogeneity of a third identity may be observed in the associative relation 
between the characters Vladimir and Estragon in Samuel Beckett’s play Waiting for 
Godot. ‘[Waiting for] Godot has long passages where the two men’s dialogue, if that 
is the word, is almost homogenous: their antiphonal lines sound like answering 
echoes within the same poem.’ (Peter 1988: 14)   
 
Estragon:  What shall we do now?  
Vladimir:  While Waiting.  
Estragon:  While Waiting. (Silence)  
Vladimir:  We could do our exercises.  
Estragon:  Our movements.26  
Vladimir:  Our elevations.  
Estragon:  Our relaxations.  
Vladimir:  Our elongations.  
Estragon:  Our relaxations.  
Vladimir:  To warm us up.  
Estragon:  To calm us down.  
Vladimir:  Off we go. (Vladimir hops on one foot to the other. 
Estragon imitates him.) 
 
(Beckett 2010) 
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Bend It Gilbert & George  
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In the collaboration between Tim Noble and Sue Webster the concept of 
‘working together’ is overtly articulated in their attempt to sublimate the two 
collaborators into a unified third27 artist. Comparable to the identical attire of Gilbert 
& George and the homogenized gender identities of Ulay and Abramović, Noble and 
Webster enact a literal process of physical convergence through the use of the same 
black hair dye and the wearing of identical clothes. ‘Their work derives much of its 
power from its fusion of opposites, form and anti-form,28 high culture and anti-
culture, male and female, craft and rubbish’ (timnobleandsuewebster.com). This ‘fusion’ 
of opposites adheres to a process of synthesisation and consequently raises the 
question as to whether or not artist-to-artist identities (perceived as a third force) 
perform the preservation and privilege of homogeneity. A ‘third entity represents the 
midpoint between two systems. It is here, at the center of the tension of opposites, 
that collaboration is born. The process does not mirror one energy system or the 
other but the integration of these dualities.’ [sic.] (Crawford 2008: 263). This statement 
suggests that an oppositional relation exists between collaborators and that the 
integration of these dualities must be enacted in order to generate collaboration. 
Artistic collaborations may be considered to ‘run a common risk of becoming 
incorporated into the system they are reacting against.’ (Billing 2007: 8). 
Collaboration29 is a method of artistic practice commonly utilized in the 
deconstruction of authorialism and ’as an alternative to contemporary individualism  
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Not left, not right, but somewhere in the middle with all 
the worst aspects of both left and right. Is there a 
fourth way?   
 
(Murray H., 2009, It’s Not Rocket Science and Other Irritating 
Modern Clichés, Piatkus Books Ltd: 153) 
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29 
 
We: A way of saying ‘I’ when you feel like sounding 
schizophrenic. 
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and the traditional role of the romantic artist as a solitary genius.’ (Billing 2007: 28). It 
is perhaps necessary to situate this collaborative discourse in a theoretical framework 
relating to authorialism, thus establishing the historical centrality of the artist as 
author. Foucault states that the author is an ‘ideological figure by which one marks 
the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning.’ (Foucault 2002[b]: 953). 
Foucault’s statement suggests that the traditionally privileged position of the author 
effects a limitation on potentiality. Barthes proposes the author as a tyrannical figure 
insistent upon an almost quasi-theological reading. This proverbial author-God 
appears to articulate a logocentric attitude toward authorship and as such affirms 
authorial centrality. The historical author/artist, when believed30 in, is regarded as an 
expressive, individual voice, an author-God, and is commonly considered to be an 
originator of meaning. In The Death of the Author Barthes suggests that assigning a 
text an author is to impose a single meaning on that work and thus limit its potential. 
(The supposed ‘death of the author’ in the Twentieth Century may be seen as 
analogous to the supposed death of God during the enlightenment of the Nineteenth 
Century).  
 
The Gods are dead but they have 
died from laughing, on hearing 
one God claim to be the only 
one. (Deleuze 2006: 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
believe 1. accept as true or as conveying the truth31  
 
(Pearsall, J., Trumble, B., [Eds.], 1995, Oxford English Reference 
Dictionary, (2nd Edition), Oxford University Press) 
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The real truth    an incalculable gamble 
 
The Sun, 8 Jan 2013   The Guardian, 8 Jan 2013 
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To accept an authorial meaning is arguably to reinforce the hierarchical 
binary opposition between the author and the reader. This binary relation may be 
perceived as the persistence of an oppositional logic and the maintenance of a 
reciprocal condition between major and minor ideologies. A deconstructionist 
response to the ‘death of the author’ may be said to manifest itself in the birth of the 
reader, a concept theoretically offering the possibility for meaning to proliferate 
beyond a single trajectory. Paradoxically, the birth of the reader may be perceived as 
a simple reversal of major and minor positions where one term continues to form the 
axiomatic foundation of the other. This text attempts to destabilize the hierarchical 
relation between the author and the reader through a digressive32 movement between 
the noetic text and the poetic footnote. This gesture does not simply proffer the 
production of multiplicity but operates as a process to displace the pursuit of finite 
meaning.  
 
A process implies the idea of a 
permanent rupture in established 
equilibria. (Guattari 2006: 420) 
 
The established equilibria of a collaboration may be said to manifest itself in 
the stasis of a third identity. This third identity appears to replicate a traditional  
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(Dramatic theme tune) PRESENTER: And so to our first 
contender.  Good evening. Your name please?  CONTESTANT: 
Ah Good Evening.  PRESENTER: Your chosen subject is 
answering questions before they are asked, this time you 
have chosen to answer the question before last each time, 
is that correct?  CONTESTANT:  Charlie Smithers. 
PRESENTER: And your time starts now. What is 
Palaeontology? CONTESTANT:  Yes absolutely correct.  
PRESENTER: What is the name of the directory that lists 
members of the peerage?  CONTESTANT:  A study of old 
fossils.  PRESENTER: Who are Len Murray, and Sir Geoffrey 
Howe?  CONTESTANT:  Berks.  PRESENTER: Correct.  What is 
the difference between a donkey and an ass?  CONTESTANT:  
One is a trade union leader, the others a member of the 
Cabinet.  PRESENTER: Complete the quotation ‘to be or not 
to be’.  CONTESTANT: They are both the same. 
 
The Two Ronnies, 1980, Mastermind 
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model of authorialism and thus exchanges one dominant ideology for another, a 
single authority for a collective authority. Gabri ‘cautions against collaboration as 
formalism, a risk that intensifies when interest in collaboration increases’ (Billing 
2007: 14). Gabri’s cautionary statement gives emphasis to collaboration as an 
established practice and its subsequent incorporation into the stabilizing system this 
text attempts to disrupt. This discourse seeks to rearticulate the ‘third’ of artist-to-
artist collaborations through the affirmation of the dialogic process implicit in 
collaborative practice. The ‘product’ of art practice, whether a traditional art object 
or the identity of an artist (Gilbert & George)33 typically holds a logocentric position 
and thus, a proposed emphasis upon dialogic process is, in itself, a repositioning; a 
digression from the centrality of representation. 
 
Digression – the life of dialogue – is 
one of the main antagonists of the 
monologic principle. (Sandywell 2010: 298) 
 
The non-oppositional process of collaborative dialogue resists the inherited 
culture of negative dialectics (thesis/antithesis) and as such may hold the potential to 
resist the stasis of a third term. Collaborative dialogue is theoretically opposed to 
monologism and its cooperative premise positions dialogic triumph as an act of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Thou shalt never say never 
 
Thou shalt not have mind over matter 
 
Thou shalt count your chickens before they are hatched 
 
Thou shalt not stand to reason 
 
Thou shalt not stitch in time to save nine 
 
Thou shalt not keep a stiff upper lip 
 
Thou shalt be a fool like an old fool 
 
Thou shalt go backwards and forwards 
 
Thou shalt have your cake and eat it 
 
Thou shalt not keep your friends close and your enemies 
closer 
 
 
Ten Commandments for matthews & allen (after Gilbert & George) 
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futility. ‘Thesis and antithesis, through noise, provide synthesis at rest, in 
equilibrium. But this work of the negative drives out, banishes, excludes the middle, 
the third position.’ (Serres 1997: 78). This ‘third position’ introduced by Serres is not 
the consensual third of collaborative unity or Hegelian synthesis and as such suggests 
a potential disruption to the stasis of the metaphysical third term. 
 
We have known places where dialogue [has] flourished: two people in 
search of truth struggle to exclude the noise between them that 
prevents their hearing each other, and try to include in their midst the 
meaning born from the intersection of their vocabularies and the 
interlacing of their good will. Dialogue is played out between [three] 
people, the two who appear to speak, plus the excluded third, their 
demon. (Serres 2008: 330) 
 
Serres suggests that to ‘hold a dialogue is to suppose a third man and seek to exclude 
him.’ (Serres 1982: 67). Perhaps it is in the duplicitous etymology of the term 
collaboration that a connection to the Serresean third man34 may be found. Our 
general understanding of the term collaboration is to ‘work jointly esp. in a literary 
or artistic production’; however, a second meaning shadows this conception; to 
‘cooperate traitorously with an enemy’ (Pearsall & Trumble 1995). The Serresean third is  
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1949, The Third Man 
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not a unifying force, a third hand35 or a gesture toward consensus but rather the 
background noise that is with or through (dia) all matter. 
 
Macbeth: What is that noise? 
(Act V, scene IV) 
 
Serres suggests that the clamour of opinion vociferated in dialectical battle or 
in dialogic triumph serves to render the third man imperceptible; however, a 
collaborative dialogue conceived as a non-oppositional process is arguably 
uninhibited by the noise of a dialectic and thus may permit the Serresean third man 
to be heard. If collaborative dialogue resists the language of opposition and 
conflation, then how does this practice operate? Collaboration, perceived as an act of 
alliance, does not presuppose unity but acknowledges the non-oppositional practice 
implicit in ‘working together’. ‘At the outset, it was less a matter of sharing a 
common understanding than sharing the sum of our uncertainties’ (Dosse 2001: 8). 
Perhaps it is in the Deleuzian conception of ‘a’ multiplicity that a suitable theoretical 
perspective for this discourse on collaborative practice may be established. Deleuze 
suggests that we should adopt the word multiplicity as a noun inferring ‘a’ 
multiplicity.  
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Multiplicities are not parts of a greater whole that have been 
fragmented, and they cannot be considered manifold expressions of a 
single concept or transcendent unity. (Parr 2010: 181) 
 
The non-oppositional process of collaborative dialogue silences the clamour of 
dialectical battle; however, in order to resist a culture of synthesis, collaboration may 
be re-imagined as ‘a’ multiplicity, a force that is multiple in itself. ‘In a multiplicity 
what counts are not the terms or the elements but what there is between’ (Lomax 2000: 
138). Serres proposes background noise as the excluded third man, a force that is 
between and within all matter. The excluded third is situated as an agent of 
potentiality, a noise, an exception to the rule, a jolt of chaos that fluctuates to disrupt 
equilibria.  
 
Listen twofold.36 But listen even harder to that which is relegated to 
the background. Yes, listen to that other noise, which is in the 
background, just within earshot. 
And what can be heard? Indeed, what is sounded? 
Answer:37 the restlessness of the world; the agitation that lies at the 
bottom of the world; the turbulence that turns the world; the 
boundless sounds of the world as it perturbs and excites itself as it  
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MATTHEWS: What is it? 
 
ALLEN: My question is this.  Is dialogue, capable, is 
dialogue capable of sustaining demagoguery………………………… 
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ceaselessly becomes and comes undone. And what a cacophony comes 
from this, what a commotion. Some would call this chaos. And some 
would call this disorder. (Lomax 2004: 11-12) 
 
Lomax suggests a common cultural perspective wherein chaos and disorder are 
perceived as negative conditions. It is in the story of Babel that this privilege of unity 
and order may be reconsidered.  
 
The Tower of Babel remains 
incomplete, never to become 
numerically one. (Lomax 2004: 27-8) 
 
The myth of Babel describes the construction of a tower. The Tower of Babel 
is an attempt to reach the heavens and its initial success is the product of linguistic 
unity. According to biblical account, punishment is placed upon the people of Babel, 
serving to confound their language: Etymologically, Babel is taken from the Hebrew 
word ‘balal’, meaning to jumble. The homogenous language uniting the people of 
Babel in the single act of constructing a tower is confused, thus transforming Babel 
into babble. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 cont. 
 
MATTHEWS: Demagoguery? 
 
ALLEN: Demagoguery…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Babble, babel- whichever way you say it, it’s a confused medley of 
sounds, a noisy assembly. Babel, babble, babel, babble: the ignorant 
are accused of this; it is said they don’t understand. Make sense. 
Don’t babble. (Lomax 2004: 27-8) 
 
To babble is to make an incoherent noise that refuses conformity to traditional 
linguistic systems. Our cultural understanding of the term babble is the 
communication of nonsense, idle talk and noise; however, what latent potentialities 
reside in the unofficial locutionary act of babbling? The confusion of tongues 
articulated in the myth of Babel is comparable to the complexity and multiplicity of 
meaning and suggests the impossibility of universal understanding. ‘The tower of 
Babel does not merely figure the irreducible multiplicity of tongues; it exhibits an 
incompletion, the impossibility of finishing.’ (Derrida 1985: 218). In the myth of Babel, 
God confuses a homogenous language to create plural tongues and thus an 
anomalous multiplicity. The mythical scattering of language is perceived as having 
confounded the unity necessary for raising the tower and consequently heterogeneity 
is reinforced as a condition of failure.  
 
Babel is not a failure, it is at that very moment when the tower is 
dismantled that we begin to understand that one must understand 
without concepts. (Serres 1997: 123) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 cont. 
 
MATTHEWS: By demagoguery you mean? 
 
ALLEN: By demagoguery I mean demagoguery…………………………………………  
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Noise, babble and disorder commonly hold negative connotations amidst the 
ideology of unity and ‘as for loud theories, don’t they in their shouting out drown out 
that background noise which I am trying to hear?’ (Lomax 2004: 24). The narrative of 
Babel suggests the concept of incompletion, heterogeneity and multiplicity. The 
attempt to construct a tower at Babel was dependent upon a universal language, a 
condition perhaps paralleled by the normative traditions of noetic writing; however, 
this attempt to preserve universality is unsettled by an anomalous and chaotic 
multiplicity. The footnotes in this text attempt to perform the confusion of tongues 
articulated in the myth of Babel and thus serve to unsettle the cultural privilege 
awarded to homogenous and unitary systems.  
 The disruptive concept of babble suggests a connection to the elements of 
dialogue commonly considered superfluous to a traditional and idealized model of 
communication.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 cont. 
 
MATTHEWS: I thought so. 
 
ALLEN: I mean UM highly charged oratory, persuasive, 
whipping up rhetoric. Listen to me! Listen to me! If 
Plato had been British would we under similar 
circumstances have been moved, charged up, fired up by 
his inflammatory speeches or would we have simply 
laughed. Is dialogue too ironic, to sustain Platonian 
styles. Would his notion have simply run false in our 
ears………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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[In] the dialectical game, the relationship from Self to Other (sender 
to receiver, as interchangeable roles) is too easily seen as 
antagonistic, as two interlocutors doing battle, each trying to enslave 
the other. (Rasch 2000: 58)  
 
Serres suggests that a dialogic battle of thesis and antithesis is unified through a 
mutual gesture seeking to overpower the pervasive background noise. Paradoxically, 
a dialectical method cannot offer an antithesis to noise; the only means of 
eliminating noise is to create more noise (the clamour of opposing perspectives). 
This discourse situates the anomalous elements of dialogue (the background noise), 
elements commonly considered to be nonsensical and disruptive, as potentialities: 
‘applications, translations, interferences, communications, passages and 
distributions which would draw its fluctuating map, sometimes its labyrinth, its 
metastable network, its becoming’ (Serres 2008: 331). If western metaphysics has 
traditionally opposed anomaly and exception through privileging unity and dualism, 
then how can the Serresean third man be perceived above this dialectical noise? It is 
perhaps in the concept of interruption, a force generally considered disruptive in an 
idealized model of communication, that the digressive third position of Serresean 
philosophy may be performed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 cont. 
 
MATTHEWS: We are talking about things running false in 
our ears. 
 
ALLEN: UM. May I compartmentalise. I hate to, but may I?  
May I? Is dialogue a function of our British cynicism, 
tolerance, resistance to false emotion, humour, and so on 
or do those qualities come extrinsically, extrinsically 
from the dialogue itself. It’s a chicken and egg 
problem…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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POZZO: (angrily) Don’t interrupt me! (Pause. Calmer.) If we all 
speak at once we’ll never get anywhere (Pause.) What was I saying? 
(Pause. Louder.) What was I saying? 
 
(Beckett 2010) 
 
In Blanchot’s text The Infinite Conversation, the concept of interruption is 
introduced as an integral component of dialogue. Interruption for Blanchot does not 
always perform a rupture or disruption in conversation but may serve to facilitate 
communication. As two protagonists engage in conversation the ‘coherent discourse 
they carry on is composed of sequences that are interrupted when the conversation 
moves from partner to partner, even if adjustments are made so that they correspond 
to one another. The fact that speech needs to pass from one interlocutor to another in 
order to be confirmed, contradicted, or developed shows the necessity of interval.’ 
(Blanchot 1993: 75). This necessity of interval suggests that a dialogue is always 
fragmented as it moves from one interlocutor to another and that interruption permits 
exchange. The dialogic adjustments introduced by Blanchot may be considered to 
perform within the vectors of dialectical synthesis: ‘Interrupting for the sake of 
understanding’ (Blanchot 1993: 76). However, for Blanchot, like Serres, dialectical 
opposition does not represent a decisive separation but rather two enemies in a  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 cont. 
 
MATTHEWS: We are talking about chickens. We’re talking 
about eggs. 
 
ALLEN: UM. Let me start a duologue here. UM. There’s 
language (pause) and there’s speech. Um. There’s, there’s 
a speech (pause) and there’s a dialogue. Mark the 
difference for me!? Mark the difference for me please!? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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relation of unity. Blanchot offers a further conception of interruption understood as 
foreignness, ‘a curvature of the universe; that is a distortion preventing any 
possibility of symmetry and introducing between things, and particularly between 
man and man, a relation of infinity.’ (Blanchot 1993: 81). Blanchot reconsiders the 
notion of interruption through eliminating negative connotations and repositioning it 
as a generative and infinite potentiality seeking escape from the limitations of third 
terms and unified phenomena. Interruption is a ‘subtle ventriloquism38 extend[ing] 
the principle of dialogue far beyond the two interlocutors who are […] actually 
present.’ (Womack 2011: 15).  
The principles of dialogue may be extended to include digression, the 
interposition of delay and deferral from presuppositions and linear trajectories. The 
concept of digression as a process of deferral may be aligned with Derridean 
différance, a neologism derived from the French verb différer combining its double 
meaning (‘to differ’ and ‘to defer’) to create a noun that oscillates between the two. 
The acknowledgment that logocentrism cannot be deconstructed by an oppositional 
logic may have given rise to the concept of différance, where meaning escapes the 
metaphysical tradition of unity to encounter the undecidability of meaning 
(undecidability is not indecision but an acknowledgment of alterity and anomaly in 
language). The interplay between perspectives in this text (an interplay between text 
and footnote and between the two interrelated theses) is conceived as a gesture  
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37 cont. 
 
MATTHEWS: We have moved on to dialogue. 
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toward Derridean différance where meaning enters into a process of deferral. The 
Latin differre, meaning to detour or delay, is considered in relation to the verb differ, 
suggesting a temporality that delays completion and presence to encounter difference 
and exception (presence, in this context, is aligned with concepts of representation 
and stasis). Différance may be said to dislocate presence and subsequently generate a 
trajectory that fluctuates between traditional binary oppositions. The movement39 of 
différance is that ‘which disorganizes ‘historically’, ‘practically’, [and] textually,  
the opposition or the difference (the static distinction) between opposing terms.’ 
(Derrida, 2004[a]: 6). Derrida demonstrates this oscillating gesture through the 
metaphysical privilege afforded to speech over writing (proposed by Austin, et al.), a 
privilege disrupted through the philosophy of différance: The discreet change from 
difference to différance silently deconstructs the binary order of speech and writing. 
Derrida suggests that différance belongs to neither speech nor writing and 
alternatively exists in a space beyond or between these two terms: ‘It belongs to no 
category of being, present or absent.’ (Derrida 1968: 259). The mark of distinction 
between the terms difference and différance remains inaudible. This mute irony may 
be overlooked as an erroneous deviation from linguistic convention; however, the 
mere recognition of this infraction serves to reinforce the disruptive potential of 
différance. In the 1968 paper Différance Derrida proposes the concept of 
‘interposition’ where what is possible or present is made impossible by a process of  
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
Movement; the act or an instance of moving or being moved  
 
Course; a continuous onward movement or progression 
 
Process; a course of action or procedure 
 
Direction; the act or process of directing; supervision 
 
Clockwise; in a curve corresponding in direction to the 
hands of a clock 
 
Veer; change direction 
 
Change; the act or an instance of making or becoming 
different 
 
Instance; a particular case   
 
Exception; an instance that does not follow a rule 
 
 
Pearsall, J., Trumble, B., [Eds.], 1995, Oxford English Reference 
Dictionary, (2nd Edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press 
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deferral and delay. Différance suggests that every concept is part of a sequence or 
system within which it is subject to the ‘play of difference’. For Derrida the concept 
of play is not simply an activity but the production of difference though a movement 
of deferral. Différance is ‘the de-limitation of ontology (of presence)’ and therefore 
deconstructs the hierarchy privileging presence over absence, thus ‘play [jeu] 
remains beyond this opposition’ (Derrida 1968: 259 & 272). The theory of différance 
questions and disrupts the determination of presence as finitude and thus 
‘[d]ifférance can refer to the whole complex of its meaning at once.’ (Derrida 1968: 
260). Différance resists the collapse of multiplicity40 into a consensual third term and 
may offer an alternative to the limitations of opposition and consensus in 
collaboration’s history.    
 
a closer analysis of collaborative and collective art practices can 
reveal a more complex model of social change and identity, one in 
which binary oppositions of divided vs. coherent subjectivity, desiring 
singularity vs. totalizing collective, liberating distanciation vs. 
stultifying interdependence, are challenged and complicated.  
(Kester 2001: 89)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
multiplicity, profusion, host, swarm, flock, herd, drove, 
flight,41 hive, brood, litter, nest, crowd … 
 
41 
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It is proposed that différance performs between either/or dichotomies and as such 
serves to generate a culture of deferment, continually postponing unity to encounter 
anomaly and difference. When différance is applied to collaborative dialogue it 
‘includes stuttering, ellipses, and inarticulate sounds’, digressions that are 
commonly considered extraneous in the cultural inclination toward homogeneity 
(Dosse 2001: 9).  
The proposition that a master narrative ‘is a multiple reduced to the unitary’ 
acknowledges the theory of dialogism as being implicit in all philosophies, their 
histories and future potentialities (Serres 1997: 108). Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism 
effects disruption in the monograph, suggesting the interplay of perspectives rather 
than their consensus. Bakhtinian dialogism may be perceived as the interaction of 
concepts that potentially proliferate to create an ‘open work’, thus performing 
resistance to the fixity of authorialism. An undialogised work may be considered to 
be authoritative and absolute thus, as Lomax suggests, all acts of determination are 
also acts of negation (negating difference). Bakhtinian dialogism suggests that an 
author cannot remove the marks of citationality or an inherent ‘interaction between 
meanings.’ (Bakhtin 1981: 426). The homogeneity and apparent indivisibility of Gilbert 
& George is no exception to the Bakhtinian rule. Gilbert & George retain the 
citational marks of the odd couple42 Morecambe and Wise, George’s Eric to 
Gilbert’s Ernie. Dialogism provides scope for the inclusion of peripheral matter, the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
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background noise that is traditionally excluded from an idealized model of 
communication or the search for autocratic meaning. 
 Dialogism and différance suggest that a ‘text must have retained a mark of 
what it lost or put in reserve, set aside.’ (Derrida 1968: 275). The ‘aside’ proffered by 
Derrida aligns this discourse with the notion of paralogism and the proposition that 
there is something to the side of the logos (the logos conceived as a major language) 
and thus proposes all phenomena as multiple. The inherent multiplicity in the term 
différance (meaning both to defer and to differ) serves as a metaphor for the existent 
multiplicity in all language systems.43  
 
In the end, it is a strategy without 
finality. (Derrida 1968: 259) 
  
 The parallel relation between the metaphysical third term and the third hand of 
modernist collaboration44 affirms a cultural propensity toward unity. In the context of 
a proposed disruption to autocratic meaning, the synthesized third of collaboration 
theory may be reconfigured as a non-oppositional multiplicity. The non-oppositional 
process of collaborative dialogue is proposed as a method to include noise,45 
babble, exception46 and anomaly, effectively generating difference through dialogic 
différance. The collective intention of collaborative practice suggests a resistance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
I wonder if illiterate people get the full effect of 
alphabet soup. (Jerry Seinfeld) 
 
44 
Well, here’s another nice mess you’ve gotten me into. 
(Laurel and Hardy) 
 
45 
My definition of an intellectual is someone who can 
listen to the William Tell Overture without thinking of 
the lone ranger. (Billy Connolly) 
 
46 
I never forget a face, but in your case I’d be glad to 
make an exception. (Groucho Marx) 
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to traditional notions of opposition and ‘implies shared aims and objectives, win-win, 
equality.’ (Fremantle 2012). The Derridean theory of différance and Bakhtinian theory 
of dialogism suggest that multiplicity is implicit in all systems; however, this 
inherent flux47 is arguably obscured by a cultural heritage that privileges the stasis of 
representation, metaphysical third terms and unified phenomena.  
 
Any power is a multiple reduced to the 
unitary. (Serres 1997: 108) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ‘Pataphysical Third 
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I am attempting to extricate myself from 
the hell of dualism. (Serres 1997: 131) 
  
In The Birth of Physics, Serres suggests that the logic of duality must be opened to 
plurality. It is within the metaphysical traditions of dualism and opposition that the 
possibility for digression may be generated. It is proposed that the term ‘versus’, 
commonly positioned between the opposing arguments of a dialectic48 (one versus 
other), may be reconsidered in the context of its Latin root ‘vertere’ meaning to turn. 
Turning is ‘an agitation that produces turbulence, which in its turning may, possibly, 
open up the chance for the creation of the new.’ (Lomax 2004: 29). In Serresean 
philosophy turbulence serves to disrupt and unsettle the reiteration of ordered 
phenomena, the normative and the standard.  
 
[R]eferences to the clinamen in recent theory deal with the entry of 
chance into an ordered universe and the subsequent breakup of order 
and chaos into a universe lodged between the probable and the 
exceptional. (Abbas 2005: 61) 
 
The clinamen is a concept taken from ancient atomic theory referring to the 
spontaneous deviation of an atom, a movement comparable with the digressive  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
 
 
Deleuze mockingly refers to the dialectic as a donkey, 
wearily carrying the weight of the world on its back as 
it laboriously works its way through history. 
 
(Hyatt, M., 2006, No-where and Now-here, ProQuest: 110) 
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character of Derridean différance. Différance rejects the concept of a reductive 
binary paradigm and yet operates within this logic of opposition to enact its 
oscillating multiplicity. As Derrida suggests, différance resists finitude and dislocates 
presence through a process of deferral. ‘The clinamen then may stand for différance, 
and for the moment of invention among the play of constraints [or rules]’ (Brannigan 
1999: 130). It may be suggested that the ‘constraints’ introduced by Brannigan refer to 
the conventions that govern a logocentric culture and thus the clinamen signifies that 
which generates ‘vagaries that diverge from what directs them, escaping the events 
of the system that controls them.’ (Bök 2001: 43). The clinamen proffers the potential 
to digress from a hegemonic order and a reconsideration of the supposed binary 
positions of noetic and poetic practices.  
 The clinamen is a scientific concept that metaphorically generates potential  
to resist the stasis of determinism49 (the oxymoronic phraseology of a ‘scientific 
metaphor’ is suggestive of an equivalence between metaphysical dichotomies 
wherein oppositional characters are situated within the same narrative field).  
 
If it were not for this swerve, everything would fall downwards like 
raindrops through the abyss of space. No collision would take place 
and no impact of atom upon atom would be created. Thus nature 
would never have created anything. (Lucretius 2007: 43) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
Gablehauser:  I need your official answer.  
Sheldon:   Well, it's not what he said.  
Gablehauser:  Then what is it?  
Sheldon:   I want a different question.  
Gablehauser:  You can't have a different question.  
Sheldon:   Formal Protest!  
Gablehauser:  Denied!  
Sheldon:   Informal Protest!  
Gablehauser:  Denied! I need your official answer.  
Sheldon:   No, I decline to provide one.  
Gablehauser:  Well, that's too bad, because the answer 
your teammate gave was correct.  
Sheldon:   That's your opinion. 
 
(The Big Bang Theory, The Bat Jar Conjecture, series 1, episode 13)
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Serresean philosophy offers a reimagining of the clinamen and adopts Lucretius’ 
poem De rerum natura (On the nature of things) as a ‘creative science of change and 
circumstance [which] interrupts the reign of the same’ (Serres 1982: 3-4). For Lucretius 
the swerve of the atom (clinamen) serves as a metaphor for multiplicity in language 
and arguably anticipates a contemporary understanding of non-linear dynamics and 
chaos theory. ‘Lucretius draws an analogy between atoms and words, arguing both 
substance and utterance result from a random complex of combinations and 
permutations.’ (Bök 2001: 44). The permutations implied in Lucretius’ text may be 
applied to the interposition of the letter ‘a’ in the word difference that enacts 
Derridean différance. Similar combinations and permutations may be observed in 
McCaffrey’s poetics where letters are replaced in a process50 that interrupts the 
expectation of textual linearity. ‘The unpredictable swerve of the letter from the 
laminar flow of syntax and grammar invalidates the notion of a fixed, inert 
meaning.’ (McCaffrey 2001: 21). 
The binary system that Derridean différance attempts to dismantle may be 
perceived as a system of constraints within which a turning may be performed.  This 
system of constraints ‘must not be rigid, there must be some play in it, it must, as 
they say, ‘creak’ a bit; it must not be completely coherent; there must be a clinamen’ 
(McCaffrey & Rasula 2001: 534). It is in this ‘creaking’ between order (the constraint) and 
chaos (the clinamen) that an exception to the oppositional rule may be situated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
Srrsn phlsphy ffrs  rmgnng f th clnmn nd dpts Lcrts’ pm D 
rrm ntr (n th ntr f thngs) s  ‘crtv scnc f chng nd 
crcmstnc [whch] ntrrpts th rgn f th sm’. (Srrs 1982: 3-4). 
Fr Lcrts th swrv f th tm (clnmn) srvs s  mtphr fr 
mltplcty n lngg nd rgbly ntcpts  cntmprry ndrstndng f nn-
lnr dynmcs nd chs thry. ‘Lcrts drws n nlgy btwn tms nd 
wrds, rgng bth sbstnc nd ttrnc rslt frm  rndm cmplx f 
cmbntns nd prmttns.’ (Bk 2001: 44). Th prmttns mpld n 
Lcrts’ txt my b ppld t th ntrpstn f th lttr ‘’ n th wrd 
dffrnc tht ncts Drrdn dffrnc. Smlr cmbntns nd prmttns my 
b bsrvd n McCffry’s ptcs whr lttrs r rplcd n  prcss tht 
intrrpts th xpcttn f txtl lnrty. ‘Th nprdctbl swrv f th 
lttr frm th lmnr flw f syntx nd grmmr nvldts th ntn f  
fxd, nrt mnng.’ (McCffry 2001: 21). 
Th bnry systm tht Drrdn dffrnc ttmpts t dsmntl my b 
prcvd s  systm f cnstrnts wthn whch  trnng my b prfrmd.  
Ths systm f cnstrnts ‘mst nt b rgd, thr mst b sm ply n t, 
t mst, s thy sy, ‘crk’  bt; t mst nt b cmpltly chrnt; thr 
mst b  clnmn’ (McCffry & Rsl 2001: 534). t s n ths ‘crkng’ 
btwn rdr (th cnstrnt) nd chs (th clnmn) tht n xcptn t th 
ppstnl rl my b sttd.  
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In the context of writing, a clinamen indicates digression from monologism to 
deviation and anomaly.  
 
A small deviation (a swerve) that can operate as the germ of 
something new, a deviation that creates schizzes in an existing regime 
whilst opening up a gap where possibility can enter. (These glitches, 
or points of indeterminacy open up the possibility of a multiplicity of 
pathways, and thus a multiplicity of possible worlds). (O’Sullivan 2006: 
154) 
 
matthews and allen’s footnotes attempt to perform a series of ‘schizzes’ within the 
existent regime of academic writing. The ‘glitch’ that O’Sullivan refers to may be 
conceptualized as an act of turning away from a noetic ideology and thus serves as a 
method51 to generate anomaly and difference. ‘To affirm an elsewhere we have to 
turn from that which is already here.’ (O’Sullivan 2009: 251). Both the glitch and 
clinamen resist the fixity of representation and operate as indeterminate phenomena 
deviating from the fate of contrivance. Lucretius refers to atoms as the ‘seeds of 
things’, particles that are perpetually moving and colliding. For Lucretius, the logic 
of the clinamen is located in the constant motion of the atom where the anticipated 
trajectory of particles deviates to generate anomalous collisions. ‘Such assemblages  
 
 
51 
 
i    e  o  e   o    i i  , a   i   e  i  i a e   i  e  io    
o   o o o i  ,  e ia io , a   a o a  .  
 
A   a    e ia io  (a   e  e)   a   a  o e a e a    
e  e   o   o e  i    e , a  e ia io    a    ea 
es    i  e  i  a  e i  i    e i e   i    o e i   
u  a  a    e e  o  i i i    a  e  e . (  e e   
i   e , o   oi    o  i  e e  i a   o e  u    e  
o  i i i   o  a  u  i  i i   o   a   a  , a     
u  a  u  i  i i   o   o  i  e  o    ). (O’ u  i 
a  2006: 154) 
 
 a   e   a   a  e ’   oo  o e  a  e     o  e  o   a  e ie  
o  ‘   i  e ’  i  i    e e i  e    e i e o  a a e i    i 
i  .   e ‘  i   ’   a  O’ u  i a   e e    o  a   e  o  e  
ua i e  a  a  a   o   u  i   a a    o  a  oe i  i eo o   
a     u   e  e  a  a  e  o   o  e e a e a o a   a    i  e 
e  e. ‘ o a  i   a  e  e  e e  e  a e  o  u     o    a    
i   i  a  ea    e e.’ (O’ u  i a  2009: 251).  o     e   i    
a     i a e   e i     e  i i   o   e  e e  a io  a   o e 
a e a  i  e e  i a e   e o e a  e ia i     o    e  a e o   
o   i a  e.  u  e iu   e e    o a o   a    e ‘ ee   o    
i   ’,  a  i  e    a  a e  e  e ua     o i   a    o  i i  
.  o   u  e iu ,   e  o i  o    e   i a e  i   o a e  i    
e  o   a    o io  o    e a o    e e   e a  i i a e    a e  
o   o   a  i  e   e ia e   o  e e a e a o a ou   o  i io  
. ‘ u   a  e   a e   
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empower the clinamen to install puns, acrostics, anagrams, metagrams, paragrams, 
and textual parapraxes’ (McCaffrey 2001: 21). The movement of the clinamen is 
proposed as a resistance to determinism and as an advocation of the exception to the 
noetic rule. In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze proposes the clinamen as an ‘irreducible 
plurality’ and thus characteristic of the impossibility for unitary and subsequently 
closed systems to be maintained. (Deleuze 2004[b]: 269). The clinamen creates 
turbulence in a striated system and enables particles to form temporary alliances 
(alliances akin to those formed between the noetic text and the poetic footnote). The 
clinamen, conceived as ‘the tiniest possible angle of contingence that initiates a 
turbulence within the laminar flow - needs no other referent than the intrinsic one of 
the flow.’ (Lomax 2004: 29). A striated system suggests linearity, a system in which 
Lucretius’ atomic flow may remain laminar; however, Deleuze and Guattari propose 
smooth space as a means to ‘disrupt the striations of conventional space’ (Parr 2010: 
257). In many of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical texts the virtual is aligned with 
‘smooth spaces’52 wherein that which is smooth suggests the mathematical idea of a 
structure with infinite derivatives. The concept of smooth and striated space should 
not be perceived as that which adheres to an oppositional logic but rather as a 
relation where striated space emits smooth spaces. In The Birth of Physics, Serres 
proposes the clinamen as an element of smooth space, a space where a generative 
turning is enacted. 
 
 
 
52 
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The turbulence generated by the clinamen effectively performs a resistance to 
the binarism of cause and effect and thus enters into a philosophy of causa sui, the 
cause in itself. ‘The clinamen, the ‘swerve’ and the turning […are] not a deviation 
from the straightforward path of order, [but] rather a path which invents itself’ 
(Lomax 2000: 201). The concept of ‘a path which invents itself’ finds an association 
with autopoiesis53 and, as Serres suggests, a system that is both productive and 
destructive, ordered and chaotic. Autopoiesis, taken from the Greek meaning ‘self’ 
and ‘creation’, implies that difference may be generated in itself. The notion of 
difference, in its traditional conception, may return this discourse to a binary order, 
presupposing difference as the variance between two conditions. Difference has 
traditionally been understood as difference from a dominant ideology; however, 
through the concept of ‘difference in itself’ Deleuze suggests that this oppositional 
logic may be disrupted from within the system: a ‘difference in itself’. 
 Deleuze proposes that each repetition (repetition conceived as the reiteration 
of cultural norms) generates difference. ‘The marking of the same territory takes 
place against the background of a variation in intensities between one parade and 
another.’ (Williams 2003: 12). Deleuze proposes that each repetition is not a repetition 
of the same but a variation understood as difference. Deleuze refers to Nietzsche’s 
Eternal Return and denies repetition as a cyclical system that repeats mimetically,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
An alphabet is a finite set A of letters, and a finite 
sequence of letters is a word in A; if A := {a; b; c; o; 
t}, then words include act, boat, and obbbt, for example. 
The vertex set W of the associated word graph Γ(A) 
consists of all possible words in A. Words w1 and w2 are 
joined by an edge if and only if they differ by one of 
1. inserting or deleting a letter 
2. swapping two adjacent letters 
3. replacing one letter with another. 
Then the 'word metric' dw on W is the edge metric on the 
associated word graph. 
Thus dw(act,boat) = 3 and dw(act,obbbt) = 4, via paths 
such as act, bact, baot, boat and act, abt, bbt, bbbt, 
obbbt respectively. 
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here’s one I  
made 
earlier	one; a single thing or person or example	
repositioning our thinking of repetition as produced by means of difference. For 
Nietzsche, the Eternal Return is the production of diversity and the repetition of 
difference. The Eternal Return, for Deleuze and Nietzsche, must be considered as 
that which is opposed to stasis and thus the Eternal Return itself belongs to 
difference. It is not being (stasis) that returns but the act of returning that affirms a 
process of becoming (flux). The Eternal Return54 resists the cyclical philosophies 
that replicate static being and alternatively affirms a culture of difference in itself, 
causa sui. A principle of return positions the reiterative and citational methodologies 
existent in both text and paratext as proceeding within ‘a variation in intensities’ and 
proffers this text as that which ‘invents itself’. 
 
Being taking a turn and producing 
difference in itself.  (Lomax 2000: 210) 
 
‘What is the logic of this process by which order becomes chaos and chaos 
becomes order?’ (Abbas 2005: 57). The interplay between order and chaos and the 
implementation of the clinamen as metaphor leads this discourse toward the 
principles of chaos theory. According to a deterministic model of science, every 
event is the result of a preceding event without deviation from predetermined rules. 
Determinism functions on the principle of cause and effect (a binary order) and as  
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such requires the study of what are termed ‘initial conditions’ (initial conditions refer 
to a set of preliminary values belonging to or imposed upon the system). Traditional 
scientific principles, including Newton's laws, are deterministic because they suggest 
that given the same initial conditions an identical effect will be produced. Scientific 
determinism is principally opposed to the notion of ‘difference in itself’ where 
repetition is the agent of difference. Contemporary scientific research, however, 
acknowledges that measurement is not infinitely accurate and therefore concedes that 
uncertainty is implicit. The scientific ambition to eradicate the minimal inaccuracies 
that lead to instability has been countered by speculation that the presence of chaos 
within the deterministic principles of physics (in an infinitesimally small quantity) 
may paradoxically generate ordered structures. Serresean philosophy acknowledges 
the concept of chaos within Lucretius’ text and imagines an ‘ordered chaos’.55 The 
concept of ordered chaos denotes a condition wherein disorder emerges from 
apparent order. ‘Laminar flow, the figure of chaos, is at first sight a model of order 
[…] Turbulence seems to introduce a disorder into this arrangement […] Disorder 
emerges from order’ (the academic text is a model of order wherein a clinametic 
movement between text to paratext effects disorder) (Serres 2001: 27). 
The concept of ‘difference in itself’, the emergence of disorder from order, is 
comparable to the metaphoric turning of meaning from a fatalistic state of inertia to 
the performance of an exception to the metaphysical rule, thus escaping the binarism  
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strangely familiar 
act naturally 
silently pronounced 
countless numbers 
terribly pleased 
thinking aloud 
live recording 
modern tradition 
drawing a blank 
constant change 
slight exaggeration  
pure evil 
unfunny joke 
 
 
	 72 
of cause and effect. If the clinamen is conceived as a movement without cause or 
origin then it must be positioned philosophically, beyond a homogenized and 
determinable order. ‘We call this dark precursor, this difference in itself or difference 
in the second degree which relates to heterogeneous systems and even completely 
disparate things, the disparate.’ (Deleuze 2004[a]: 147). The dark precursor, or somber 
precursor, is introduced in the Deleuzian text Difference and Repetition as an 
imperceptible force that resists categorization. Deleuze suggests that every system or 
series contains dark precursors, agents that perform and in doing so interrupt the 
continuity of the existing system. The dark precursor may be aligned with those 
small inconsistencies, imperceptible differences, which create a turning from laminar 
flow to the production of anomaly and exception. Deleuze refers to the dark 
precursor as the differentiator, an operative third force that creates a relation between 
heterogeneous series, between text and paratext. The dark precursor generates a 
rupture in supposedly stable systems and creates a relation between supposedly 
disparate potentialities. ‘[E]very system contains its dark precursor which ensures 
communication of peripheral series’ and when two potentials enter into 
communication a reaction or event emerges (Deleuze 2004[a]: 145-6). The Deleuzian 
mark of a zigzag (Z),56 or lightening bolt, is that which illuminates after the 
imperceptible dark precursor (matthews and allen’s paratextual practice is a 
Deleuzian zigzag, a lightening bolt that materializes in the wake of the dark  
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zanyism  buffoonery 
zazzy  flashy 
zeroable able to be omitted from a sentence 
without any loss of meaning  
zetetic proceeding by inquiry; a search or 
investigation  
zeugma use of a word to modify two or more 
words in different ways 
zoism doctrine that life originates from a 
single vital principle 
zonary   of or like a zone; arranged in zones 
zonelet   a little zone 
zonoid   like a zone 
zonule   small zone 
zwischenzug  chess move made to play for time 
zwitterion  ion carrying both a positive and 
negative charge 
zygodactylic  having two toes in front and two 
behind 
zygology  science of joining and fastening 
zygon  connecting bar 
zygopleural bilaterally symmetrical 
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precursor, the imperceptible background noise). ‘Something ‘passes’ between the 
borders, events explode, phenomena flash, like thunder and lightening’. (Deleuze 
2004[a]: 144). The dark precursor performs a transgression of traditional borders, 
borders between noetic and poetic positions, and thus interrupts the establishment of 
a linear trajectory. Exceptions and anomalies generated by the dark precursor 
effectively connect ‘conscious acts and representations to determination by an 
unconscious, shifting, and insecure ground.’ (Smith & Sommers-Hall 2012: 42). The 
imperceptible character of the dark57 precursor resists determination and as such 
emerges as an aleatoric practice, nonsense, unthought. ‘It is the ultimate and self-
determining source of determination, behind which there is nothing at all’ (Hallward 
2006: 27).  
The movement of the dark precursor serves to unsettle the equilibrium of 
ordered systems and yet this imperceptible force has the capacity to generate 
phenomena that may subsequently create other ordered systems, thus this dark 
precursor is commonly characterized as a paradox. The notion of paradox appears 
significant in a discourse where order and chaos perform simultaneously; doxa 
referring to the dominant ideology (order) and paradoxa placed in opposition (chaos). 
The paradox is situated ‘to the side’ of the doxa and always makes reference to it. In 
an attempt to question the relation between doxa and paradoxa Barthes formulated a 
third term, the Neutral (±). ‘I define the Neutral as that which outplays the paradigm,  
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the darkest hour is just before the dawn 
before you can say Jack Robinson 
all work and no play makes Jack a dull boy 
play both ends against the middle 
in the middle of nowhere 
appear out of nowhere 
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or rather I call Neutral everything that baffles paradigm.’ (Barthes 2008: 6). The 
Neutral is that which unsettles and baffles the paradigmatic binary and thus offers the 
possibility for a reconfiguration of the traditional third position of dialectical 
consensus. The Neutral adopts the character of plus-minus (±), a ‘pataphysical 
symbol, as a means ‘to equate things to each other in a system that values the norm58 
of difference’ (Bök 2001: 11). (matthews and allen adopt the concept of a plus-minus 
relation (±) wherein a philosophical discourse and an idiomatic colloquialism may 
equate to each other).  
 
By chance collisions and quaint 
accident (Wordsworth 1995: 71) 
 
Deleuze refers to the dark precursor as that which is invisible and 
imperceptible, suggesting that any attempt to determine the dark precursor’s origin 
will result in an approximation from which the initial conditions are indeterminable. 
If we accept that the dark precursor is an element without origin then it may be 
possible to escape the limitations of a cause and effect paradigm. (matthews and 
allen do not attempt to determine their dark precursors but rather invite these agents 
of disorder into their collaborative system).  
The elusive dark precursor finds a parallel with Lewis Carroll’s Snark, a  
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name that finds no clarification in our language. The Snark is resistant to a traditional 
configuration of identity and, like the dark precursor, is a disembodied force. The 
interplay between sense and nonsense in Carroll’s writing posits language as an 
inventive and fluid process. In The Hunting of the Snark Carroll introduces a map (an 
object traditionally associated with the determination of territories) that contains 
nothing, a ‘perfect and absolute blank!’ Carroll’s map is a blank domino, a joker,59 
the Snark, having no character of its own it is a potentiality. (Carroll 2009: 56).  
 
These are the procedures of the dark precursor, the elements of 
chance and necessity and the transversal movements that induce 
resonances in collateral objects and infuse new forms into the lifeless 
matter of the virtual. (Sheerin 2009: 101)  
 
The concept of the clinamen is of significance in Alfred Jarry's 'pataphysics, a 
science of exceptions which attempts to challenge notions of universality. 
‘Pataphysics is described as the science of imaginary solutions and proposes a 
culture of equivalence through the collapse of the traditional dichotomy between 
science and poetry. This dichotomy arguably persists in a culture where the 
‘scientific and the novelistic are opposed to and repel one another’ (Abbas 2005: 10). 
(The proposed equivalence between text and paratext in this research may therefore  
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Falstaff: How now, how 
now, mad wag! what, in 
thy quips and thy 
quiddities?  
(Shakespeare Henry IV, Act I 
Scene i)  
 
Fool:  Thou hast pared 
thy wit o' both sides 
and left nothing i' 
th' middle.   
(Shakespeare, King Lear, Act 
I, scene iv) 
 
Clown: It is like a 
barber's chair that 
fits all buttocks, the 
pin-buttock, the 
quatch-buttock, the 
brawn buttock, or any 
buttock. 
(Shakespeare, All's Well That 
Ends Well, Act II, scene ii) 
 
Bottom:  No more 
words: away! go, away!  
(Shakespeare, Midsummer 
Nights Dream, Act IV, scene 
ii) 
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be characterized as ‘Jarry-esque’). 
The implementation of the clinamen (a scientific concept) as a metaphor (a 
poetic device) for 'pataphysical thought effectively generates a culture of equivalence 
between noetic and poetic disciplines. ‘The ‘pataphysician does not counteract 
science so much as exaggerate science, adopting it parodically and applying it 
excessively, in order to destroy it ultimately by exhausting its imaginary potential.’ 
(Bök 2001: 102). (matthews and allen parodically adopt the academic footnote 
‘exhausting its imaginary potential’). 'Pataphysics is frequently described as a 
pseudophilosophy or an antiphilosophy, observing that which lies beyond 
metaphysics: ‘Put metaphysics behind pataphysics and you merely make it into a 
façade for a belief. But the essence of pat.60 is that it is a façade for a façade, with 
nothing behind it.’ (Torma 2003: 58). A façade suggests that what is actual is only one 
perspective and thus situates the supposed continuity of actuality as illusory. 
Deconstructionists frequently refer to the Nietzschean assertion that determinate 
truths do not exist, thus proffering the concept of perspectival interpretation. 
Nietzschean perspectivism is resistant to the concept of objective reality and 
alternatively suggests that all ideations take place from particular perspectives, 
inferring that there can be no universal truth only a myriad of potentialities. The 
philosophies of Jarry and Nietzsche reject the notion of a panoptic view and  
any subsequent claims to universality. Perspectivism serves to undermine a  
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methodological orthodoxy and the assertion that a complete understanding may be 
attained through multiple perspectives (an assertion which, for the ‘pataphysician, is 
the affirmation of paradigmatic unity). ‘The truth of the ludic abides by no belief; 
instead, such truth is entertained as one of many hypothetical61 alternatives. It is 
merely a “potentiality”.’ (Bök 2001: 73).  
Jean Luc Nancy, in his text The Inoperative Community, proposes a mythic 
community that performs by means of universality, commonality, the normative, and 
the standard. Nancy attempts to subsume multiplicity into a unity founded upon 
consensus and conciliation. ‘Perhaps the problem is […] that there is too much 
forced commonality and prescribed collaboration today in the sense of social 
unanimity and political consensus’ (Billing 2007: 19). ‘Pataphysics attempts to 
introduce uncertainty into a systematic ideology that privileges consensus.  
 
Jarry offers a poetic theory of contradictory undecidability, 
continually inverting a dyadic hierarchy, while momentarily 
subverting its mutual exclusion – neither cancelling nor surpassing 
the dialectic: not Aufhebung, but Steigerung. (Bök 2001: 33) 
 
Aufhebung is a German word meaning both contradiction and synthesis, thus 
reminiscent of the dialectic; however, Jarry proposes Steigerung, meaning to  
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What if there were no hypothetical situations? 
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increase, thus implying multiplicity. ‘Pataphysics is an imaginary science; there is no 
such authority as ‘pataphysics. The science of ‘pataphysics offers an alternative to 
the closed system of logocentrism by ‘making reality itself nothing more than a 
figment of our imagination.’ (Bök 2001: 126). In Pataphysics and the Revelation of 
Laughter, Daumal suggests that anything may be elevated to the category of God if 
we ‘adopt the attitude of the gentlemen62 who doesn’t laugh’. Under these 
circumstances everything and anything may assume the position of God: ‘And there 
it is: absurd and absolute multiplicity.’ (Daumal 2012: 12). 
 
the swerve of an exception must 
intervene (Bök 2001: 70) 
 
The ‘pataphysical exception, the exception to a logocentric rule, may find an 
associative relation with the concept of singularity in Deleuzian philosophy. In the 
Deleuzian lexicon the term ‘singularity’ has become integrally linked to a discourse 
on difference and exception. For Deleuze, singularity is a universal condition; the 
universal in this context does not refer to a common element but is an 
acknowledgment of the universality of continuous change. From a Deleuzian 
perspective, matter is in a constant state of flux; however, when some alteration or 
anomaly occurs it is, paradoxically, described as an exceptional or unique  
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phenomenon. The singular is the point at which something differs and defers from 
that which is commonplace. ‘There is no other to singularity’ and therefore no 
governing power to which the exception must refer (Lomax 2000: 178). ‘Surprise 
breaks the promise of the expected: it is the exception that disturbs the suspense of 
what we know must happen next’ (Bök 2001: 11). (The anticipated trajectory of this 
academic text is arguably ‘broken’ by a series of paratextual63 interruptions). 
   
I know now that in the beginning 
Chaos was lit by an immense burst of 
laughter. In the beginning, Faustroll 
laughed the world. (Daumal 2012: 12) 
 
The complexity of ‘pataphysical thought lies in its resistance to classification 
and categorization; to attain an understanding of ‘pataphysics is to misunderstand 
this science of exceptions. ‘Pataphysics proffers an anti-systematic philosophy of 
exceptions. The Exploits of Dr. Faustroll is the imagining of an alternative ‘reality’, 
a world that may replace this world. Jarry suggests that ‘reality’ is never as it is but 
always as if it is, in that ‘reality’ only exists as one possibility. ‘Pataphysics ‘narrates 
not what is, but what might have become.’ (Bök 2001: 8). A ‘pataphysical emphasis on 
potential rather than actual phenomena generates a culture of equivalence between  
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This we, those verses, Susan’s tears, these notes at the 
feet of certain pages. All shall be made clear, in time. 
 
(Barth, J., 1982, Sabbatical, New York: Putnam) 
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traditionally opposed forces. ‘[‘Pataphysics] proceeds to become the plus-minus, 
embodying the idea of opposites as equivalent.’ (Hugill 2012: 11). In Lewis Carroll’s 
Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There, ‘pataphysical equivalence 
is established through the equality of cabbages and kings, sense and nonsense. The 
plus-minus (±) of ‘pataphysical equivalence represents that which is and is not 
simultaneously. The concept of a plus-minus (±) finds an association with Derridean 
undecidability where no hierarchy or privilege is established. It is in a ‘pataphysical 
turning from empirical science to aleatoric poetry that we encounter the particular, 
Deleuzian singularity, the exception65 to the rule. The ‘pataphysical clinamen ‘is the 
knowledge of the particular and the irreducible, therefore the reverse of physics.’ 
(Daumal 2012: 7).  
What is the function of a clinamen in a ‘pataphysical ‘(il)logic’? The 
movement of the clinamen is not an external force but a coextensive potential 
affirming the impossibility of determined phenomena. The ‘clinamen finds a way to 
detour around things in a system that values the fate of contrivance.’ (Bök 2001: 11). 
The clinamen creates turbulence within the system, performing in an intermediary 
position between order and chaos. The fluctuation generated by this clinametic 
swerve operates ‘as the germ of something new.’ (O’Sullivan 2006: 154). The clinamen 
‘is able to slide through that dimension of reasoning which everyday logic 
reductively conceives of as a single immobile point.’ (Daumal 2012: 8). The clinamen is 
a temporal agent of multiplicity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 I before E except after C  
Pride goes before a fall The bigger 
they are the harder they fall We’re 
number two, we try harder You never know what 
you can do till you try Never say never Don’t make me say it 
again! Make do and mend If you don’t make mistakes you don’t make 
anything Two heads are better than one Something is better than 
nothing And now for something completely different How now brown cow?
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noise66  
noise 
background noise 
background noise 
background noise 
background noise 
background noise 
 
You tell me that a fluctuation is a tiny jot of chaos, indeed, a tiny jolt. 
And then you say that the jolt is an element of motely multiplicity. You 
say that it is a jot of noise. (Lomax 2004: 29)  
 
The concept of background noise is proposed by Serres as a clinamen, an 
element of fluctuation and turbulence. In French the word for noise has multiple 
meanings inferring both a battle and auditory noise. Serres conceives communication 
as a game played between two interlocutors united in battle against the background 
noise that threatens to disrupt their dialogue. They are ‘united against the phenomena 
of interference and confusion, or against individuals with some stake in interrupting 
communication. These interlocutors […] battle together against noise.’ (Serres 1982: 
xxvi). In Serresean philosophy noise serves as a disruptive element, a ‘third man’, a  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
  Audial noise 
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clinamen in communication. If, in a traditional model for communication, a message 
is to be passed between interlocutors then there must be no interference; the 
interlocutors must engage in a mutual battle against the background noise, thus 
resisting collaboration with the ‘enemy’. 
 
No matter what their argument, the interlocutors are in no way 
opposed (as in the traditional concept of the dialectic); on the 
contrary, they play on the same side and together battle against a 
mutual enemy. And what is the enemy? The noise of the world that 
hums in the background and perpetually threatens to hum between 
them. (Lomax 2004: 13)  
 
Traditionally, the dialectical game is understood as two interlocutors in battle, thus 
establishing an oppositional logic;67 however, in Serresean philosophy this dialectical 
battle is reconfigured as two interlocutors united against a common enemy, a third 
man, an unwelcome guest, a clinamen. Serres proposes that ‘to hold a dialogue, is to 
suppose a third man and seek to exclude him.’ (Serres 1982: 67). A Serresean dialogue 
requires two interlocutors and a method of communication from one to the other, 
thus a message moves through a middle. The space between interlocutors has the 
potential to effect communication and as such transform homogenous meaning. The  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
logical reasoning, 
ratiocination, 
dialectics, induction, 
generalisation. 
Argumentation, 
discussion, 
pourparler, 
controversy, polemics, 
debate, wrangling, 
logomachy, 
disputation, 
disceptation.(Phrases)
A paper war; a war of 
words; a full-dress 
debate.(Roget, P., 1912, 
Thesaurus of English Words 
and Phrases)  
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effective capacity of background noise upon which a dialogue is held is proposed as 
a space of potentiality wherein the message is exposed to multiplicity.  
 This research situates collaborative dialogue as a non-oppositional practice 
that, in its resistance to the ‘noise’ of dialectical tradition, has the potential to include 
the Serresean third man. Collaborative dialogue may be understood as that which 
quietens the clamour of opposition associated with dialecticism and binarism. The 
fluctuating background noise of the Serresean third man generates a jolt of chaos that 
schizzes and turns to disrupt the laminar flow. Serres proposes background noise (the 
excluded third man of dialogue) as a force that is within all matter. This continual 
presence of background noise suggests the possibility for exception and anomaly to 
be generated within what may be perceived to be stable and logocentric systems. In 
Serres’ Genesis we are encouraged to think outside of the metaphysical categories of 
unity and order. Serres suggests that multiplicity, although not necessarily reasoned 
or ordered, may be heard beneath the logocentric proclamations of rationality 
imposed by history and tradition.  
 
If noise is introduced, then the received message contains certain 
distortions, certain errors, certain extraneous material, that would 
certainly lead one to say that the received message exhibits, because 
of the effects of the noise, an increased uncertainty. (Hainge 2013: 205) 
 
67 cont. 
 
generalisation a 
general notion or 
proposition obtained 
by inference from 
particular cases. 
(Pearsall J., Trumble, B., 
1995, The Oxford English 
Reference Dictionary) 
proposition It is 
undesirable to believe 
a proposition when 
there is no ground 
whatever for supposing 
it is true. (1941, The 
Oxford Dictionary of 
Quotations) 
undesirable a noun 
from the adjective 
indicating a person or 
thing that is 
unwanted. An 
undesirable is usually 
a foul creature that 
is detested by 
society. 
(www.urbandictionary.com ) 
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Serres imagines background noise as a disruptive clinamen, a noisy potential. For 
Serres, homogenous systems are merely pockets of ordered relations resting upon a 
cacophony of noise. ‘Order is a rare island; it is an archipelago. Disorder is the 
common ocean from which these islands emerge.’ (Serres 2005: 13). Noise is 
commonly perceived as an unwelcome guest in an ideological system of dialogic 
exchange; however, for Serres, noise is aligned with multiplicity and potentiality. 
The parasitic third man of a dialogue is elevated from the role of irritant to a force 
from which a digressive and generative multiplicity may emerge. 
In conventional academic writing a traditional binary relation may be said to 
exist between the author and the reader; however, when a digressive or parasitic 
force enters that system (matthews and allen’s footnotes) this closed field of 
communication may be said to escape linearity.  matthews and allen’s footnotes 
attempt to articulate the possibility for meaning to bifurcate. These footnotes are 
indicative of the metaphorical noise situated in the background of all phenomena. 
matthews and allen’s footnotes compel the reader of this text to perform a clinametic 
movement between text and paratext, disrupting the striations of conventional 
academic space. The relation between the noetic academic text and poetic paratext 
suggests a ‘pataphysical plus-minus (±), the equivalence of cabbages and kings. 
   
The resulting structure is a complex fabric, without center, hierarchy,  
 
 
 
67 cont. 
 
person a category 
found in many 
languages that is used 
to distinguish between 
the speaker of an 
utterance and those to 
or about whom he or 
she is speaking.(2010, 
Random House Dictionary, 
Random House, Inc.) 
 
utterance great 
opportunity for a 
hidden double meaning 
here. Utterance of 
course means 'saying,' 
or 'something said,' 
but an archaic use of 
the term means 'the 
bitter end,' i.e., as 
in 'fight to the 
utterance.'(Bowler, P., 
2009, The Completely 
Superior person's Book of  
Words) 
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or single organizing principle. The composite field is instead one of 
multiple elements, cohesive at one layer but disjunct in relation to 
others’ (Abbas 2005: 6). 
background noise 
background noise 
background noise 
background noise 
background noise 
noise 
noise 
 
 
 
 
67 cont. 
 
double double - talk - 
talk that is 
calculated to mislead. 
(Gulland, D., 1986 The 
Penguin Dictionary of 
English Idioms) 
 
mislead to reason ill, 
falsely, to pervert, 
quibble, equivocate, 
mystify, evade, elude, 
gloss over, varnish, 
misjudge, 
miscalculate. (Roget, 
P., 1912, Thesaurus of 
English Words and 
Phrases)  
 
reason without rhyme 
or reason without 
sense, reason or a 
logical system. 
(Kirkpatrick, E., Schwarz, 
C., 1993, The Wordsworth 
Dictionary of Idioms) 
 
system I must Create a 
System, or be enslav’d 
by another Man’s;  
I will not Reason and 
Compare: my business 
is to Create. (Blake, 
W., Jerusalem, IN, 1953, 
The Oxford Dictionary of 
Quotations)  
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The Parasitic Third 
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The parasite intervenes, enters the 
system as an element of fluctuation. 
(Serres 2007: 191) 
  
 The parasite is proposed as an agent of disruption within a system arguably 
constrained by an oppositional logic. Serres proposes the oppositional dialogue 
synonymous with traditional dialectics (A-B) as effectively performing a reciprocal 
gesture. The interlocutors engaged in dialectical battle68 share a common objective, 
to exclude the unwelcome guest that threatens to disrupt their communication. This 
common objective paradoxically positions the dialectic as monologic (A-A), thus 
establishing consensual stasis. The parasite is an unwelcome guest in communication 
serving to interrupt this monologic encounter.  
 The parasite is a background noise that fluctuates to generate anomaly and 
exception in dialogue. This parasitic noise is ‘loud or unpleasant or undesired’, a 
‘confused sound of voices and movements, irregular fluctuations accompanying a 
transmitted signal but not relevant to it.’ (Pearsall & Trumble 1995). ‘Like the noise of 
the crowd that thunders and rumbles, at times breaks up and at times gets bigger.’ 
(Serres 1997: 57). This thundering, rumbling noise (the parasite) is commonly regarded 
as an obstacle or irritant in an idealized communication system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 
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Rhiannon Slade (Symposium Curator): Can you hear me now? 
Harrison & Harrison: No one is saying anything 
WochenKlausur: There’s just noise from the mic. 
Harrison & Harrison: Still mostly noise 
Skype Message: The connection69 speed between you is unknown 
 
During the In-Dialogue Symposium, Nottingham 2012, a panel comprising of 
curator Rhiannon Slade, artist John Newley and the collaborative doubles 
WochenKlauser and Harrison & Harrison attempted to enact a traditional academic 
presentation. Slade and Newley were physically in attendance whereas 
WochenKlauser and Harrison & Harrison attended the symposium virtually via 
Skype. The two collaborative doubles participating in the symposium via Skype 
could hear each other but not the speakers and curators at the symposium site. As a 
consequence of this digital malfunction WochenKlauser and Harrison & Harrison 
began conversing with each other, the resultant conversation appearing on a large 
screen in front of the symposium delegates. This interaction took place in the 
background of Newly’s presentation. The expectation of a monologic presentation 
was disrupted by breaks in connection, intermittent signals and static in the 
communication system. The interaction between WochenKlauser, Harrison & 
Harrison and the malfunctioning digital phenomena effectively became the parasitic 
background noise of the symposium.  
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What was once an obstacle to all 
messages is reversed and added 
to the information. (Serres 1982: 78) 
  
 The parasite is commonly identified as an unwelcome guest, an irritant; 
however, within Serresean philosophy the parasite is repositioned as an agent of 
fluctuation generating an adaptive response in the system to which it is annexed. 
 
As though ‘supplanting’ were a simple operation, the object of a 
simple cognition! As though ‘to add’ something like a ‘parasite’ 
constituted a simple addition!70 As though an addition were ever 
simple! As though that to which a parasite is ‘added’ could possibly 
remain as it is, unaltered! As though an addition or reception did not 
alter! (Derrida 1988: 103) 
 
In aligning the parasite with the disruptive character of matthews and allen’s 
footnotes it may be possible to reconsider the parasite as a generative force creating 
excitation in its host system (the academic text). ‘If some equilibrium exists or ever 
existed somewhere, somehow, the introduction of a parasite in the system 
immediately provokes a difference’ (Serres 1997: 182). The difference generated by the 
presence of a parasite disrupts the stasis of the system. 
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The old idiot71 wanted indubitable truths at which he 
could arrive by himself: in the meantime he would doubt 
everything, even that 3 + 2 = 5.  
 
(Deleuze, G., Guattari, F., 1994, What is Philosophy?, Verso Books: 
62) 
 
71 
 
[…] it is a tale 
Told by an idiot, full of sound  
Signifying nothing. 
 
(Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act V, scene v) 
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Resistance to parasitical energy suggests a cultural preoccupation with unity 
and order, the desire for a ‘single God and identifiable individuals.’ (Serres 1997: 3). 
When a system settles into a perpetual state of stability it effectively becomes closed; 
however, when a parasite enters that system its trajectory is interrupted and 
subsequently an adaptive response is generated. This ‘[change] comes from a rupture 
in equilibrated exchanges’ (Serres 1997: 182). Serres proposes the parasite as static in 
the system, a crackling radio signal, an intermittent communication, or a fluctuation. 
In French the word parasite has multiple meanings, referring to a disruptive noise, an 
unwelcome guest, and a life form that lives off another. When a system is host72 to a 
parasite that system must either adapt to its presence or actively expel the 
‘unwelcome guest’. ‘Parasitology, as we shall soon realize, uses the vocabulary of 
the host: hostility or hospitality.’ (Serres 1997: 193).  The supposed dichotomy between 
the terms ‘hostility’ and ‘hospitality’ are aligned in the undecidable character of the 
parasite; however, Serres continues to assign the character of the parasite the label of 
‘devil’ and ‘evil’, arguably perpetuating its negative connotations. 
The parasite will always generate disruption in the ideological unity of an 
ordered system, whether it is considered a welcome or unwelcome guest. The 
ideological unity of the artist Gilbert & George actively seeks to expel the presence 
of parasitic elements. The collaborative double intentionally adopt a principle of  
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Hosting houseguests involves a little more effort than 
just pulling out the foldout couch. To help make visits 
more pleasant for everyone involved (including you!) we 
asked Lizzie Post —great–great-granddaughter of etiquette 
arbiter Emily Post, author of How Do You Work This Life 
Thing?, what she does to keep guests happy during an 
extended stay. A word of warning: If you play by her 
rules, be prepared to welcome visitors back for years to 
come. 
 
1. Set a specific start and end date for the visit. 
2. Be a prepared hostess. 
3. Don’t make friends feel like intruders. 
4. Make your home visitor-friendly. 
5. Be clear about the house rules. 
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‘friendlessness’ in order to create a closed and unified equilibrium. In a conversation 
with Trisha Andres, Gilbert & George respond to the question what do you think of 
artists of today? 
 
George: We are very supportive of young artists. We think every 
country needs more artists 
Gilbert: But we are not very, … gallery going. We have never been 
because we don't want to be, … we don't want to be … 
George: Contaminated 
 
George suggests that a ‘contaminant’ would create interference in, or disruption to, 
their collaborative system. A cultural resistance toward the contaminant or parasite 
suggests the persistence of order, unity and homogeneity. ‘The work of the parasite 
changes systems’ and as such offers the possibility to recast its negative character of 
disorder (the unwelcome guest) as potentiality (Serres 1997: 57). Looking toward 
instabilities and denying fixed representation effectively articulates a culture of 
exception and anomaly.  
In the Serresean communication model a message is passed between two 
stations; the movement from one station to another requires a medium, a middle, 
through which it is channeled. The word medium is etymologically derived from the 
Latin adjective medius meaning intermediate, or middle ground. This middle space73  
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through which communication passes produces effects and as such is a space of 
potentiality. Interlocutors must adjust their communication to expel or incorporate 
this parasitic middle. The common response to a parasite is its exclusion. This 
exclusionary act serves to acknowledge the presence of a parasite and as such affirms 
the inevitability of alteration through a process of expulsion. Conversely, what 
potentialities are generated when the parasite becomes a welcome guest in 
collaborative dialogue? A parasitic philosophy of meaning may suggest a condition 
where ‘other’ systems are always in relation to that which is central. This theory of 
relations may be said to bring the force74 of the parasite into focus.  
The parasite performs an undecidable relation between the supposed 
dichotomy of the external and the internal, being neither the host system nor 
separable from it. The Derridean supplement, like the parasite, ‘is neither a plus nor 
a minus, neither an outside nor the compliment of an inside’ (Derrida 1998: 1xxii). The 
concepts of supplement and parasite superficially suggest a superfluous element 
added to existent phenomena. In French the term supplement has duplicitous 
meaning, inferring both an addition and a substitution. Derrida continues to 
complicate our understanding of language by introducing terms that resist a single 
definition. A supplement is generally perceived to be something secondary, serving 
as an addition. Rousseau’s use of the term supplement reiterates this perspective and 
is used to designate the relationship between a first and second force.75 Rousseau 
suggests that the secondary force76 of the supplement is superfluous, merely adding  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
May the force be with you 
 
75 
 
I felt a great disturbance in the force, as if 
millions of voices suddenly cried out in terror and 
were suddenly silenced 
 
76 
 
The force will be with you always 
 
 
(Star Wars, 1977) 
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itself to that which is complete and fully present. A consideration of the supplement 
leads to an intentional paradox where Rousseau’s superfluous addition is 
complicated by the Derridean assertion that the supplement is also a substitution. 
Derrida suggests that nothing complete can be added to and therefore proposes the 
notion of an ‘originary lack’ in supposedly present phenomena. In the metaphysical 
system, that which is perceived as complete and present is considered contaminated 
by the presence of a supplement. Derrida proposes the supplement as both an 
accretion and a substitution, as such the supplement is ambiguous, a Derridean 
undecidable. ‘Undecidability - which might also be understood in terms of ‘the 
experience of the impossible’ - does not, then, merely paralyze decision, but instead 
gives it its very chance or possibility’77 (Wortham 2010: 30). Undecidability does not 
simply refer to indecision between opposing forces (affirming logocentrism through 
stable oppositions) but suggests that what is present or decided could be otherwise.  
 
[a] break with this structure of belonging can be announced only 
through […] a certain strategic arrangement which, within the field 
of metaphysical opposition, uses the strengths of the fields to turn its 
own stratagems against it, producing a force of dislocation that 
spreads itself throughout the entire system, fissuring in every 
direction and thoroughly delimiting it. (Derrida 2001: 34) 
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Schrodinger’s cat walks into a bar… and doesn’t. 
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The theory and practice of the footnote is comparable to the supplement in its 
designation as a secondary gesture. The gesture of the footnote is commonly 
perceived as an addition or accompaniment to a ‘primary’ text; however, the 
footnotes in this document attempt to resist categorization as extraneous matter. 
Grafton suggests that footnotes are often treated as ‘the offhand production and 
disposal of waste products’78 (Grafton 1999: 7). matthews and allen’s footnotes do not 
attempt to usurp the academic text but rather perform a fluctuating and undecidable 
relation that resists the stasis of an authoritarian discourse. The supplement and 
parasite do not replace existing systems but alternatively compel those systems to 
adapt to their presence. This adaptive response results in the production of 
difference. The supplementary gesture of a footnote implies that the ‘primary’ text to 
which it is annexed is incomplete, thus inferring that meaning is never complete. If 
meaning is proposed as incomplete then both the supplement and parasite serve to 
disrupt the illusory conditions of unity, completion and stasis. ‘The supplement and 
the turbulence of a certain lack fracture the limit of the text, forbidding an exhaustive 
and closed formalization of it’ (Derrida 2004[b]: 42). For Derrida, the supplement is not 
simply an additional component but an indispensable supplementarity.  
The Derridean critique of logocentrism is integrally linked to the supplement 
through the suggestion that a dominant ideology is always subject to a process of 
supplementation and deferral, unity defined in relation to multiplicity. This  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
 
 
 Martin Creed, 1995, Work No.88 
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undecidable relation between unity and multiplicity is articulated in Lomax’s 
narrative of the twittering tree.  
 
To have said ‘The tree is twittering’ or ‘The birds in the tree are 
twittering’ would have been to attribute the twittering to a tree-
subject or a plural bird-subject. But, strictly speaking, the twittering 
of the twittering-tree could not be attributed to either, or both, of 
these said subjects. (Lomax 2004: 22) 
 
Lomax’s twittering tree gives the illusion of unity; however, this oscillating 
phenomenon resides in neither the tree79 nor the birds. This undecidable condition 
may be considered to unsettle the supposed dichotomy between unity and 
multiplicity. The twittering phenomenon articulated in Lomax’s narrative is 
comparable to the indistinguishable relation between the host (tree) and the parasite 
(birds). The indeterminacy of this relation arguably unsettles the persistence of an 
oppositional logic (the oppositional logic of text and supplement).  
 
To the inexpert, footnotes look like 
deep root systems, solid and fixed; 
[…] however, they reveal themselves 
as anthills, swarming with […] 
activity. (Grafton 1999: 9) 
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The footnote traditionally operates as a stratagem to augment the position of a  
‘primary’ text; however, matthews and allen adopt the footnote as a system that 
proffers fluctuation and oscillation. matthews and allen are mindful of the relation 
between the ‘primary’ text and the footnote being perceived as a dichotomy; 
however, the footnotes within this discourse are not opposed to the academic text but 
serve to ‘excite the host system’. Neither the academic text nor the footnotes remain 
unchanged through this relation.  The host (the academic text) and the parasite (the 
footnotes) interrupt80 each other, in a process of bifurcation and digression. 
 
Footnotes are also the essential digressions of textual praxis, 
writing’s polyphonic reflexive sites… Digression – the life of  
dialogue – is one of the main antagonists of the monologic principle 
(closed language knows no digression) (Sandywell 2010: 298). 
 
The footnote is commonly referred to as a paratext. A paratextual practice has the 
potential to articulate the ‘divergent practices under history’s apparently stable 
surface.’ (Grafton 1999: 7). Genette defines the paratext as an element accompanying a 
primary text, not simply an addition but rather that which generates an undecidable 
space between ‘text and off-text’ (Genette 1997: 1).  This act of looking to the periphery 
of an authoritarian text may be perceived as entering a liminal space.  
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How to interrupt  
• Actually...  
• Excuse me...  
• I’m sorry, but...  
• I just want to say...  
• May I interrupt here?  
• Do you mind if I say something?  
 
 
(www.englishpond.com/speaking)  
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a threshold, or – a word Borges used 
apropos of a preface – a vestibule that 
offers the world at large the possibility 
of […] turning. (Genette 1997: 2) 
 
The digression implicit in paratextual practice suggests a process of turning 
away from the dominant ideology. Rogoff suggests that the destabilization of 
logocentrism requires a process of Looking Away. Rogoff expresses discomfort with 
the obligation placed upon the reader to invest in a singular consideration of a text. 
Rogoff recounts a visit to a Jackson Pollock exhibition at the Tate gallery and the 
inevitable slippage that occurs from the ‘single’ art object to and from other 
phenomena. Rogoff’s unauthorized act of Looking Away81 (from the central tenets of 
culture that invariably demand our attention) results in a process of digression.  
 
In the process [of looking away] we produce for ourselves an 
alternative mode of taking part in culture in which we affect […] 
modalities of attention and subjugation, that break down the 
dichotomies of objects and viewers. (Rogoff 2004: 133) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
MACBETH 
 
[Aside]82 Two truths 
are told, 
As happy prologues to 
the swelling act 
Of the imperial theme. 
I thank you, 
gentlemen. 
 
82 
 
‘Breaking the fourth wall’ relates to any practice which 
seeks to dispel the illusion that the audience is 
watching a slice of ‘real life’. The same expression is 
also used in relation to film and fiction to describe a 
text’s acknowledgement of its own artifice.  
 
(Cuddon, A., Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theories, 
Penguin: 288) 
 
 
	 98 
The active process of digressing from a central subject suggests a 
philosophical perspective that permits parasitic background to enter a supposedly 
autocratic system. In Looking Away from a sanctioned script our attention is diverted 
from the master narrative to encounter other potentialities. This digressive act of 
turning brings into focus that which is situated ‘beside’ the supposedly central 
discourse. Etymologically the English term ‘beside’ is aligned with the Greek word 
‘para’, thus paralogism infers that which is beside or beyond the logos. Lyotardian 
paralogism does not simply attempt to revivify the system but rather seeks an 
exception to the rule83 that will generate difference. Lyotard makes a distinction 
between the innovative moves of modernity and the ‘impossible’ move aligned with 
postmodernity. Paralogism seeks an unforeseeable trajectory that will disrupt and 
digress from the systematic order, effectively changing the rules84 by which that 
system operates. ‘Paralogism legitimates a continued search for new moves which 
challenge the consensus of dominant paradigms.’ (Haber 1994: 25) 
 The language of digression may be said to permeate contemporary culture (the 
digital hyperlink being a significant example); however, the process of digression 
arguably still holds negative connotations in the paradigms of noetic practice. A 
digression is a veering off, an aside, an anecdotal condition, and as such resists a 
cultural inclination toward unity and order. It is proposed that through a process of 
digression a dominant ideology may be opened to multiplicity. ‘[T]he production of  
 
 
 
83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both are too much of a 
burden.  
 
(Nietzsche, F., 2006, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book For All and 
None, Cambridge University Press)  
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meaning in the process of signification is continually deferred and supplemented in 
the play of more-than-one.’ (Barker 2004: 52). 
It is possible that our cultural heritage (operating by means of an oppositional 
logic) will coerce the reader to assign this academic writing a noetic value and 
matthews and allen’s footnotes a poetic85 value. It is in the continuous deferral 
between text and footnote that this oppositional expectation is arguably confounded. 
matthews and allen’s footnotes, akin to the parasite, find their way into the relation 
between the academic author and the reader. These footnotes seek to generate 
digression within the ‘master narrative’ and thus provoke an adaptive response in the 
reader. The academic text in this research performs an illusory noetic order whereas 
the parasitic footnotes perform an illusory poetic disorder. The relation between 
these supposedly opposed forces attempts to generate alteration in both the noetic 
and the poetic, the host system and the parasite, the academic text and the footnote 
(as supplement).  
The parasite is etymologically described as ‘one who eats at the table of 
another’ and as such suggests a movement that proceeds in one direction. In Serres’ 
most concise definition of the parasite, it is described as ‘a thermal exciter’, which 
positions the parasite less as a destructive force than something that excites the host 
system. The disruption generated by the presence of a parasite, either through an act 
of its expulsion from or absorption into the system, raises the question of what may 
be possible when a parasite is actively sought.  
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aesthetic, ascetic, athletic, cosmetic, eidetic, 
frenetic, gametic, genetic, hermetic, herpetic, kinetic, 
magnetic, pathetic, phonetic, phrenetic, prophetic, 
prosthetic, synthetic … 
 
 
	 100 
matthews and allen are positioned as a parasitic voice ‘dining at the table’ of 
academic writing. When the parasite’s narrative (‘one who eats at the table of 
another’) is applied to matthews and allen’s footnotes, an association to citationality 
appears implicit. matthews and allen’s footnotes perform a citational gesture 
(citationality as a method to question the authority of ‘original’ texts and ‘master 
narratives’), ‘feeding off’ cultural phenomena. Citationality, in addition to the 
theories of intertextuality, appropriation and dialogism, implies that the monograph 
is a façade behind which multiple potentialities are situated.  
 
- But they repeat each other, still; they substitute for each other…  
- Nonsense: they86 don't replace each other, since they are added…  
- Precisely  
 
(Derrida 2004[a]: 170)  
  
Serres reminds his readers that the French word ‘hôte’ translates to infer both host 
and guest in English. ‘The host, the guest: the same word; he gives and receives, 
offers and accepts, invites and is invited, master and passer-by.’ (Serres 2007: 15). The 
undecidable relation between the character of host and guest suggests that these 
supposedly opposed forces interrupt each other. The movement between text and 
footnote creates digression in the anticipated linearity of traditional research and 
serves to resist the performance of homogenous meaning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
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If the social and cultural response to an oscillating disorder is to expel or 
subsume that which oscillates (with a view of returning to a systemized order) then 
‘an observer seated within the system […] overvalues87 the message and undervalues 
the noise’ (Serres 2007: 68). 
 
The problem, in a word, is that the logic 
of parasitism is not a logic of distinction 
or of opposition. (Derrida 1988: 96)  
 
The parasite performs its disruption from within the host system, difference 
in itself. The parasite, akin to a minor literature, operates from within the hegemony 
of a major language. The parasite offers the potential to extricate meaning from the 
‘hell of dualism’, being neither the same nor other (Serres 1997: 131). The parasite is 
part of the host system, it is the clinamen that disturbs the laminar flow, a 
background noise that disrupts communication, an oscillation that is ‘neither the 
same nor different from that which it parasites.’ (Derrida 1988: 96).  
Serres aligns the parasite with ‘the joker’. The joker may represent any 
existing card: king, jack, seven or ace, et al. Akin to the blank domino, the joker has 
no character of its own; it is a Derridean undecidable. The joker is both included and 
excluded from the system to which it is annexed. This blank figure oscillates 
between the supposed antithetical relations of noetic and poetic genres, treating both  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
 
Limited Edition  
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as emergent effects of the same ordering practice. Conversely, J.L. Austin attempts 
to perpetuate a dichotomy between the serious88 and the non-serious. ‘[A] 
performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said 
by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy, […] 
Language in such circumstances is […] not used seriously [thus] parasitic upon its 
normal use.’ (Austin 1975: 22). Austin suggests that language performed on stage or in 
poems is a parasite of ‘serious’ language, thus arguably perpetuating the dichotomy 
between noetic and poetic practice. The indeterminate character of the joker in a 
game of cards serves as a metaphor for disruption to Austin’s dichotomous 
positioning of serious and non-serious language. The joker may assume the role of 
king; however, it is neither king nor joker, serious nor non-serious, noetic nor poetic, 
host nor parasite, message nor noise, and yet it is arguably both. 
 
Noise is a joker necessary to the system. It can take on any value, and 
is thus unpredictable so that the system is never stable. Instead, it  
is non-knowledge. Systems work because they do not work. 
Dysfunctioning remains essential for functioning. The model, then, is 
free of parasites, free of static […] while the system is always infected 
with parasites. (Serres 1994: 98)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 
  
 Get serious! 
 When the going gets tough, the tough get going. 
 Going according to plan. 
 Cut one’s coat according to one’s cloth.  
Turn one’s coat. (To change from one side to another. The 
image is of having a coat which is a different colour inside 
out). 
 
 
	 103 
matthews and allen are jokers89 
 
The citational practice of matthews and allen situates the collaborators as a 
pair of Serresean jokers. Their parasitic footnotes are both included (via the 
implementation of a conventional referencing system) and excluded (as unwelcome 
guests) from the system to which they are annexed (the academic canon). matthews 
and allen attempt to confound the pursuit of ideological authorialism through 
parasitological methodologies. Citationality, understood as a parasitic practice, 
situates the collaboration as agents of instability, Serresean jokers that may ‘take on 
any value’ (Serres 1994: 98). 
 
“What matter who’s speaking” 
someone said, “What matter 
who’s speaking” (Beckett 1994: 85) 
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The Parapoetic Third 
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a ludic language-game that must 
systematically (ap)prove its own 
inconsistency and inefficiency by 
convolving problems, invoking 
anomaly for the sake of what is 
abnormal and unknown. (Bök 2001: 14) 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary designates what is ‘para’ as that which is to 
one side, beside, aside,90 amiss, faulty, irregular, disordered and improper. 
McCaffery suggests that ‘the lateral adjacency of ‘beside’ offers a multiplicity of 
satellitic invocations: the friend, neighbor, relative, lover, guide, witness and judge.’  
(McCaffery 2006: 323). These auxiliary classifications are commonly understood as 
secondary to a primary one, a margin to a centre. The para is situated beside a 
dominant ideology; however, ‘[b]eside is also between, interstitial and intervallic, as 
well as extra, outside’ (McCaffery: 2006: 323). Parapoetics is situated ‘to the side’ of its 
governing ideology; however, it is also that which interrupts ideological authority, 
disrupting from between and within the axioms of power.  matthews and allen’s 
paratexts find an alliance with the concept of parapoetics wherein the intention to 
disrupt ideological authorialism is performed from between and within the axioms of 
academic writing. 
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To soliloquise, to say or talk91 to oneself, to say aside, 
to think aloud, to apostrophise. 
 
91 
 
Every speech, written or otherwise, has to have 
punctuation. Tonight I am the punctuation.  
 
(Eisenhower, D., 1996, IN, Sommer, E., Weiss, D., Metaphors 
Dictionary, Visible Ink Press: 399)  
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The concept of parapoetics suggests a gesture that is situated to the side of 
poetry. Comparable with the parasitic supplement, parapoetics is a simultaneous 
relation to and disruption of the system to which it is annexed. McCaffery suggests 
that the concept of that which is para evades janiformity (a reference to the Greek 
god Janus) in that it resists the oppositional logic of an inside/outside binarism and is 
alternatively situated beside and between these conditions. David Caroll’s 
description of paraesthetics offers an associative relation to the practice of 
parapoetics: It is ‘something like [a poetics]92 turned against itself […] a faulty, 
irregular, disordered, improper [poetics]- one not content to remain within the area 
defined by the [poetic]’ (McCaffery 2004: 91). Parapoetics may be considered analogous 
to the Serresean parasite in its relation to a host system (poetry) and its potential to 
disrupt that system. The theory of parapoetics proposes a culture of potentiality 
rather than a predetermined or fixed designation. ‘Deracinated and detached from 
poetics proper, and maintaining its distance from any discourse that seeks to master 
or explain, it can be likened to a hesitation within a caesura.’ (McCaffery 2006: 324). To 
hesitate suggests the interrupted flow of matter, static in the system, a cut-flow, a 
glitch, a clinamen. Parapoetics is effectively a departure from the traditions of 
generality and universality (systems that invariably subsume multiplicity into unity) 
toward a cultural practice that explores the possibilities of anomaly and exception. 
Parapoetics is the practice of ‘uncertainties and [operates] as a force of disruption 
 
 
 
 
92 
 
you really are a 
poet, aren't 
you?  
 
did grasp that 
fact, did you?  
 
What I need is a 
theory to explain 
it all.  
 
That's a very 
interesting 
theory.  
 
... merely a 
system of 
differences.  
 
You imply, of 
course, that what 
matters...is not 
truth but 
difference.  
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among stability, it aims to transform a total unity into multiplicity.’ (McCaffery 2006: 
323). Parapoetics resists predetermination and actively situates itself in an 
indeterminate condition where metaphysical aspirations of unity encounter anomaly. 
McCaffery’s conception of parapoetics imagines a relation between poetics and 
architectural theory where (in the manner of ‘pataphysical equivalence) supposedly 
discrete disciplines are opened to possibility. ‘Multiplicity, before reaching unity, or 
without unity, has gaps, it has margins, it is riddled with exceptions’ (Serres 1997: 111). 
McCaffery introduces typographical exceptions through the scribal practice 
of scriptio continua, suggesting that ‘parapoetics will situate interstitially, the way 
punctuation falls between meaning.’ (McCaffery 2001: 326). Scriptio continua or 
continuous script is a method of writing without spacing or punctuating marks 
between words and sentences. Scriptiocontinuaorcontinuousscriptisamethodofwriting 
withoutspacingorpunctuatingmarksbetweenwordsandsentences. The use of scriptio 
continua demonstrates semantic indeterminacy and subsequently disrupts the 
systematic meaning generated through a punctuative tradition.  
 
confluence of language, nonsense, and desire – is experienced as a 
kind of scriptio continua; as a process not of separation but of 
segmentive erasure. Because segmentive clarity is dissolved, words in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 cont. 
 
A presence or an 
absence?  
 
and  
 
Having 
them both in the 
same title would 
be more or less 
irresistible. 
 
but with a trace 
of something.  
 
you don't think 
it was chance?  
 
no chance.  
 
then what? 
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continua are initially encountered as letters-becoming-words, 
presignificatory instabilities and uncertainties in a protosemantic 
continuum. Punctuation and spacing – as well as its complicated 
conceptual incarnation as Derridean différance – can be thought of 
as severing activities that slice a continuum into culturally 
recognizable sequences but may also be seen as clinamens. (McCaffery 
2001: 110) 
 
The unintentional and intervallic transgressions of parapoetics suggests a 
connection to Deleuze and Guattari’s writing on minor literatures. A minority is, in 
its common usage, perceived as diametrically opposed to a majority; however, a 
minor literature may contrarily be considered to operate from within a major 
language ‘using the same elements as it were, but in a different manner.’ (O’Sullivan 
2005). Deleuze and Gauttari’s concept of the minor may be aligned with a discourse 
on parapoetics in its intention to interrupt the trajectory of a major language. In 
Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Deleuze and Guattari assert that a ‘characteristic 
of minor literature is that in it everything takes on a collective value’. The collective 
value of a minor literature disrupts the logocentric tradition of individual 
authorialism and gestures toward a ‘collective enunciation’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1986: 
17). Deleuze suggests that a major language should be understood as a force of  
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But when did 
you ever discover 
that in a 
question-and-
discussion 
session?  
 
it is not a to-
and-fro process, 
but an endless, 
tantalising 
leading on...  
 
...combining 
fiction and non 
fiction, fantasy, 
criticism, 
confession and 
speculation.  
 
Everything-and 
then some.  
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constancy and a minor language as variability, potentially a culture of exceptions. If 
a minor literature operates from within a major language then minor variations are 
implicit in major systems: Variations understood as glitches, digressions, clinamens. 
This relation is ‘neither a union, nor a juxtaposition, but the birth of a stammering’ 
(Deleuze & Parnet 2007: 9). 
A minor literature, perceived as a foreign language, is situated within the 
homogeneity of a major language. This ‘foreign language cannot be hallowed out in 
one language without language being toppled or pushed to a limit.’ (Deleuze 1997: 5). 
Deleuze’s use of the phrase ‘hollowed out’ implies an internal disturbance, a 
clinamen that serves to disrupt the centrality of homogenous language systems. A 
rupturing of representation. A minor literature is both part of a major language and 
foreign to it, thus parasitic. Deleuze suggests that a minor literature ‘opens up a kind 
of foreign language within language, which is neither another language nor a 
rediscovered patois, but a becoming-other of language, a minorisation of this major 
language, a delirium that carries it off [and…] escapes the dominant system.’ 
(Deleuze 1997: 5). The paratextual practice of matthews and allen is a minorisation of a 
major academic language, a delirium that escapes the dominant monographic system.  
Katarina Zdjelar employs the concept of parapoetics to articulate the 
transgressions that occur in the literal process of translation between a major and a 
minor language. Zdjelar suggests that the ‘failings’ in the process of translation yield 
similar results to that of parapoetics.   
 
 
 
 
92 cont. 
 
many twists and 
turns.  
 
like playing 
tennis with a 
ball made of 
Krazy Putty that 
keeps coming back 
over the net in a 
different shape.  
 
isosceles 
triangle?  
 
Certainly not. 
What makes 
you think so?  
 
shall I tell you 
the story? 
 
from the 
beginning  
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Translation is not simply about transcribing one system into another, 
nor for that matter is it about trying to transfer narratives and 
concepts, it is also concerned with transporting the logic of one 
system into another, and producing excess. (Zdjelar 2007: 15) 
 
The ‘excess’ described by Zdjelar may be aligned with the Serresean third man, a 
superfluous character in an idealized model of communication, and that which 
generates a stuttering of language. In He Stuttered, Deleuze suggests that stuttering is 
a poetic comprehension of language where language itself is stretched. This 
stretching of language is the effective process of a minor literature where ‘language 
trembles from head to toe.’ (Deleuze 1997: 109). When this stuttering and stretching of 
language is recontextualized within the field of parapoetics it resists the derogatory 
classification of failure and adopts a generative third character. Parapoetics is not the 
poet’s facility for invention and intentional digression from tradition but the aleatoric 
gesture of language and its relations.  
Zdjelar’s implementation of parapoetics relates to a mode of communication 
where an unfamiliar language is articulated through hesitation, irresolute utterance 
and misunderstanding, and where an unintentional poeisis is generated. Zdjelar 
suggests that parapoetics ‘refers to all that takes place outside of meaningful 
language’ (Zdjelar 2010). A literal understanding of Zdjelar’s statement may suggest an  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 cont. 
 
Both know the 
inevitable 
conclusion of 
a narrative  
sequence that 
begins thus.  
 
It all comes back 
to the same thing 
in the end  
 
you really are a 
poet, aren't 
you?'  
 
 
(Lodge, D., 2011, 
Small World, Vintage 
Books) 
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oppositional logic, an outside opposed to an inside; however, parapoetics utilises 
existing phenomena, stretching its language beyond93 an idealized unity. In Zdjelar’s 
film Shoum we hear the sound of the 1984 Tears for Fears song Shout. Two men 
from Belgrade attempt to decipher the lyrics as though decoding a complex code. 
The two men do not speak English and consequently, they phonetically translate and 
interpret Shout.  
 
Shoum Shoum Lajdi o Lau’, they write and sing, in a strange invented 
language somewhere between phonetic transcription, Serbian, and 
English, as ‘Tears for Fears’ sing ‘Shout, shout, let it all out’. We 
witness how through errors and deformations an entirely ‘new 
language’ is being created. (katarinazdjelar.net/shoum) 
 
Shoum functions as a corrupted form of English akin to the grammatical distortions 
and nonsensical linguistic constructions of Stanley Unwin. Unwin, the third man in 
the straightman/funnyman formation of Morecambe and Wise, speaks unwinese; a 
ludic language where the question ‘What is the use of atoms?’ might receive the 
reply ‘Deeply fully enters here and the calculodes of the incubus soon send the pi-R-
squared up the polly, which is enough in all condescience to make the useful ploy in 
the atomole…’ (Unwin 2002) 
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To boldly go where no man  V vay’ bolDly nuqDaq pagh 
man has gone before   (Klingon translation) 
(English translation) 
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Unwinese may be considered to operate in a similar manner to that of a 
mondegreen. The mondegreen, introduced by Sylvia Wright in The Death of Lady 
Mondegreen, refers to the accidental mishearing and misinterpretation of a song lyric 
or poem. The terminology generated through mishearing and misinterpretation may 
be said to resist predetermined phenomena and subsequently attains ‘new’ meaning 
(comparable to Zdjelar’s film Shoum where a ‘new’ language generated). In Wright’s 
1957 essay The Death of Lady Mondegreen she recounts a childhood memory in 
which she hears the ballad The Bonny Earl of Murray:  
 
Ye Highlands and ye Lowlands,  
Oh, where hae ye been?  
They hae slain the Earl Amurray,  
And Lady Mondegreen.  
 
The last line94 of the ballad should read: And laid him on the green. 
 
Lady Mondegreen had never existed prior to this mishearing; however, the process 
of misinterpretation led to Wright’s narrative construction of Lady Mondegreen’s 
tragic death. ‘Language stops being representative in order to now move toward its 
extremities or its limits’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1986: 23). The mondegreen, like the 
clinamen, appears to operate by means of an aleatoric gesture.  
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"Roads? Where we're going we don't need roads." (Back to 
the Future 1985) 
 
"Louis, I think this is the beginning of a beautiful 
friendship." (Casablanca 1942) 
 
"That's right, that's right. Attaboy, Clarence." (It’s A 
Wonderful Life 1946) 
 
"A man's got to know his limitations." (Magnum Force 1971) 
 
"Well, nobody’s perfect!" (Some Like It Hot 1959) 
 
"God damn you! God damn you all to hell!" (Planet Of The 
Apes 1968) 
 
"The greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing 
the world he didn’t exist. And like that – poof – he’s 
gone!" (The Usual Suspects 1995) 
 
"Oh Good. For a moment there, I thought we were in 
trouble." (Butch Cassidy And The Sundance Kid 1969) 
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if you lay yourself open to mondegreens, you must be valiant. The 
world, blowing near, will assail you with a thousand bright and 
strange images. Nothing like them has ever been seen before, and who 
knows what lost and lovely things may not come streaming in with 
them? But there is always the possibility that they will engulf you and 
that you will go wandering down a horn into a mondegreen 
underworld from which you can never escape. (Wright 1954: 51) 
 
Mondegreens, mishearings and misunderstandings may be considered to digress 
from, or detour around, the intelligibility of an anticipated trajectory and thus 
encounter anomaly and exception. These exceptions reveal ‘that everything has the 
potential to be anomalous’ (Bök 2001: 40). 
The aleatoric departure from homogenous meaning toward anomaly and 
exception are arguably made manifest in the literary characters Mrs Malaprop and 
Officer Dogberry. A malapropism is the unintentional use of an incorrect word in 
place of a word with a similar sound.  The word malapropism is derived from the 
French ‘mal à propos’ meaning inappropriate. Mrs Malaprop, a character in Richard 
Brinsley Sheridan’s 1775 comedy The Rivals, habitually misuses words, resulting in 
a nonsensical, often humorous utterance. Officer Dogberry, a character in 
Shakespeare’s Much Ado About Nothing, similarly includes nonsensical words in his 
speech due to their comparable95 sounds.  
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Mrs MALAPROP:  There, sir, an attack upon my language! what do 
you think of that? – an aspersion upon my parts of speech! was ever 
such a brute! Sure, if I reprehend any thing in this word, it is the use 
of my oracular tongue, and a nice derangement of epitaphs! (Sheridan 
2004) 
 
It is perhaps in the construction of characters such as Mrs Malaprop and Officer 
Dogberry that semantic slippage has been consigned to the nonsensical utterances of 
comedy and thus considered superfluous to a noetic ideology.  
Mondegreens, Malapropisms and Dogberryisms are effectively background 
noise, ‘the clinamen of speech effecting an oral deviation’ (McCaffery 2001: 94). These 
transgressions are comparable to the noise that Serresean philosophy attempts to 
detect, that which homogenous language attempts to silence. These disruptive and 
digressive phenomena operate as minor literatures performing from within a major 
language. The conception of a language situated between the meaningful and the 
meaningless may be observed in the ‘Anna Livia Plurabelle’ section of James 
Joyce’s Finnegans Wake where the overheard exchange between two washerwomen 
on opposite sides of the Liffy oscillates in an undecidable condition. The background 
noise96 of washing activities and the movement of the river disrupts the interlocutory 
trajectory between the women, making their words fluctuate between sense and 
nonsense. 
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Heark in your Ear * 
 
 
* I cannot conjecture what the Author means here, or how 
this Chasm could be fill 'd, tho it is capable of more 
than one Interpretation.  
 
(Swift, J., 2010, A Tale of a Tub and Other Works, Cambridge 
University Press: 116) 
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Can't hear with the waters of. The chittering waters of. Flittering bats, 
fieldmice bawk talk. Ho! Are you not gone ahome? What Thom 
Malone? Can't hear with bawk of bats, all thim liffeying waters of. 
Ho, talk save us ! My foos won't moos. I feel as old as yonder elm. A 
tale told of Shaun or Shem? All Livia's daughtersons. Dark hawks 
hear us. Night! Night! My ho head halls. I feel as heavy as yonder 
stone. Tell me of John97 or Shaun? Who were Shem and Shaun the 
living sons or daughters of? Night now! Tell me, tell me, tell me, elm! 
Night night! Telmetale of stem or stone. Beside the rivering waters of, 
hitherandthithering waters of. Night! (Joyce 2012: 215-16)  
 
Semantic slippage effects a deviation from the standardized language system; 
however, this digression retains that from which it deviates. The interplay between 
intentional and unintentional words included in the literary texts of Joyce, Sheridan, 
Shakespeare and Wright generate an oscillating language. This stuttering and 
stammering of language enacts an anomalous slippage between sense and nonsense 
(for Deleuze, stuttering is an effect of language rather than a literal affectation of 
speech). This slippage, in Derridean thought, vibrates between supposedly 
oppositional terms suggesting the impossibility for the discrete categorization of  
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language and meaning. A culture of parapoetics suggests a poetics derived from the 
supposedly extraneous irregularities generated through semantic slippage, digression, 
deviation, misunderstandings and misinterpretation.   
 
Like a ship98 of the tongue  Like a slip of the tongue 
the clinamen is less a    the clinamen is less a  
performance than a    performance than a  
harpooning.    happening. 
 
(McCaffery 2001: 18) 
 
McCaffery introduces the concept of ‘error’ into the language of poetics through the 
resultant exceptions and anomalies generated through typographical inaccuracies: 
‘The unpredictable swerve of the letter from laminar flow of syntax and grammar 
invalidates the notion of a fixed inert meaning.’ (McCaffery 2001: 21).   
 
“I only took the regular course.” 
“What was that?” inquired Alice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
98 
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“Reeling and Writhing, of course, to begin with,” the Mock Turtle99 
replied; “and then the different branches of Arithmetic - Ambition, 
Distraction, Uglifcation, and Derision.”  
(Carroll 2010: 94) 
 
In the relation between supposedly oppositional language systems (the 
scholastic language of noetic reason and/or the language of poetic unreason) a 
potential third language may be conceived. McCaffery’s alignment of poetics and 
architecture suggests the possibility for a dialogue to take place between theoretically 
discrete practices. ‘The dialogue between these two practices occurs as much within, 
as between, each other, and the integrity of both practices should be risked.’ 
(matthews and allen attempt to put the integrity of both text and paratext at risk) 
(McCaffery 2004: 99). McCaffery suggests that it is necessary for seemingly 
homogeneous disciplines to risk contamination through their interrelation: 
potentiality exists in the space between familiarity and foreigness. Parapoetics 
challenges a cultural resistance to error and anomaly and ‘focuses on the interval 
where contamination, paralogicality, uncertainty, and misprision precipitate 
discovery’ (McCaffery 2006: 326). The contaminant serves to interrupt the impasse 
arguably reached within autocratic systems and discrete classifications. If parapoetics 
proposes the reconfiguration of error and failure as generative principles, then the  
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stuttering and stammering of language may resist homogenization to effect 
difference.  
 
What is noise in the paradigm of 
nostalgia is music to the 
prognosis of paralogy.  
(Bök 2001: 58) 
 
The anomaly is a glitch, a sudden irregularity or malfunction in a system 
operating by means of generalities, universalities and presuppositions. The term 
glitch has been used to describe a mode of electronic music that essentially 
implements the ‘aesthetics of failure’.100 Glitch music operates in a cultural space 
where malfunctioning, stuttering, errancies and system failures are perceived as 
generative phenomena. A glitch is a fault, a malfunction that creates a cut in the  
flow of contrivance. Cut-flows, static, electrical humming and scratching may be 
understood as gestures that, in a Rogoffian sense, ‘look away’ from the conventions 
of composition toward a culture of instability and disorder. ‘Indeed, the glitch – in 
whichever regime it operates and ruptures – is the ‘sound’ of this something else, 
this something different attempting to get through.’ (O’Sullivan 2009: 251). This glitch 
machine may be aligned with Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of a desiring- 
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Ten Commandments for matthews & allen (after Gilbert & George) 
 [out-takes] 
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machine that only operates when it malfunctions. In the text Anti-Oedipus the 
desiring-machine is described as a flow producing and flowing interrupting force. ‘A 
machine produces a flow’ (the flow of the scholastic text), ‘another machine coupled 
to this interrupts the flow’ (matthews and allen’s paratexts) (O’Sullivan 2006: 24).  
Deleuze and Guattari speak of ‘cut-flows’, ‘break-flows’ and ‘schizz-flows’, 
trajectories that are punctuated and disrupted through their relation to other 
machines. Desiring-machines are essentially forces that are capable of autopoiesis. 
Interruption, in the context of a desiring-machine, is not a negation of an existent 
trajectory but the relation between conjunctive and disjunctive forces: ‘and then, and 
then… and then…’ (Deleuze & Guattari 2004[b]: 39). Deleuze and Guatarri’s desiring-
machines are analogous to the bachelor-machine of ‘pataphysics in its operative cuts 
in the flow of matter. Dr. Faustroll’s painting machine, bearing the name Clinamen, 
‘devastates’ a museum of ‘masterpieces’101 through its revolving, gyroscopic 
movements, ‘like a spinning top it dashed itself against the pillars, swayed and 
veered in infinitely varied directions’ (Jarry 1997: 88 ). Bök suggests that this 
‘pataphysical machine is a deviant device, an apparatus of anomaly, arguably 
evoking Serresean noise. Bachelor ‘machines always constitute a system of 
interruptions in which every component behaves like a clinamen.’ (Bök 2001: 57).  
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Machines with such freedom never have 
to prove their ability, since they fulfil no 
real purpose, no true command. (Bök 
2001: 55) 
 
Parapoetics, bachelor-machines and deleuzoguattarian desiring-machines are 
machines used in a contrary way to that which they were intended. Disruption, 
rupture, stalling, errancy, cuts, glitches, breaks, fits and starts, all suggest movements 
which baffle the paradigm of contrivance. matthews and allen’s ‘footnote-machine’ 
disrupts the anticipated function of an academic footnote. The traditional academic 
footnote serves as a complimentary accompaniment to a scholarly text whereas 
matthews and allen’s footnote-machine sways and veers in ‘infinitely varied 
directions’, like the swerve of Bas Jan Ader’s bicycle in Fall II, it is a clinamen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bas Jan Ader, 1970, Fall II102 
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Laurel and Hardy 
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A parapoetic gesture, a misinterpretation, a digressive clinamen or the 
interruptive operations of a desiring machine, all gesture toward Lyotard’s 
paralogism. Paralogism, suggesting that which is beyond or beside103 reason 
(beyond/beside the logocentric text), creates a break in the flow of continuity and 
uniformity. Paralogism is not false reasoning, as a standard dictionary definition may 
suggest, but rather a resistance to totalizing metanarratives. Lyotard makes reference 
to a paradigm shift that has arguably taken place in postmodern science,104 from 
deterministic principles to the study of uncertainties and anomalies. That which 
invokes anomaly ‘serves the will to disrupt.’ (Bök, 2001: 38). The conception of a para-
machine implies an anomalous and uncertain practice which, like the science of the 
particular (‘pataphysics), studies that which escapes generality and commonality; the 
exception. 
matthews and allen’s footnotes, conceived as disruption amid stability, 
perform anomalous asides and disordered digressions in relation to the academic 
text. These irregular movements accent the effective disruptions of a parapoetics that 
is commonly characterized as extraneous matter. The faulty irregularity of disordered 
hesitations and chance encounters attempt to generate an oscillating space between 
author/reader, one/many, noetic/poetic, theory/practice, serious/non-serious, that is 
resistant to the totalizing traditions of western metaphysics.  
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SCIENCE - A little science takes one away from religion 
and a lot returns one to it.  
 
(Flaubert, G., 2010, Dictionary of Received Ideas, [Trans. Gregory 
Norminton], Oneworld Classics Ltd: 85) 
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Operating as a probe into uncertainties 
and as a force of disruption among 
stability, parapoetics aims to transform 
a total unity into multiplicity. (McCaffery 
2012: 97) 
  
matthews and allen’s footnote-machine serves to articulate the possibility for 
digression within the anticipated cohesion of an academic text. This footnote-
machine operates by affirming the anomalous condition of parapoetics and thus 
resists the metaphysical traditions of unity, synthesis and the conflated third term. 
Parapoetics, being ‘emancipated from a predetermined destination, and able to 
install itself within the dialectical tensions and determinants of any number of target 
fields’, suggests a means through which the dialectical paradigm may be disrupted 
(McCaffery 2006: 323). matthews and allen’s footnote-machine seeks to include 
anomaly, the exception105 to the rule, the parasitic third man, and the stuttering and 
stammering of a minor literature that is commonly ‘crushed and denounced as a 
nuisance.’ (Deleuze & Parnet 2007: 14).  
 The non-oppositional process of collaborative dialogue is proposed as a 
method to affirm parapoetics, where intervallic error, background noise and parasitic 
phenomena are perceived as equivalent to a traditional conception of noesis. ‘To be  
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the exception proves the rule. prov. something that does not 
follow a rule shows that the rule exists. Ellen: Men are 
always rude. Jane: But Alan's always polite. And Larry and Ted 
are polite, too. Ellen: They're just the exceptions that prove 
the rule. Bill: All the shows on TV are aimed at people with 
low intelligence. Alan: What about that news program you like 
to watch? Bill: The exception proves the rule.  
 
(www.freedictionary.com)  
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noted here again is how two speakers, irreconcilable adversaries, find themselves 
forced to turn together against the same third man for the dialogue to remain 
possible’ (Serres 1982: 16). Through collaborative dialogue, matthews and allen attempt 
to affirm the pervasive and generative character of interruption and digression. 
Cultural perceptions of dialogue commonly adhere to historical traditions of a 
dialectic. The Oxford English Reference Dictionary defines a dialogue as ‘a 
discussion, especially one between representatives of two political groups’ (Pearsall & 
Trumble 1995). The lexiconical reference to ‘two political groups’ implies a culture of 
argumentation and opposition. This oppositional logic aligns dialogue with a 
metaphysical heritage of thesis and anti-thesis where, as Serres suggests, the 
parapoetic third is imperceptible amid the clamour of dialectical battle.106 
Collaborative dialogue (conceived as an act of alliance) is arguably uninhibited by 
the noise of dialectical systems and as such may enable interruptive phenomena to 
escape designation as extraneous matter. Blanchot suggests that interruption is 
already a component of dialogue in that ‘when two people speak together, they speak 
not together but each in turn: one says something, then stops, the other something 
else (or the same thing), then stops’; they interrupt each other (Blanchot 1993: 75). 
Blanchot situates certain modes of interruption as integral to a traditional system of 
communication:  A ‘pause between sentences, pause from one interlocutor to 
another, and pause of attention, the hearing that doubles the force of locution.’ 
(Blanchot 1993: 75). Intervals (marked by pauses, blanks, and gaps) do not alter the  
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trajectory of a dialogue but may be implemented as methods to reinforce the 
structure of interlocution. It may be suggested that this model of communication 
seeks to homogenize the process of dialogue through the implementation of accepted 
interlocutionary rules.  
 
We are constantly told: to respect the order107 of logical dependency 
we must begin with the ‘standard’, the ‘serious’, the ‘normal’, etc., 
and we must begin by excluding the ‘non-standard’, the non-serious’, 
the ‘abnormal’, the parasitical. (Derrida 1988: 90).  
 
matthews and allen’s footnote-machine attempts to resist a ‘logical 
dependency’ on normative systems through a process of including phenomena 
generally perceived to be superfluous. Blanchot compels us ‘to cease thinking solely 
with a view to unity, and to make the relations of words an essentially 
dissymmetrical field governed by discontinuity’ (Blanchot 1993: 77). matthews and allen 
attempt to invent a stammering space through the consideration of events and 
phenomena that take place in the interstices of dialogue.  
 In the proposition to utilize dialogue as a method to encounter anomaly, it is 
perhaps appropriate to reference Bohm’s text On Dialogue. Bohm’s conception of 
dialogue is resistant to a dialectic and proposes shared meaning, where ‘nobody is  
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LAW AND ORDER - How many crimes are committed in your 
names!  
 
(Flaubert, G., 2010, Dictionary of Received Ideas, [Trans. Gregory 
Norminton], Oneworld Classics Ltd: 60) 
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trying to win. Everybody wins if anybody wins’108 (Bohm 2004: 2). This non-
oppositional conception of dialogue is, superficially, coherent with the premise of 
collaborative practice; however, Bohmian dialogue infers a conflation of 
perspectives, arguably conforming to a tradition of synthesis. It is perhaps in Bohm’s 
scientific heritage where the greatest disparity between matthews and allen’s 
dialogic-machine and Bohmian dialogue may be observed. Bohm states that ‘in 
dialogue you have to be serious. It is not a dialogue if you are not’ (Bohm 2004: 16). 
Bohm’s conception of dialogue supports a cultural propensity toward noesis and 
consequently effects an oppositional logic between serious and non-serious 
phenomena. matthews and allen’s footnote-machine seeks to generate a culture of 
equivalence wherein poesis is not simply characterized as the inverse of noesis. This 
footnote-machine attempts to recast the figure of parasite, clinamen, and anomaly, as 
something other than the antithetical relation of order, thus ‘ceasing to think only 
with a view to unity. And this means therefore: not fearing to affirm interruption’ 
(Blanchot 1993: 82).  
 
Here we have made use of everything 
that came within range, what was 
closest and as well as farthest away. 
(Deleuze & Guattari 2004[a]: 3)  
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 If artist-to-artist dialogue resists the dialectical logic of opposition and 
subsequent collapse into unity, then what is the operative language of this practice? 
‘[N]ew ideas seem to emerge from the dialogue without “belonging” to either of the 
pair’ (Farrell 2003). An ideological model of dialogue may be characterized as the 
linear trajectory from one interlocutor to another; however, a ‘line does not go109 
from one point to another, but passes between the points, ceaselessly bifurcating  
and diverging’ (Deleuze & Parnet 2007: viii). matthews and allen’s footnote-machine 
articulates digression and anomaly through the incorporation of elements commonly 
excluded from the prevailing academic discourse.  matthews and allen may be said to 
escape the limitation of an oppositional logic through their inclusion of tangential 
phenomena. The inclusion of peripheral phenomena is generated through a process 
of listening to the metaphoric background noise of the master narrative. This act of 
looking away from the dominant discourse is the performance of digression and 
deferral.  
 
At the feast everyone is talking. At the door of the room there is a 
ringing noise, the telephone. Communication cuts conversation, the 
noise interrupting the messages. As soon as I start to talk with this 
new interlocutor, the sounds of the banquet become noise for the new 
‘us.’ The system has shifted. (Serres 2007: 66) 
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A ringing telephone, a barking dog,110 a noise, a distraction, an absent item 
from a shopping list, an advertising jingle, a mishearing, a rumour, an anecdote, a 
colloquialism, an old wives tale, a malapropism, a stutter, then a stammer, and then 
the murmur of anomaly sounds above the proclamations of unity. ‘Chance speaks of 
the limits of reason as a faculty that, finally, reflects only its own presuppositions.’ 
(Kavanagh 1993: 4). The operative language of matthews and allen’s footnotes involves 
what may be termed a ‘play of constraints.’ The constraints (or rules of the game) 
employed by the collaborative double are, to some extent, intended to confound their 
own limitation: A typographical error that breaks the continuity of a word game and 
thus baffles the imposed paradigmatic rules.  
 
be exist; occur; be present. have a specified quality, 
position, or condition 
 
condition the state something is in: (conditions) circumstances. 
Something that is necessary if something else is to exist 
or occur 
 
else in addition. instead, other 
 
other distinct from one already present or mentioned; extra, 
further, different, the one of two people or things not 
already mentioned or accounted for 
 
two one more than two 
 
(matthews and allen, 2010, Collaboration [excerpt]) 
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Does the name Pavlov ring a bell? 
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In the work Collaboration, the rules of the game stipulate that matthews and allen 
must produce a series of textual digressions by selecting a word from each definition 
to generate a supplementary meaning, each definition serving to alter the trajectory. 
matthews and allen’s constraints are subject to exception when a slippage occurs in 
the definition of the word ‘two’. A definition that should have read ‘one more than 
one’, through typographical error, reads ‘one more than two’. This parapoetic gesture 
generates an aleatoric play of meaning between the collaborative double and the 
traditional formation of a third collaborative identity.   
The exception that explicates the rule serves as a reiteration of the 
impossibility of a totalizing systematic order. The system stutters and stammers to 
generate anomaly and thus resists the displacement of one authorizing system for 
another. matthews and allen’s footnote-machine does not seek to invert the 
hierarchical positions of noetic and poetic practices but rather attempts to ‘graph its 
drifts and meanders, sounding out its blanks and gaps’111 (Maharaj 2010).  
 
Is it not fair to say that, wherever a 
norm prevails, chance seems to 
intervene on behalf of an anomalous 
behaviour? (Bök 2006: 27) 
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Mind the gap! 
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A parallel112 may be observed between the anomalous operations of matthews 
and allen’s footnote-machine and the parapoetic gesture of Tom Stoppard’s 
tragicomedy Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead.  Stoppard’s absurdist play 
focuses on Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, two minor characters from Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet. Stoppard’s play is literally situated ‘beside’ Shakespeare’s Hamlet, implying 
an equivalence between major and minor narratives. In Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern Are Dead scenes from Hamlet operate as a background to the dialogues 
between Stoppard’s two confused protagonists (similarly, this academic document 
operates as the background noise in the workings of matthews and allen’s footnote-
machine and vice-versa). Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead creates a 
stammering narrative that oscillates between the major character of Hamlet and the 
minor characters of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. This play situates itself beside 
and between the Shakespearean canon, generating disruption from within the 
dominant discourse. 
 The dialogue between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern frequently manifests as 
a series of misunderstandings and through the inclusion of asteismus in their 
conversation multiplicity in meaning is affirmed.  
 
Rosencrantz:  We might as well be dead. Do you think Death 
could possibly be a boat? 
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PARALLEL - One must only choose between the following: 
Caesar and Pompey, Horace and Virgil, Voltaire and 
Rousseau, Napoleon and Charlemagne, Goethe and Schiller, 
Bayard and Mac-Mahon…  
 
(Flaubert, G., 2010, Dictionary of Received Ideas, [Trans. Gregory 
Norminton], Oneworld Classics Ltd: 74) 
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Guildenstern: No, no, no113… Death is… not. Death isn’t. You 
take my meaning? Death is the ultimate 
negative. Not-being. You can’t not be on a 
boat.  
Rosencrantz: I’ve frequently not been on boats. 
Guildenstern: No, no, no - what you’ve been is not on boats. 
 
An asteismus is essentially a play on words where a second speaker alters the 
(non)sense of terminology spoken by their protagonist. The use of an asteismus is 
commonly considered to be a comedic device; however, in this ludic conversation 
between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern the supposedly finite dichotomies of being 
and nonbeing, sense and nonsense, appear impossible.   
 
it is as if the language were stretched 
along an abstract and infinitely varied 
line. (Deleuze 1997: 109) 
 
The ‘abstract and varied line’ of this discourse bifurcates and deviates to 
generate a stammering space that is resistant to metaphysical dichotomies and 
totalizing narratives. matthews and allen’s footnote-machine is a malfunctioning 
device that resists the anticipated explanatory function of academic annotation. This 
(dys)functional footnote-machine affirms a parapoetic practice, situating anomaly, 
exception, error and interruption as generative potentialities.  
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The Vicar of Dibley, Series 5 episode 1, [Excerpt] 
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we should view the constraint as a 
generator of potentialities, only some 
of which will be actualised in concrete 
form. (James & Perloff 2009: 155) 
 
matthews and allen’s footnote-machine utilizes the effective concept of 
constraints to generate potentialities. These machinic constraints operate in the space 
between the traditional dualities of order and disorder. This tensive space attempts to 
resist homogenization through the implementation of constraints (a method 
paradoxically suggesting unifying stratagems). The play of constraints in matthews 
and allen’s footnote-machine seeks to generate ‘vagaries that diverge from what 
directs them, escaping114 the events of the system that controls them.’ (Bök 2001: 43). 
The language of a rule and a constraint differs in that a rule is commonly perceived 
as an accepted norm whereas a constraint is perceived as an excessive exaggeration 
of the rule (matthews and allen adopt the word rule as a satirical gesture that implies 
both cultural convention and the ludic vocabulary of childhood games). The 
constraint may be said to go beyond the rule forcing ‘the system out of its routine 
functioning’, thus generating anomaly (Motte 1998: 41). The purposeful construction of 
constraints is intended to parody the unifying rules implicit in traditional 
metaphysical thought. This parodic gesture affirms that ‘[t]he classical  
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playwright who writes his tragedy observing a certain number of familiar rules is 
freer than the poet who writes that which comes into his head and who is the slave of 
other rules of which he is ignorant.’ (Queneau 1998: 41). The concept of constraint-
based practice was introduced in the first OuLiPo manifesto as an alternative to the 
romanticized notion of artistic inspiration. OuLiPo is a contraction of Ouvroir de la 
Littérature Potentielle, translating to ‘workshop for potential literature’. For the 
Oulipians, the objective of a constraint is to establish ‘techniques which can dismiss 
inspiration from their affectivity.’ (Lescure 2001: 67). Writing115 under constraint 
operates as a method to destabilize the traditional centrality of the artistic author and 
thus to liberate the artist from the servitude of artistic expression. Constraint-based 
practice operates as a machinic paralogy where ‘acts of prosthetic automation do not 
simply assist in the process of writing so much as replace the concept of writing 
itself.’ (Bök 2001: 67). matthews and allen adopt the notion of constraint-based practice 
through the formulation of ludic rules. The ludic rules of matthews and allen’s game 
attempt to destabilize the ideological figure of the author who traditionally imposes 
homogenous meaning. Homogenous systems are arguably dependant upon the 
implementation of and adherence to determined rules. matthews and allen observe 
the playful character of OuLiPo and their use of constraints to disrupt the rules that 
govern cultural contrivance. This observation serves as a point of departure for 
matthews and allen’s footnote-machine where ‘a machinic calculus has the potential  
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WRITING - Currente calamo: that’s the excuse for poor 
style and faulty grammar.  
 
(Flaubert, G., 2010, Dictionary of Received Ideas, [Trans. Gregory 
Norminton], Oneworld Classics Ltd: 99) 
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to generate the novelty of anomaly.’ (Bök 2001: 65). matthews and allen establish 
constraints that serve to generate potentialities. This constraint-based practice 
manifests as a series of rules in a dialogic game between the collaborative double 
where ‘potential generates a new process rather than an old product. The exception 
to the rule implies not a freedom from but the outcome of such an exhaustive 
constraint.’ (Bök 2001: 71). This exception to the rule is a swerve, a clinamen deviating 
from the fate of contrivance.  
 
The ideal game is defined by chance and the production of rules. And 
this production of rules is not arbitrated by some benevolent and wise 
force which would guarantee lawfulness and regularity, but by an 
aleatory point, by pure chance. (Hughes 2008: 112) 
 
Georges Perec’s lipogrammatic novel A Void is composed entirely without 
the use of the letter ‘e’, excepting the author’s name.116 A Void is an example of 
constraint-based practice where the exclusion of the letter ‘e’ generates an inventive 
potentiality.  
 
A gap will yawn, achingly, day by day, 
it will turn into a colossal pit, an abyss  
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without foundation, a gradual invasion 
of words by margins, blank and 
insignificant, so that all of us, to a man, 
will find nothing to say. (Perec 2008: 16) 
  
The News At Ton, a comedy sketch by the double act The Two Ronnies, appears 
comparable to the linguistic constraints implemented by Perec and the OuLiPo 
group. The News At Ton implements a constraint generated by the faulty mechanisms 
of a dysfunctional machine - a typewriter that substitutes the letter ‘o’ for the letter 
‘e’. These machinic errors give rise to an anomalous language where the ‘Queen’ 
becomes the ‘Quoon’ in a continuous and ludic slippage of meaning. 
‘Letters no longer remain gridlocked in the striated space of their lineated pages; 
instead, they flit and dart within a smoother space of volatile links that spiral 
outward from any starting point’ (Bök 2006: 29). Christian Bök’s text Eunoia, the 
shortest word in the English dictionary117 to contain all five vowels, adopts the 
principle of constraint demonstrated in Perec’s A Void. In Eunoia, the rules of the 
game constrain the writer to use only one vowel per chapter: Chapter A, Chapter E, 
Chapter I, Chapter O and Chapter U. ‘Enfettered, these sentences repress free 
speech. The text deletes selected letters. We see the revered exegete reject metred 
verse’ (Bök 2008: 31). 
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DICTIONARY - Say of it: “Only for ignoramuses.” A 
dictionary of rhyme:118 to use or not to use? Shameful!  
 
(Flaubert, G., 2010, Dictionary of Received Ideas, [Trans. Gregory 
Norminton], Oneworld Classics Ltd: 27) 
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I’m, chyme, chime, dime, lime, climb, clime, slime, mime, 
rime, crime, grime, prime, cyme, time, thyme, Trondheim, 
Sondheim, Mannheim, sublime, quicklime, brooklime, 
birdlime, begrime, daytime, playtime, foretime, wartime, 
bedtime, halftime, lifetime, ragtime, full-time, 
sometime, meantime, noontime, springtime, longtime, 
pastime, peacetime, mistime, part-time, enzyme, isocheim, 
mesenchyme, paradigm …  
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The OuLiPo method of constraint-based practice places ‘emphasis on 
potential rather than actual literature’ (Hugill 2012: 58). In attempting to understand 
the intentions of the Oulipians it is perhaps advantageous to think outside of the 
traditional notions of completed literary works and alternatively place emphasis upon 
the term ‘potential’. ‘Potential’ suggests that which is possible as opposed to actual. 
The OuLiPo group ‘has been concerned not with literary works but with the 
structures and procedures capable of producing them.’ (Brotchie & Mathews 2005: 213). 
The Oulipian distinction between ‘created creations’ and ‘creations that create’ 
reflects matthews and allen’s distinction between the footnote (being one possibility 
among many potentialities) and the footnote-machine (a device capable of generating 
a field of potentialities). The Oulipian use of terminology such as ‘workshop’ and 
‘potential’ suggests an emphasis upon the process involved in generating language 
rather than the static product of literary activity.   
 The emphasis on process in the Ouplipian machine is integral to the concept 
of a generative practice. Process refers to a ‘continuous series of facts or operations 
that can lead to other series of facts and operations. A process implies the idea of a 
permanent rupture in established equilibria.’ (Guattari 2006: 420). Guattari’s definition 
of process articulates the collapse of an order/119disorder dichotomy and effects an 
associative relation to the ‘initial conditions’ (order) of scientific experimentation 
and the subsequent rupture of the clinamen (disorder). ‘Disorder is the end of  
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The slash is most commonly used as the word substitute 
for ‘or’ which indicates a choice (often mutually 
exclusive) is present. 
 
 
	 137 
systems, and their beginning. Everything always goes toward chaos, and, sometimes, 
everything comes from it.’ (Abbas 2005: 13). The clinamen is the affirmation of 
anomaly within a system that privileges the standard120 and the serious. The 
clinamen is ‘the opening of difference and of play.’ (Barker 2012: 200). 
 The Oulipian constraint effectively operates as the rule in a game, thus 
analogous to the language of childhood games and notions of play. The associative 
language of play is commonly perceived as activity without serious or practical 
purpose. This dichotomous language of the serious and the non-serious suggests a 
connection to the Derridean concept of the ‘play of differences’ (a play of difference 
being an oscillating movement between traditional dichotomies: the serious and the 
non-serious). This play of difference renders the static classification of dichotomies 
‘impossible’, and thus suggests the affirmation of ambiguity and anomaly. 
Deconstructionist philosophy responds to a system of homogeneity that limits play 
by establishing codes and conventions that appear innate and perform ‘as is’. The 
hierarchical duality of noesis and poesis, the serious and non-serious, effectively 
operates as a metaphysical ‘as is’. As Jarry suggests in his science of ’pataphysics, 
the actual is never ‘as it is’ but always ‘as if it is’, in that actuality only exists as an 
interpretative speculation, thus ’pataphysics ‘narrates not what is, but what might 
have become’ (Bök 2001: 8). The OuLiPo group respond to the ‘pataphysical science 
of exceptions ‘by inflecting the mathetic intensities of numerological forms, arguing  
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that exception results from the constraint of programs.’ (Bök 2001: 64). It is in this 
exception to the rule that a language of anomaly and difference is arguably 
generated.  
‘From which point it’s but a hop, skip and a jump121 to grasping why so much 
was built on so rigorous a constraint.’ (Perec 2008: 177). The construction of rules and 
constraints appear frequently in the practice of collaborations, collectives and groups. 
The rules of the collective game suggest an operational logic that permits the 
participation of multiple players.   
 
The weed overflows by virtue of being 
restrained. (Deleuze & Parnet 2007: 30) 
 
George: We go shopping every two years, so we don't have to shop on 
a daily basis. We buy enough lavatory paper, toothpaste, shampoo, 
soap to last us quite some time. (Gilbert & George 2012) 
 
The constraints at play in the collaboration between Gilbert & George operate as a 
method to maintain their homogenous third character. In THE LAWS OF 
SCULPTORS Gilbert & George utilize constraint-based practice to introduce the  
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concept of control: ‘Always be smartly dressed, well groomed, relaxed, friendly, 
polite122 and in complete control’ (Gilbert & George 2012). The practice of Gilbert & 
George adopts the concept of control (control employed as a deliberate strategy to 
confound social expectation) as a method to simultaneously construct collaborative 
rules and disrupt cultural convention (the interplay of order and disorder).  
 
Rules must efface the idiocracy of the 
anomalos, but ironically such a rule 
about rules already risks the anomaly 
of paradox itself. (Bök 2001: 39) 
 
Deleuze and Guattari employ dialogic constraints in their collaborative-
machine to generate a practice of anomalous multiplicity. Their dialogic systems and 
regimes appear to resist the conversational character commonly associated with the 
process of dialogue. Francois Dosse, author of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: 
Intersecting Lives, describes deleuzoguattarian dialogue as something akin to a 
‘purification ritual: while one spoke, the other listened silently.’ (Dosse 2001: 9). This 
deleuzoguattarian dialogic constraint ensures that all concepts are played-out within 
a culture of equivalence. ‘If I told him that the center of the earth was made of 
raspberry jam, his role would be to find out how to make that idea work.’ [sic.] 
(Deleuze 2001: 9). 
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Wit and vivacity are two highly important ingredients in 
the conversation of a man in polite society, yet a 
straining for effect, or forced wit, is in excessively 
bad taste. There is nothing more insupportable in society 
than the everlasting talkers who scatter puns, 
witticisms, and jokes with so profuse a hand that they 
become as tiresome as a comic newspaper, and whose loud 
laugh at their own wit drowns other voices which might 
speak matter more interesting. 
 
(Hartly,123 C., 2006, Gentlemen's Book of Etiquette, University of 
Michigan: 12-13) 
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matthews and allen’s decision to abide by a series of constraints is, in part, an 
acknowledgment of the rules at play in all aspects of culture and the assertion that 
‘no rule can be undermined by pretending that the rule does not exist’ (Bök 2001: 67). 
matthews and allen adopt the concept of dialogic constraint as a means to generate 
machinic potentialities that resist the traditions of artistic authorialism. A-typical 
matthews and allen constraint reads as follows: ‘A written dialogue will take place 
between matthews and allen via the medium of email. The dialogic constraint 
stipulates that matthews and allen may communicate using only the concluding lines 
of a text to generate potentialities from what others perceive as a finite work’ (see 
matthews and allen’s epilogue). matthews and allen are ‘rats who must build the 
labyrinth124 from which they propose to escape.’ (Motte 1998: 22). New constraints are 
drafted for each potential footnote and although constraints recur, no system is 
permitted to settle into government. The establishment of dialogic constraints 
reinforces the non-oppositional character of matthews and allen’s collaborative 
machine and affirms that it is the footnote-machine that speaks and not matthews 
and/or allen. These machinic constraints perform a ludic code that attempts to resist 
the metaphysical tradition of homogeneity. Through a process of incorporating 
anomaly, exception, and the noise of the Serresean third man into the academic text, 
the footnote-machine seeks to perform digression from the traditional centrality of  
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authorial meaning. Deleuze suggests that ‘creating has always been something 
different from communicating. The key thing might be to create vacuoles of non-
communication, circuit breakers so we can elude control.’ (Deleuze 1995: 175). 
matthews and allen attempt to evade authorial control through the implementation of 
ludic rules and constraints performed by an abstract machine.125 (The ‘abstract 
machine’ is associated with the mathematician Alan Turing who imagined a 
hypothetical machine that had the ability to perform infinite mathematical 
calculations. Turing’s abstract machine serves to question the definitude with which 
traditional mathematics is associated.) 
 
the diagram exists at an abstract level 
which is not itself formal; rather, it is a 
site of potentiality that provides the 
conditions of possibility (James 2009: 153) 
 
The constraint is a condition of possibility that suggests diagrammatic 
thought. Deleuze differentiates the figure of the diagram from structure, suggesting 
that ‘there is no diagram that does not also include, besides the points which it 
connects up, certain relatively free or unbound points, points of creativity, change 
and resistance.’ (Deleuze 2006: 44). The character of the Deleuzian diagram is that of a  
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Awareness is like consciousness. Soul is like spirit. 
But soft is not like hard and weak is not like 
strong. A mechanic can be both soft and hard, a 
stewardess can be both weak and strong. This is 
called philosophy or a world-view. 
 
RACTER [raconteur] (an artificial intelligence computer programme 
that generated English language prose at random), 1984, The 
Policeman's Beard is Half Constructed. 
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fluid and unstable abstract machine which appears to resist any definitive definition: 
‘As we get close to it, it remains elusive.’ (Zdebik 2012: 178). The diagram is a non-
representational machine mapping an undecidable and indiscernible space, a space 
between stable structures (between collaborative constraint and footnote). The 
diagram, in the context of architectural practice, is situated between the concept of a 
building and the actual building. ‘The house described is ‘floating’, its parts 
detached. This is not a stable house. It is incorporeal’ (Zdebik 2012: 122). 
 Deleuze articulates a distinction between the mimetic operations of tracing 
(the repetition of what is already present) and mapping as a site of potentiality. 
Etymologically the diagram is a contraction of ‘dia’, from the Greek meaning 
through, and gram meaning that which is drawn; thus the diagram may be said to 
operate through that which is marked. The diagram’s ‘secondary connotation of 
marking or crossing out’ generates an undecidable condition and positions the 
diagram as analogous to the Derridean concept ‘under erasure’ (Knoespel 2001: 147). 
Derridean under erasure effectively refers to a text wherein what is written is struck-
through. The process of crossing out connotes that which is both present and absent, 
thus undecidable. matthews and allen’s footnotes metaphorically place the academic 
text under erasure,126 effectively dislocating traditional perceptions of unitary 
meaning.  
‘The diagram is not precise, or representational, but charts the relation of 
forces that can be utilized or made’ (Zdebik 2012: 7). Akin to a map, the diagram does  
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fluid and unstable abstract machine which appears to resist 
any definitive definition: ‘As we get close to it, it remains 
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The diagram’s ‘secondary connotation of marking or crossing 
out’ generates an undecidable condition and positions the 
diagram as analogous to the Derridean concept ‘under erasure’ 
(Knoespel 2001: 147). Derridean under erasure effectively 
refers to a text wherein what is written is struck-through. 
The process of crossing out connotes that which is both 
present and absent, thus undecidable. matthews and allen’s 
footnotes metaphorically place the academic text under 
erasure, effectively dislocating traditional perceptions of 
unitary meaning.  
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not trace static and determinable phenomena but rather generates conditions for 
possibilities. A map has no determined entry or exit point, no indication of when or 
where a journey is to begin or end, only possible trajectories, possible terrains.  
 
there is no longer a subject that tries to conform to the image, and 
either succeeds or fails. Rather, a zone of indistinction, of 
indiscernibility, or of ambiguity seems to be established between two 
terms, as if they had reached the point immediately preceding their 
respective differentiation: not a similitude,127 but a slippage.’ (Zdebik 
2012: 160) 
 
Deleuze refers to the diagram as ‘the map of relations between forces’, an indistinct 
and undecidable condition (Deleuze 2006: 37). The footnote-machine operates as an 
abstract machine, a map of relations between noetic and poetic forces. The footnote-
machine is neither the academic text nor the footnotes but a series of functions that 
make up a system. The diagram does not attempt to close the gap between 
phenomena (this is not a gesture toward synthesis) but rather attempts to widen this 
fluctuating space of potentiality. Thus the diagram performs a ‘fluctuating process 
occurring between static structures. As a concept it describes the flexible, elastic, 
incorporeal functions before they settle into a definitive form’ (Zdebik 2012: 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abbott & Costello, 1942, Who Done It? [watts are volts] 
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matthews and allen’s footnote-machine performs diagrammatically, describing the 
functions and constraints of the academic/paratextual system. The constraints of the 
footnote-machine suggest the operations of an abstract machine that may be applied 
‘beyond a specific state – to heterogeneous situations.’ (Zdebik 2012: 9). The abstract 
machine values that which is fluid and unformed, thus adhering to the language of 
process (a Guattarian conception of process being a rupture in established equilibria). 
 
the diagram is highly unstable or 
fluid, continually churning up matter 
and functions in a way likely to 
create change. (Deleuze 2006: 30) 
 
The diagram suggests the interplay between order and chaos; analogous to 
the clinamen, it is the emergence of ‘unexpected conjunctions or improbable 
continuums’ (Deleuze 2006: 31). The diagram, perceived as that which is drawn, 
suggests an alliance with the concept of a ‘sketch’, which etymologically may be 
considered to perform the language of the clinamen-machine. Zdebik contextualises 
the word ‘sketch’128 in the German ‘skizze’, a term derived from the Italian ‘schizzo’ 
meaning ‘to splash or to squirt’. This splashing and squirting is comparable with the 
movements of Faustroll’s clinamen-machine, movements that rupture the flow of 
matter. 
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The diagram is rhythm emerging from 
chaos, the manipulation of chance to 
suggest the emergence of another 
world. (O’Sullivan 2006: 255) 
  
The manipulation of chance generates a paradox in Oulipian practice in the tensive 
relation between order (constraints) and disorder (clinamen). This diagrammatic and 
uncertain relation of forces is effectively articulated in the title of Mallarmé’s poem 
A throw of the dice will never abolish chance. Bök proposes chance as that which 
performs two contradictory operations: the dispersal of associative phenomena and 
the assemblage of disparate phenomena (deterritorialization and reterritorialization). 
‘Is it not fair to say that, wherever a norm prevails, chance seems to intervene on 
behalf of an anomalous behaviour?’ (Bök 2006: 27). Nietzsche correlates the dice-
throw with multiplicity and the affirmation of chance, where each throw generates 
potentialities. 
 
it is not a matter of unbridled spontaneity or sheer chaos. On the 
contrary, in these cases the operation129 of chance occurs only in the 
context of certain predetermined conditions, much like a deck of cards 
or a pair of dice. Within those constraints, a process is set in motion 
that has unpredictable results. (Iversen 2010: 19)  
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The truth130 of the ludic abides by  
no belief; instead, such truth is 
entertained as one of many 
hypothetical alternatives. It is merely 
a “potentiality”  (Bök 2001: 73) 
 
The concept of potentiality has traditionally been perceived as contrary to 
actuality (an Aristotelian inheritance). This oppositional logic historically privileges 
the concept of actuality and subsequently positions potentiality as marginal. The 
actual connotes a condition of certainty and stasis, thus adhering to a cultural 
propensity toward ordered systems and known phenomena. Contrarily, the concept 
of potentiality is traditionally perceived as a temporary and uncertain state, 
suggesting that which subsists in a minoritarian condition. An inclination toward 
actualizing potential may effectively be perceived as the negation of potentiality. It is 
perhaps in Giorgio Agamben’s account of potentiality that we find a means to escape 
this oppositional impasse. Agamben’s essay On Potentiality offers a critical 
trajectory beyond the binarism of an actual/potential relation. Agamben offers a 
theoretical perspective where potentiality resists the homogeneity of majoritarian 
actuality; ‘here we are confronted with a potentiality that conserves itself and saves 
itself in actuality.’ (Agamben 1999: 184).  Agamben argues that the binarism assigned to  
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You could obtain some 
useful information 
from an unexpected 
source.  
(Aries 8 Jan 2013, 
theastrologyroom.com)  
 
That may be true.  
(Sagittarius 11 Jan 2013, 
dailymail.co.uk)  
 
Knowledge is power.  
(Taurus 11 Jan 
2013, russellgrant.com)  
 
Obstacles will 
disappear when you 
shine the light of 
knowledge.  
(Aries 14 Jan 2013, 
dailyhoroscopes.com) 
 
Two heads are better 
than one. 
(Aries 14 Jan 2013, 
theastrologyroom.com)    
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Aristotle’s philosophy of an actual/potential binary may be reconsidered. 
Potentiality, rather than being designated as that which has yet to be actualized, may 
be repositioned as a potential ‘not to be’. For Agamben, this ‘impotentiality’ 
questions the traditional primacy of actuality. ‘What is essential is that potentiality is 
not simply non-Being, simple privation, but rather the existence of non-Being, the 
presence of an absence’ (Agamben: 1999: 179). Agamben describes the persistence of 
potentiality as that which remains in the actual (in the context of matthews and 
allen’s paratextual practice, a multiplicity of potential footnotes may be said to reside 
in the footnote which is actualized). This persistence of potentiality in actuality 
suggests an association to Thucydides’ proposition that stasis, the actual, is a 
condition in which oppositional forces enter into a static state yet retain ‘internal 
disturbances’. Deleuze and Parnet suggest that dualisms are inherent in all language 
systems and as such they do not disregard duality, but rather propose the stammering 
of language between actuality and potentiality (Deleuze & Parnet 2007: 34). Deleuzian 
philosophy suggests the coupling of actuality and potentiality where ‘actuality is 
unfolded from potentiality’ (Colebrook 2010: 10).   
 
It fluctuates, it does not remain. Or if 
it remains, it does so by fluctuating. 
It is one, it isn’t one, unstable.  
(Serres 1997: 50) 
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more supported and 
better understood.  
(Capricorn 14 Jan 2013, 
dailymail.co.uk) 
 
It is possible though, 
that you could talk 
your way around this. 
(Aquarius 14 Jan 2013, 
horoscopes.co.uk)   
  
We want to know who to 
love and cheer, who to 
hate and boo. We don't 
really want to be 
troubled with 
extenuating 
circumstances and 
reasons to reconsider 
our opinions. 
(Sagittarius 11 Jan 2013, 
dailymail.co.uk) 
 
Sudden revelations can 
be unsettling.  
(Aquarius 14 Jan 2013, 
patrickarundell.com)   
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Agamben’s potentiality suggests that the system actualized or unfolded is 
only one possibility among many potential systems. Agamben’s collapse of the 
actual and potential dichotomy suggests that potentiality persists in that which has 
been actualized, thus making actuality unstable (this ‘collapse’ of actuality and 
potentiality does not give way to unity but rather generates a stammering space). 
‘The multiplicity of the possible is here, it is now. It is intermediary between the 
phenomena, it rustles in the midst of the forms that emerge from it’ (Serres 1997: 23-24).  
The persistence of potentiality in that which is actualized implies that both 
the noetic text and the poetic footnote are situated in a stammering space. matthews 
and allen’s footnote-machine attempts to affirm the possibility for other potentialities 
to persist in that which has been actualized. ‘When the first sonnet was written 
almost a thousand years ago, what counted was not the poem itself but a new 
potentiality of future poems.’ (Brotchie & Mathews 2005: 213). 
Agamben states that ‘[every] written work can be regarded as the prologue 
(or rather, the broken cast) of a work never penned, and destined to remain so, 
because later works, which in turn will be the prologues or the moulds for other 
absent works represent only sketches’ or diagrams (Agamben 1993: 3). Agamben’s 
suggestion that every work is prefatory situates the text as diagrammatic, thus 
generating a condition of undecidability between text and diagram, actuality and 
potentiality. 
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This could be a time 
when mixed messages 
are possible. 
(Scorpio 14 Jan 2013, 
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you need the 
connection. 
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matthews and allen’s footnote machine, comparable to the Oulipian 
constraint and the Deleuzian diagram, attempts to map the imaginary space of 
potentiality. This space of potentiality is characterized through the concept of 
anomaly, the principle of variance, differing from the norm, the standard, the 
orthodox, and the actual. The digressive operations of the footnote serve as a one 
possibility in the mapping of potentiality. Several ‘anticipatory plagiarists’ have 
utilized the footnote as a method for disruption. Anticipatory plagiarism is a ludic 
and somewhat paradoxical phrase employed by the OuLiPo group to ‘identify its 
predecessors: authors who have previously used methods now seen as “Oulipian”.’ 
(Brotchie & Matthews 2005: 211). matthews and allen’s anticipatory plagiarisms may 
include, for example,  Danielewski’s labyrinthine text House of Leaves. The copious 
footnoting in House of Leaves disrupts the concept of linearity where every 
permutation of the page leads the reader toward digression.  
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beyond what is 
seemingly obvious. 
(Taurus 11 Jan 2013, 
dailymail.co.uk)  
 
You might even doubt 
your own mind. 
(Aries 15 Jan 2013, 
horoscopes.co.uk)  
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space of an otherwise blank page. These digressive devices compel the reader to 
perform disruptive gestures: an inclining motion of the head, the rotation of the text, 
the flitting from one section of text to another. Danielewski’s exceptions to the 
literary rule appear to affirm Louis Borges’ assertion that ‘the book and the labyrinth 
[are] one and the same.’ (Borges 1999: 217). Auster’s novel Oracle Night may also be 
perceived as generating a Borgesian bifurcation where the use of footnotes perform 
an almost hypertextual practice. The fictional terrain depicted in Auster’s footnotes is 
presented as one among many possibilities. The use of paratextual material in Oracle 
Night and House of Leaves, et al. is intended to ramify rather than unify the narrative 
field. The digressive paratexts of matthews and allen also suggest a relation to 
Mallarmé and the 1897 text Divagations; ‘a new mode of writing that moved between 
the critical essay and the prose poem, constantly challenging and redefining their 
limits’ (Forsdick & Stafford 2005: 233).  
 
Stories131 and ever more stories that 
know only too well that each one 
uttered is but one possibility amongst 
a much vaster set of possibilities 
(Lomax 2004: 82) 
  
131 
 
I'll tell you a story 
About Jack a Nory; 
And now my story's begun; 
I'll tell you another 
Of Jack132 and his brother, 
And now my story is done. 
 
132 
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The paratextual matter generated by matthews and allen’s footnote-machine 
articulates one possibility among a multiplicity of future possibilities which remain 
in a state of potentiality, thus ‘a potential work is a work which is not limited to its 
appearances’ (Motte 1998: 20). matthews and allen’s footnote-machine operates via a 
series of constraints that simultaneously question artistic decision and the 
romanticized notions of inspiration and expression associated with authorial activity. 
These collaborative constraints include non-oppositional dialogue devised as a 
means to include the Serresean third man and consequently generate a circumstance 
wherein the dialectical relation between noetic and poetic practice falters. matthews 
and allen attempt to question established authorial noesis through the methodological 
inclusion of informal or ‘small narratives’; the idiom, the proverb, the joke.133 
matthews and allen utilize humour as a device to question the authority of the 
standard and the serious and the traditional dichotomy between the serious and the 
comedic. The informality of jokes, urban myths, anecdotes, et al. is positioned as 
equivalent to the supposed centrality of an academic text. The rules of matthews and 
allen’s game serve to perform différance in the anticipated monocracy of the 
academic text. ‘There are no preexisting rules; each move invents its own rules; it 
bears upon its own rule’ (Deleuze 2004[b]: 70). These constraints reside ‘more in the 
ordering of the means than in the intuition of the ends’ (Motte 1998: 49).  
 
 
 
133 
 How to Tell a Joke   
Very little in Comedy is a sure thing; however, there are 
steps you can take to help build the favorable response 
you want from your audience, whether you're onstage or 
amongst friends. 
Difficulty Level: Easy    Time Required: Varies 
Here's How: 
 
Avoid detours. As a rule, jokes work best in a straight 
line.134 
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The Oulipians are the anticipatory plagiarists135 of matthews and allen’s 
constraint-based practice where ‘[w]hat is potential generates a new process rather 
than an old product. The exception to the rule implies not a freedom from but the 
outcome of such an exhaustive constraint. The exception explicates the rule, testing 
its limits, defying its fields, forsaking the nomic work of one paradigm for the ludic 
risk of another paralogy’ (Bök 2001: 71). 
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[In]conclusion 
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There are multiplicities which 
constantly go beyond binary 
machines. (Delezue & Parnet 2007: 19) 
 
Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule is a complex 
of gestures serving to unsettle the metaphysical legacy of authorialism. This 
discourse considers six philosophical perspectives relating to the third position, from 
metaphysical monocracy to proliferative potentiality. The crowd, clinamen, 
parapoetic gesture and parasitic background NOISE operate as tropes for 
multiplicity, generating disruption within a traditional authorial paradigm (the word 
‘trope’ taken from the Greek ‘tropos’ meaning to turn). This disruptive discourse 
suggests that ‘behind the visible facade of the system, […] the rich uncertainty of 
disorder’ persists (Foucault 2002[a]: 84). 
This research is contextualized within the metaphysical tradition of 
dialecticism, aligning dialectical synthesis with the conflated third hand of 
collaboration136 theory. The language of opposition and consensus permeates 
philosophical tradition manifesting in the sublated third term and/or the stasis of 
binary opposition. Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule 
performs the destabilization of the oppositions at play in this text (noetic/poetic, 
theory/practice, author/reader, one/multiplicity, order/chaos, serious/non-serious,  
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stoic/ludic) whilst attempting to resist the stasis of stable opposition. The complexity 
of this research resides in the inclusion of two narrative constructs (text and paratext) 
and two collaborative protagonists (matthews and allen), wherein the language of 
duality (albeit an intentional system of dualism implemented by the collaboration) 
may ostensibly be perceived as a series of oppositional gestures; however, the 
relation between the noetic text and the poetic137 paratext is resistant to an 
oppositional reading as these two textual spaces are not theoretically opposed. 
matthews and allen’s paratexts are not contradictory gestures that attempt to subvert 
or usurp the academic text, more accurately they are ‘the idea of opposites as 
equivalent.’ (Hugill 2012: 11). 
 
By using the principle of equivalents as 
its point of departure, the game is free: 
the situation can completely construct 
itself. (Jorn 1961) 
 
Contemporary philosophy acknowledges that every single harbours the 
multiple; however, this discourse has situated the language of unitary thought (the 
standard, the normative, the rule) as a persistent precept in the construction of 
meaning. In the proposition to unsettle unity (that which is ‘formed of parts that  
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Poetic Licence138 
 
138 
 
LIBERTY - 0 liberty! What crimes are committed in your 
name! We have all the liberties that are necessary. 
Liberty139 does not mean license (phrase for 
conservatives).  
 
(Flaubert, G., 2010, Dictionary of Received Ideas, [Trans. Gregory 
Norminton], Oneworld Classics Ltd: 61) 
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constitute a whole’  Pearsall & Trumble 1995) this discourse has introduced the concepts 
of exception and anomaly. Akin to Jarry's 'pataphysical science of exceptions, 
matthews and allen’s paratextual practice seeks to generate anomaly in the authorial 
system, ‘inciting a riot in the prison house of language’ (Andrews 1996: 45). matthews 
and allen perform the metaphoric Serresean third man in Sillman’s prison-house of 
language, being neither prison guard (the autocratic author) nor prisoner (the 
acquiescent reader). This third man is proposed as a NOISE in the background of 
ideological unity, an intervallic exception in a paradigmatic order.  
matthews and allen recast the homogenous character of the collaborative 
‘third’ as a site of proliferation. In an act of resistance to the unitary principles of 
collaboration theory, the protagonists matthews and allen adopt the non-oppositional 
process of collaborative dialogue as their modus operandi.140 The Serresean assertion 
that ‘to hold a dialogue is to suppose a third man and seek to exclude him’ served as 
a foundational point of departure in the proposition to reconfigure the collaborative 
third position (Serres 1982: 67). Collaborative dialogue (conceived as an act of alliance) 
is posited as that which is uninhibited by dialectical systems and thus positions the 
dialogic triumph of one participant as futile. This non-oppositional process disrupts 
both oppositional traditions of argumentation and singular subjectivities and as such 
is proposed as a method to enable interruptive phenomena to enter the dialogic 
system. 
 
 
 
 
140 
 
 
process; a series of actions 
something; an unspecified thing 
thing; an object of unspecified type; an action, utterance 
utter; make a sound or words with the mouth or voice; speak 
speak; utter words in an ordinary voice; have a conversation 
act; do something 
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Linearity141 is already questionable when two interlocutors interact 
within a given environment, bringing about other circumstances, 
having instable and mutual perceptions, thus, constituting a chaotic 
system. In fact, such variables are well known. They are what we call 
noise  (Ferraz 2007)  
 
matthews and allen generate a stammering space through the inclusion of 
events and phenomena that take place in the interstices of their collaborative 
dialogue. This reimagining of artist-to-artist dialogue is proposed as a method to 
include the ‘noise of the world that hums in the background and perpetually 
threatens to hum between them’ (Lomax 2004: 13). matthews and allen’s collaborative 
dialogue contains dark precursors, indistinguishable elements that generate a 
clinametic movement. The dark precursor is that which precedes the event (the 
footnote is an event preceded by an indeterminate dark precursor); it is an agent of 
inconsistency, an imperceptible difference, which generates the turning from laminar 
flow (the academic text) toward anomaly (matthews and allen’s footnotes). If ‘every 
system contains its dark precursor which ensures communication of peripheral 
series’, then when two potentials enter into communication a reaction or event 
emerges (Deleuze 2004[a]: 145-6). The imperceptible character of the dark precursor is  
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situated as an operative third142 force that creates a relation between heterogeneous 
series (between text and off-text); the dark precursor is that which precedes the 
paratextual event. 
 
It is the ultimate and self-determining 
source of determination, behind which 
there is nothing at all. (Hallward 2006: 27)  
 
matthews and allen’s footnote machine is a collaborative apparatus effecting 
the internal collapse of metaphysical authorship. matthews and allen’s paratextual 
practice, conceived as a ‘foreign language cannot be hollowed out in one language 
[the scholarly text] without language being toppled or pushed to a limit.’ (Deleuze 
1997: 5). matthews and allen appropriate both in the physical space allocated for 
academic citation and in the infrastructure of scholarly writing as a means to 
articulate ‘the problematic limit between an inside and an outside that is always 
threatened by graft and by parasite’ (Derrida 1991: 196). The character of the footnote 
is recast as a parasitic device operating as a stratagem to question the linearity of the 
academic discourse. This ‘parasite intervenes, enters the system as an element of 
fluctuation’ (Serres 2007: 191). 
matthews and allen’s footnote machine [dys]functions via a system of 
constraints employed by the collaborative double as a strategy to escape the tyranny  
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1. With one another  
2. Or any two 
3. With a third  
 
(Antin, D., 1991, Selected Poems: 1963-1973, Los Angeles: Sun & Moon 
Press: 68) 
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of authorial decision. Furthermore, the implementation of constraint-based practice 
questions the precepts of a system wherein ‘vagaries […] diverge from what directs 
them, escaping the events of the system that controls them’ (Bök 2001: 43). Perec 
(matthews and allen’s anticipatory plagiarist) is cited as a writer143 working with the 
productive potentialities of constraint-based practice wherein limitation (the 
omission of letter ‘e’) generates new phraseologies:  
 
Any form of constraint, including this 
ludic constriction, works to limit 
authorial control and acts as a machinic 
approach to artistic production. 
Limitations working to constrain an 
author mark a shift in opinion from a 
traditional romanticism surrounding 
authorial autonomy to an anomalous 
multiplicity. This story turns from a 
tradition of totalizing conclusions to a 
condition of possibility. This 
poststructural account positions finality 
as an affirmation of unitary thought 
and as such aims to cast-off a cultural 
inclination towards stasis. It is an 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      143 
 
The art of writing is the 
art of applying the seat of 
your pants to the seat of 
your chair. (American proverb) 
 
Art is long, life is short. 
(From the Greek physician 
Hippocrates (c.460-357BC) 
comparing the difficulties 
encountered in learning the art 
of medicine or healing with the 
shortness of human life)  
 
How long is a piece of 
string? (Traditional saying, 
used to indicate that something 
cannot be given a finite 
measurement) 
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account without conclusion and as such 
may disrupt traditional philosophical 
and ontological thought. This study is 
principally a dismantling of an 
oppositional logic that arguably still 
informs cultural opinion. This play of 
constraints is a ludic[rous] solution to a 
tyrannical tradition of authorial control. 
 
The paratextual practice of matthews and allen is generated by the purposeful 
inclusion of events that escape a conventional authorial system, the inclusion of 
NOISE. This metaphoric NOISE manifests as a paralanguage of idioms, 
colloquialisms, old wives tales, image, verse and audial digression (the resonant 
NOISE of Lyotardian ‘petit récits’). matthews and allen’s ‘small narratives’144 are 
citational gestures serving as a strategem to unsettle the autocratic position of the 
author and as an escape from the servitude of artistic expression. Plagiarism by 
anticipation is proffered as a concept wherein the principles of metaphysical 
authorship falter. Both academic text (unwittingly) and poetic paratext adopt the 
concept of anticipatory plagiarism; however, the traditional academic text 
acknowledges its predecessors as a means to validate a monocratic position whereas  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144 
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matthews and allen recognize anticipatory plagiarism as a philosophical position 
from which the ideological figure of the author (as originator) is problematised. 
 
For PLAGIARISM read also PLA[Y]GIARISM, for the process of 
writing at work here is also playful – it is a demonstration, a game, a 
performance. (Federman 1993: 51) 
  
This discourse characterizes Bakhtin, Bök, Carroll, Deleuze, Derrida, Guattari, 
Lomax, Lyotard, McCaffery, Perec, Serres, et al. as anticipatory plagiarists. The 
philosophical perspectives introduced in this discourse operate as a playful 
performance of Bakhtinian dialogism (the inaudible NOISE of intertextual 
phenomena), exceeding the metaphoric boundaries of the text. Paradoxically, the 
academic voice employs citationality as a means to reinforce authorial opinion, albeit 
a theorizing of proliferative phenomena, deterritorializing and reterritorializing the 
voices of its anticipatory plagiarists ‘into a structured artistic system.’ (Bakhtin 1981: 
300). It is this propensity toward structure and systemization that the collaborative 
footnote-machine attempts to unsettle.  
matthews and allen’s citational practice effects a culture of parasitism where 
the collaboration metaphorically ‘eats at the table of others’. Parasitism holds a two-
fold145 significance in this research being both a device to displace the centrality of  
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the authorial voice (through the appropriation of cultural matter) and the theoretical 
relation between the text (host) and paratext (parasite). ‘As though that to which a 
parasite is ‘added’ could possibly remain as it is, unaltered!’ (Derrida 1988: 103).  
When drawn in relation to the philosophical discourse of repetition, 
citationality infers both reiteration and difference.  
 
Nielzsche suspents Lucretuis’ atomic  Nietzsche suspends Lucretius’s atomic 
downward decsent btu preserves thi  downward descent but preserves the 
genacy o fithe xlimamen ii thus lbvious agency of the clinamen in this obvious 
adblem uf eternal recurtence.   emblem of eternal recurrence. 
 
(McCaffery 2001: 23) 
 
In Zarathustran ‘Pataphysics McCaffery’s bifurcation146 between theory and 
practice takes the form of two columns; the right column expounding the ‘correct’ 
text, with the left column performing an ‘erroneous’ text. McCaffery suggests that 
the ‘correct’ column of text ‘involves a disposition toward the normative modes of 
signification: grammar, syntax, sentence integration, and the covering rules that 
guarantee unproblematic, intersubjective communication’ (McCaffery 2001: 6). It is this 
cultural privilege of normative modes of communication (between interlocutors and  
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speak with a forked147 tongue  
 
147 
 
zigzag148 
 
148 
 
the knight’s move149 
 
149 
 
chess - (game of) - Too serious to be a game, too futile 
to be a science.  
 
(Flaubert, G., 2010, Dictionary of Received Ideas, [Trans. Gregory 
Norminton], Oneworld Classics Ltd: 17) 
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between author and reader) that matthews and allen’s footnote-machine serves to 
disrupt. The clinametic exceptions introduced in McCaffery’s text are characteristic 
of matthews and allen’s inclusion of ‘error’ and cultural NOISE. matthews and 
allen’s footnotes find their way into the relation between the authorial text and the 
reader: ‘interstitial and intervallic, as well as extra, outside’  (McCaffery 2006: 323). 
These quasi-footnotes operate as a method to disrupt the reader’s habitual absorption 
of master narratives, generating an oscillating third space between text and paratext. 
 matthews and allen’s footnote-machine performs the excluded third of 
Serresean philosophy through the inclusion of NOISE. The footnote-machine 
attempts to generate possibilities that exceed authorial intention. matthews and allen 
establish ‘rules of the game’ that serve to disrupt singular subjectivities. These ‘acts 
of prosthetic automation do not simply assist in the process of writing so much as 
replace the concept of writing itself.’ (Bök 2001: 67). 
  The clinamen is proposed as an agent of disorder, it is ‘the end of systems, 
and their beginning. Everything always goes towards chaos, and, sometimes, 
everything comes from it.’ (Abbas 2005: 13). In the interplay between ordered text and 
clinametic paratext the word ‘sketch’, situated in a philosophical discussion relating 
to the Deleuzian diagram (chapter 6), bifurcates in the interstices of collaborative 
dialogue to generate reference to a spirograph. The digression from theoretical 
discourse to ludic game150 suggests an unintentional equivalence between standard  
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and non-standard texts, with the spirograph serendipitously reflecting the 
diagrammatic conditions of possibility.  
 
a game-without [fixed] rules, with 
neither winner nor loser, […] in 
which skill and chance are no longer 
distinguishable. (Deleuze 2004[b]: 71) 
 
The indistinguishable condition established between skill and chance151 in Deleuze’s 
‘ideal game’ infers a culture of equivalence between supposedly dichotomous 
concepts. A culture of equivalence, akin to the equality of cabbages and kings 
characterized by Carroll, is denoted in matthews and allen’s implementation of 
humour as a strategy to unsettle the dialectical relation between serious and non-
serious phenomena. ‘Instead of thinking in terms of the concept as a law that governs 
what we say, humour and satire focus on the […] particularities, noises and 
disruption that are in excess of the system.’ (Colebrook 2003: 132).  
The footnote is commonly characterized as a site where marginal narratives 
and ‘petit récits’ are in excess of the primary textual system. ‘Scholars […] tend to 
become infatuated with their prose […] and so when in the midst of crafting a subtly 
curving thought, the scholar may very easily feel the footnote is merely an  
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inopportune interruption.’ (Zerby 2003: 14). matthews and allen’s ‘inopportune 
interruptions’ perform disruption in an authorial system predicated upon 
metaphysical consensus. In the traversal gesture between text and paratext an excess 
of narrative possibilities is generated, possibilities that serve to unsettle the authorial 
paradigm. The footnote machine functions in a tensive space between order and 
disorder (the condition of order is existent in both the systematic conventions of 
academic writing and the parodic system of constraints implemented by matthews 
and allen, with disorder manifesting as NOISE). The footnote is traditionally utilized 
as an apparatus to augment and affirm the primary text; however, matthews and 
allen’s paratextual constructions are comparable to the production of NOISE. The 
scholastic ‘machine produces a flow, another machine [matthews and allen’s 
footnote machine] coupled to this interrupts the flow’ (O’Sullivan 2006: 24).  
 
INTER/RUPT[URE] 
 
The paratextual practice of matthews and allen operates via a system of 
citationality wherein a process of deterritorialization, comparable to the ‘pataphor152 
(a metaphor that creates its own context), is effected. The footnote machine is a 
[dys]functional device implementing contextomy (the inclusion of citations taken out 
of context) as a gesture to invalidate the notion of a fixed, inert meaning. matthews  
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That which occurs when a lizard's tail has grown so long 
it breaks off and grows a new lizard. 
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and allen’s citational practice operates in a similar manner to Bruce Andrews’ 
quotation collage wherein fifty-five references are reterritorialized to construct a 
‘new’ narrative. 
 
28. You’d depict not the structure of the world or its physical things, 
but the structure and set-up of language and its rules and ways of use. 
Language gets elucidated, not some ‘separate reality’. 29. Use 
language to cover a space rather than to uncover meaning.  
 
28. Bruce Andrews 29. Vito Acconci  (Andrews 1996: 5) 
 
matthews and allen’s citational practice adopts the dictionary as an apparatus 
associated with the hegemonic principles of finite knowledge and the designation of 
meaning.153 The footnote-machine utilizes the dictionary as a means to perform 
digression where one definition leads to another and another and another and so on… 
in a continuously bifurcating gesture. matthews and allen’s proliferative and 
digressive methods attempt to destabilize logocentric perspectives and articulate the 
NOISE that resonates in the aporia of authoritarian texts. This inquiry explores the 
‘interval where contamination, paralogicality, uncertainty, and misprision 
precipitate discovery’ (McCaffery 2006: 326).    
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Hamm: We’re not beginning to…to…mean something? 
 
Clov: Mean something! You and I mean something! Ah, 
that’s a good one. 
 
(Beckett, S., 1958, Endgame followed by Act without Words, Faber & 
Faber: 45) 
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The academic texts, authored by Helen Matthews and Marilyn Allen, 
generate a noetic space wherein matthews and allen perform a disruptive, 
collaborative poiesis. The two154 theses metaphorically articulate a resistance to 
dialecticism (in that the two perspectives proffered do not assume dichotomous 
positions) and furthermore reject the synthesizing traditions of collaboration theory 
(the two theses do not conflate). Two is company: Dialogic interplay AND the 
collaborative double, authored by Helen Matthews, functions as both a physical and 
theoretical paratext to Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule 
and provides a textual site wherein the traditional boundaries of this text proliferate. 
The dialogue between and within the two theses is analogous to a ‘pataphysical 
spiral infinitely expanding in an outward gesture, rendering the metaphysical centre 
imperceptible. The dialogue between the two theses, and text and paratext, is 
disseminated and performed digitally. The digital thesis effects an interlacing of 
perspectives and performs a proposed resistance to stable oppositions and unified 
phenomena. The digital methods employed in this text perform, as opposed to simply 
theorize, the digressive and proliferative character of this research (performance 
characteristically resists conclusion, and equally resists the definitions, boundaries, 
and limitations associated with traditional academic authorship). 
Hyperlink technology permits the computational mechanisms of digression to  
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pervade this text. ‘Such cases of cybernetic literature begin to dramatize a 
philosophy of ‘pataphysical perspectivism, insofar as they attempt to imagine a 
multitude of divergent realities created simultaneously from the same text.’ (Bök 2001: 
77-8). Hypertext-applications effect a process of digital différance155 where a text is 
contingent upon the conditions of deferral and difference that proliferate beyond the 
unifying logic of traditional authorialism. Digital methods of dissemination generate 
an inter-animating space wherein the practice of matthews and allen is situated in the 
same textual space as the written academic thesis, thus complicating the traditional 
relation between theory and practice. 
 
To oppose the structural underpinnings by an anti-systematic 
detonation – dizzying… elasticize… by flashes… nonsigns… 
scrambled – by a blowing up of all settled relations. sentence can 
dislocate. mangled matter. So that the relational system that seems to 
underlie the very possibility of signifying would be exploded. 
Internally collapse. (Andrews 1996: 25) 
 
matthews and allen’s method of digital dissemination unsettles the archetypal 
division between theory and practice and suggests a computational paradigm for  
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Only taxis allow true freedom of movement. By travelling 
varying distances in a set time, they contribute to 
automatic disorientation. Since taxis are 
interchangeable, no connection is established with the 
traveller and they can be left anywhere and taken at 
random. A trip with no destination, diverted arbitrarily 
en route, is only possible with a taxi’s essentially 
random itinerary.  
 
(Ford, S., 2005, The Situationist International: a user’s guide, 
Black Dog Publishing Ltd: 31) 
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critical praxis research. ‘It’s not a product that is produced, but a production, an 
event, a praxis, a model for future practice.’ (Andrews 1996: 12). The digital 
configuration of this thesis facilitates the proposition to perform its philosophical 
narrative. The digital différance between text and off-text situates the reader as a 
participant in the performance of digression. The deferral between theses and 
paratexts compels the reader156 to traverse both the peripheral and interstitial 
territories of the text. The interplay between the two scholastic texts and the ludic 
site of matthews and allen’s paratexts generates a third indeterminate space, a 
stammering space that problematizes notions of opposition, resolution and authorial 
precedence.  
 
It presents itself as an exuberant encyclopedia of narrative 
possibilities, while at the same time problematizing narrative through 
dramatic excess and through plurality and fragmentation of the 
various stories. (James & Perloff  2009: 106) 
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read between the lines 
 
be on the right lines 
 
we’ve got a right one here! 
 
here, there and everywhere 
 
if ifs and ands were pots and pans157 
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  “but I digress”  
   (Ronnie Corbett) 
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Addendum 
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This addendum introduces an elucidatory voice that is intentionally absent 
from the praxis thesis. Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an 
oppositional rule incorporates both a ‘conventional’ contribution to 
knowledge, written by the PhD candidate, and the collaborative art practice 
of matthews and allen. 
 
Collaboration is an accepted mode of practice in contemporary visual art; 
however, the concept of collaboration is problematised in the context of PhD 
research wherein ‘individual’ contributions to knowledge are a prerequisite. 
As collaborative practitioners it was necessary for matthews and allen to 
formulate a research model that would be both permissible within an 
institutional context and incorporate their collaborative methodologies. The 
disjuncture between an ‘individual’ contribution to knowledge (singular 
subjectivity) and collaborative practice (inter-subjectivity) provoked a 
reconsideration of these two modes of inquiry and posed the question of how 
a conjunctive space may be formulated.   
 
The paradigm for this research was designed to facilitate the production of 
two ‘individual’ theses, thus two ‘individual’ contributions to knowledge, with a 
collaborative component situated in the space traditionally assigned to the 
footnote. The physical composition of the thesis attempts to provide an 
equivalent space for both the scholastic text and the collaborative practice of 
matthews and allen. This methodology provides a structure for the individual 
voices of the two PhD candidates to be perceived and for the inclusion of a 
collaborative voice. The writing of this thesis has been informed and affected 
by the traditions of PhD scholarship, in terms of both institutional regulations 
and an apparent resistance to collaborative voicing. Three is a crowd: A 
potential exception to an oppositional rule is intended to proffer an 
exploration of the regimes of academic writing using collaborative methods. 
 
The collaborative art practice of matthews and allen typically problematises 
monovocal practices; as such, the concept of an ‘individual’ contribution to 
knowledge (an arguably monovocal approach to research) provided a point 
of departure for Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional 
rule. 
 
The methods used to generate matthews and allen's collaborative practice 
are alluded to in the thesis but are not articulated in definite terms. Peggy 
Phelan, although principally examining the practice of writing about 
performance rather than performative writing, suggests that writing on 
performance ‘necessarily cancels the “tracelessness” inaugurated within this 
performative promise.’ (Phelan 1993: 149). matthews and allen’s disinclination to 
enter into a critical discourse relating to their methods maybe contextualised 
within Phelan’s perspective;  in that, by writing about their ‘collaborative 
performance’, matthews and allen may ‘cancel’ its ambiguity and thus return 
the artistic author to a position of centrality.  
 
The ambiguity employed in the praxis thesis attempts to reflect the 
philosophical perspectives included, where fixed and stable systems are 
resisted in the search for a proliferative paradigm. This research situates 
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itself within the field of Poststructuralist philosophy. The research proposition, 
to unsettle entrenched dualistic systems (author/reader, noetic/poetic, 
major/minor, individual/collaborative), philosophically necessitates the 
exclusion of definitive and explanatory language; however, this addendum 
provides a space where the ‘game-playing’ of both the academic voice and 
the voices of matthews and allen is suspended and methods and modes of 
practice elucidated. The inclusion of this addendum is an acknowledgement 
of the requirements for PhD research. 
 
matthews and allen is the name given to the collaboration between Helen 
Matthews and Marilyn Allen. Collaboration within the visual arts can assume 
many forms: ‘groups of artists, circles, associations, networks, constellations, 
partnerships, alliances, coalitions, contexts and teamwork’ (Lind 2007:16). It is 
commonly adopted as a method or mode of practice to challenge a 
conventional understanding of individual artistic authorship. ‘Collaboration’ 
may be considered an umbrella term incorporating numerous approaches to 
the practice of working to shared agendas and it has been suggested ‘that 
collaboration goes beyond achieving a common objective and breaks down 
the need to identify individual contributions.’ (Fremantle 2012). Maria Lind’s text, 
The Collaborative Turn, acknowledges the heritage of collaborative practice 
from the Baroque studios to what Lind defines as the seminal transition from 
Modernist to Postmodernist perspectives. The Collaborative Turn proposes 
the emergence of collaboration as ‘an alternative to contemporary 
individualism and the traditional role of the romantic artist as a solitary 
genius.’ (Lind 2007:16 & 28).  
 
matthews and allen’s collaboration takes the form of a partnership between 
two artists: Two female, white, British, educated, middle-class artists. This 
epigrammatic account of matthews and allen attempts to contextualise the 
cultural phenomena referenced by the collaboration for their readers. 
matthews and allen’s footnotes conform to the perceptions of two female, 
white, British, educated, middle-class artists and thus within a philosophical 
discourse on difference it may be argued that these perceptions could have 
been extended to include additional social and cultural perspectives. 
 
In the context of this research matthews and allen's collaborative methods 
centre on responding to the philosophical voice presented in the thesis. The 
voice adopted to write the traditional academic component of the thesis is 
intentionally affirmative in its stance in order to provide ‘material’ from which 
matthews and allen attempt to perform a digressive and disruptive response.  
The academic voice is posited as illusory, whereby what appears to be 
authoritative and affirmative is continually displaced and unsettled through 
the inclusion of multiple perspectives and multiple voices. The text is 
intended to operate abstractly in collaboration with Deleuze, Derrida, Serres, 
et al. and to playfully construct an equivalence between established 
Poststructuralist perspectives and the cultural objects introduced in matthews 
and allen’s footnotes. The alignment between prominent Poststructuralist 
philosophers and the collaborative practice of matthews and allen may 
ostensibly appear hyperbolic but is intended to reflect Kenneth Goldsmith’s 
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suggestion ‘that all data on the network be treated as equal, whether it be a 
piece of spam or a Nobel laureate’s speech.’ (Goldsmith 2011: 34). 	
 
A reference to ‘pataphysical laughter in The Third Term (Chapter 1) defers to 
matthews and allen’s 23rd footnote, in which a comedic voice is introduced in 
the form of a joke. The opening line from the joke reads: ‘One day an 
Englishman, an Irishman, a Scotsman and a Welshman walk into a bar’. This 
familiar phrase is introduced by the collaboration as a stratagem to disrupt 
the anticipated trajectory of the academic discourse. This footnote does not 
simply create an oppositional relation to the academic text in that the 
narrative of the joke turns toward philosophical quotation in a confusion of 
voices similar to the interlacing of comedic and philosophical voices in the 
academic text (Monty Python, The Two Ronnies, Stanley Unwin, et al.).		The 
methods used to produce this footnote are characteristic of matthews and 
allen’s collaborative practice.  A dialogue was conducted between the two 
artists via email with each email consisting of a quotation liberated from its 
former context. In a similar manner to the constraint-based practice 
introduced in The Potential Third (Chapter 6), the dialogue between 
matthews and allen was subject to a set of prescribed rules. Each quotation 
in the email dialogue was limited to 140 characters in accordance with the 
140-character message limit employed by the social media platform Twitter. 
This absurdist gesture alludes to the act of ‘twittering’; short bursts of idle talk 
or babble. 
 
matthews and allen’s footnotes attempt to include ‘other’ voices within the 
strictures of the PhD document. The inclusion of an ‘other’ voice may be 
observed in Kenneth Goldsmith’s work Soliloquy. Soliloquy is an unedited 
document that contains every word spoken by Goldsmith during the week of 
April 15-21, 1996. Soliloquy although first realised in print also appears in 
Volume One of the Electronic Literature Collection. The Web version of 
Soliloquy includes many Web specific functions including the option to 
arbitrarily select a day of the week and thus escape a linear reading 
experience. The reader is instructed to move the cursor across the screen 
wherein banal textual utterances appear and disappear as fragmentary and 
temporal narratives. 
 
 Don’t for heaven’s sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! 
 But you must pay attention to your nonsense. 
 
 (Wittgenstein 2001) 
 
References to comedy double acts (Abbot and Costello, the Two Ronnies, 
Vladimir and Estragon, et al.) are intermittently introduced in Three is a 
crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule as a stratagem to 
associate matthews and allen with the hypothesis that ‘humour has been 
philosophically attributed to betraying and undermining hegemony’ (Higgie 
2007: 56-7). In The Excluded Third (Chapter 2) the academic voice asserts that 
‘Gilbert & George retain the citational marks of the odd couple Morecambe 
and Wise, George’s Eric to Gilbert’s Ernie’. The associative relation 
established between Gilbert & George and Morecambe and Wise makes 
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reference to the theory of intertextuality, with footnote 42 formulating a further 
dialogic relation with the odd couple wherein an image of matthews and allen 
bears a citational mark of the Two Ronnies through the inclusion of 
spectacles comparable to those used to form the motif for their sketch show. 
This constellation of references alludes to an interaction between texts and 
arguably the impossibility for meaning to remain under authorial control.  
 
The reader of this thesis is compelled to establish connections between 
cultural and philosophical matter and as such actively construct meaning 
within the text. This active reader paradigm attempts to question the 
traditional position of the author as the sole custodian of meaning; however, 
it is perhaps necessary to acknowledge that the intertextual references 
implied in the thesis may go unobserved by the reader.  
 
The inclusion of six perspectival chapters in this thesis is a gesture that 
attempts to establish a culture of potentiality where no single perspective is 
able to attain authority. It may be observed that the complexity of both the 
philosophy and vocabulary included in the academic writing is almost parodic 
in its performance of scholarly authorship. This parody of authorship is in 
effect a discourse that mocks by imitation and as such contains two voices, 
that of the parodied and the parodist. 
 
Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule situates itself 
within the field of praxis research, a process wherein theories are performed 
or enacted: an attempt has been made to perform parasitic philosophies by 
appending matthews and allen’s ludic discourse to the academic text, and to 
enact Derridean différance through the reader’s movement from text to 
paratext, from hypertext to hypertext, from voice to voice to voice to voice… 
as such, the thesis may be contextualised within performance writing 
practices. The thesis attempts to resist a conventional approach to practice-
based research (writing about practice) and to perform the philosophical 
premise of the thesis (writing as practice). Kosofsky-Sedgwick’s paper 
Teaching ‘Experimental Critical Writing’ provides a noteworthy context for 
Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule. Contrary to 
the majority of performance writing practices encountered in this research, 
Sedgwick’s paper explores experimental writing within an academic context. 
Teaching ‘Experimental Critical Writing’ considers a graduate programme of 
study wherein the ‘main function is to trouble and interrupt the process of 
professionalization’. (Kosofsky-Sedgwick 1998: 104). One of Kosofsky-Sedgwick’s 
writing experiments compels the student to adopt quotation as a method to 
explore a pluralisation of voices, creating ‘a fabric of quotations, a catalogue 
raisonné of quotations […] a range of metaphors for the process of quotation 
and for the relations reflected or produced by quotation.’ (Kosofsky-Sedgwick 
1998: 109-110). The intention of this thesis is to unsettle autocratic authorialism, 
an unsettling enacted in part through the inclusion of a plethora of quotations.  
 
The relatively unfamiliar references to ‘pataphysics, parapoetics and 
potentialities are employed as a method to generate a discursive space 
where ‘marginal’ philosophies attempt to unsettle major ideologies. The 
authorial voice of a PhD thesis may be regarded as a major ideology in 
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academic writing; however, the authorial voice of this thesis presents a 
theoretical discourse that proposes the destabilisation of singular subjectivity 
therein attempting to destabilise its own position by proffering philosophies 
that problematise major ideologies. 
 
Pragmatically, matthews and allen’s footnotes are a response to the 
philosophical voice of the thesis, and emerge from a process of 
collaboratively reading the academic text, a process involving verbalisation, 
articulation, intonation and aural cognition, systems subsequently generating 
mispronunciation, misinterpretation, mishearing and misunderstanding. 
Footnote 98 alludes to the potentiality of matthews and allen’s [dys]functional 
dialogic system where the word ‘ship’ emerges as ‘sheep’, ‘snip’ and ‘chip’. 
This footnote parodically references the concepts of repetition and difference 
discussed in the thesis.  
 
When an author uses a conceptual form of writing, it means 
that all of the planning and decisions are made beforehand and 
the execution is a perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a 
machine that makes the text. (Goldsmith www.epc.buffalo.edu) 
 
Prior to the realisation of matthews and allen’s footnotes, a set of rules are 
established. The rules for each footnote differ; however, recurrent strategies 
are discernible. A prevalent method adopted by matthews and allen is the 
use of dictionary definitions. The dictionary is a culturally accepted system for 
the establishment of meaning; however, matthews and allen utilise the 
dictionary definition in an effort to problematise the concept of denotative 
meaning. In The Third Term (Chapter 1), the word ‘meaning’ generates a 
footnote that continues over six pages, a strategy that compels the reader to 
temporarily suspend their engagement with the academic text. This footnote 
(18) opens with a definition from the Oxford English Reference Dictionary, 
published by the Oxford University Press and thus affiliated with the 
academic gravitas attached to Oxford University. matthews and allen’s rules 
of the game specify that a word from each definition should be selected and 
another definition generated, and so on. This footnote manifests as a 
narrative journey that digresses from the word ‘meaning’ to ‘a fool’s paradise 
founded on unreal, fanciful or insecure foundations.’ This footnote includes 
dictionaries of quotation, idioms and of phrase and fable as a method to 
explore a proliferation of voices. matthews and allen’s footnotes frequently 
reference Web-based material commonly excluded from academic research; 
notably Wikipedia and the crowd-sourced lexicon Urban Dictionary. The 
inclusion of these materials is an attempt to establish their equivalence with 
academically revered sources.  
 
matthews and allen commonly utilise digital modes of communication to 
generate their dialogic footnotes. The opening footnote in The Excluded 
Third (Chapter 2) responds to Gilbert & George’s declaration of 
‘friendlessness’. The footnote (24) consists of a text-based film that 
references the social networking website Facebook. The footnote manifests 
as a dialogue between two characters whose conversation is appropriated 
from Samuel Beckett’s text Waiting for Godot. In utilising the ineffectual 
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dialogue of Beckett’s protagonists Vladimir and Estragon, the footnote 
attempts to parody the conventions inherently associated with Facebook. 
Over a period of several months, matthews and allen held a conversation on 
the social networking website Facebook, with the ‘rules of engagement’ set 
by the collaboration restricting the characters’ conversation to a weekly 
utterance, using quotations from Beckett’s characters Vladimir and Estragon. 
In a gesture toward equivalence, an excerpt from Waiting for Godot appears 
in the academic component of the thesis with a footnote comprising of a 
reference to Gilbert & George. This dislocation of voices is intended to 
complicate any inclination toward oppositional thought. The inclusion of 
Beckett and Facebook in this footnote (24) is characteristic of matthews and 
allen’s use of appropriation as a stratagem to problematise notions of 
‘authorship’ and ‘originality’.  
 
Kenneth Goldsmith’s concept of uncreative writing is derived from a class 
taught at the University of Pennsylvania where students were ‘penalized for 
showing any shred of originality.’ (Goldsmith 2011:8). Goldsmith’s students were 
rewarded for plagiarism and permitted to plunder ideas and repurpose 
knowledge. matthews and allen’s use of appropriation conforms to many of 
the principles of uncreative writing; however, it is acknowledged that these 
plagiaristic practices do not necessarily eradicate traditional authorial 
ideologies but rather require a reconfiguration of the authorial role, a 
reconsideration that recognises the coordination of material rather than its 
‘creation’. Marjorie Perloff suggests, the contemporary writer is ‘more a 
programmer than a tortured genius’, indicating that the traditional character 
of the ‘tortured genius’ is an inadequate representation of an author in a 
contemporary digital culture (Perloff 2011:1). matthews and allen’s footnotes 
are generated almost entirely from appropriated material with several 
footnotes repurposing identifiable artworks in order to complicate the reader’s 
perception of the artistic author; notably, footnote 10 wherein David 
Shrigley’s This Is Me, This Is Also Me is proffered as a ludic response to the 
concept of denotative meaning. 
 
The use of appropriation in this thesis is adopted as a method to generate a 
state of indeterminacy where authorial precedence resides neither in the 
voices of matthews or allen, Helen or Marilyn, Deleuze or Guattari, Gilbert or 
George, et al. but emerges as a constellation of perspectives, a disjunctive 
network of knowledge. 
 
Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project (focusing on the arcades of 19th Century 
Paris) is a collage of quotation that forms a complex compositional field. 
Benjamin’s interlacing of quotation is consistently cited in the field of 
performative writing and may be associated with the concept of ‘remixology’ 
introduced by Mark Amerika in his text remixthebook. remixthebook is 
described as ‘an experiment in creative risk management where the artist, 
also the professor, is willing to drop all academic pretense and turn his 
theoretical agenda into (a) speculative play.’ (Amerika 2011: xi). remixthebook is 
an exploration of what Amerika calls ‘remixology’, in both practical and 
theoretical terms. The ‘mash-up’ of material presented is posited as a 
reflection of the remix culture of the digital age. This culture is one of collage, 
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montage and the readymade, a culture that adopts quotation and plagiarism 
as necessary methods and thus provides a relevant research context for 
matthews and allen’s digital text. These aleatoric techniques find an alliance 
with many Oulipian writers and notably William Burroughs’ ‘cut-up’ technique. 
It is perhaps worth observing that remixthebook is published by a prestigious 
academic press (University of Minnesota Press) and in the context of 
academic convention may be viewed as avant-garde. Amerika preserves the 
printed book format in a similar manner to matthews and allen’s use of the 
digital iBook, which also retains many characteristics associated with a 
conventional printed text; however, the parameters of remixthebook are 
extended to include a Web-based counterpart, remixthebook.com.	The Web 
component for this project consists of over twenty-five contributing artists, 
poets, and critical theorists. The contributors were invited to ‘sample’ from 
remixthebook and reconfigure the source material within their artistic and 
theoretical practices. remixthebook is effectively an inquiry into 
postproduction and serves as a pertinent example of research in the field of 
digital literature.  
 
The concept of remixology provides a relevant context for the plagiaristic 
tendencies of digital users wherein material is subject to a ‘cut and paste’ 
approach. Several of matthews and allen’s footnotes are in effect ‘remixed’ 
across the two theses. The repetition of footnotes across Two is company: 
Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double and Three is a crowd: A 
potential exception to an oppositional rule is adopted as a method to explore 
the concept of context-specific meaning and to position matthews and allen 
as context providers rather than content providers.  
 
One example of repetition between the two theses utilises David Lodge’s 
campus novel Small World in the form of a dialogue. In Two is company: 
Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double the footnote (33) is a 
digressive response to the word ‘fiction’ appearing in a citation, and in Three 
is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule the footnote (92) 
interrupts a parapoetic discourse. It is intended that the reader’s 
deconstruction of this footnote be affected by the differing theoretical 
contexts in which it appears in each thesis. The appropriation of Lodge’s text 
can be thought to unsettle the cultural preconception of matthews and allen 
as artistic authors. 
 
Goldsmith makes reference to the phrase ‘context is the new content’ and 
acknowledges the Internet as facilitating plagiaristic tendencies (Goldsmith 
2011: 3).  matthews and allen’s methods for constructing their footnotes 
frequently include the culturally entrenched practice of inputting terms into a 
Web search engine. This process, although predictable in a contemporary 
context, is appropriate to the intentions of matthews and allen, as the 
material appropriated from the Web is publicly accessible and thus holds no 
hierarchical position: This mode of research adopts what Goldsmith refers to 
as ‘net neutrality’. 
 
matthews and allen’s decision to utilise the digital iBook is a response to the 
expectations generated by the printed text tradition where words may be 
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perceived as ‘imprisoned on a page’ (Goldsmith 2011: 25). The iBook adheres to 
many of the conventions associated with the printed text tradition; however, 
its digital configuration provides scope for the inclusion of multi-media 
reading and writing practices. 
 
Marshal McLuhan’s proposition that ‘the medium is the message’ places 
emphasis on the digital iBook as the medium and, from a McLuhanian 
perspective, the message of this research. It may be suggested that to 
accept the medium as the message conceptually disregards the nuances of 
language and the interplay of voices implemented by both the PhD candidate 
and the collaboration; however, the iBook ostensibly connects this thesis to 
the fields of digital literature and digital practice.  
 
The Electronic Literature Organization, founded in 1999, operates as an 
infrastructure for the exploration of reading and writing practices in a digital 
context.  
 
Readers come to digital work with expectations formed by print, 
including extensive and deep tacit knowledge of letter forms, 
print conventions, and print literary modes. Of necessity, 
electronic literature must build on these expectations even as it 
modifies and transforms them. (Hayles 2007) 
 
The Twenty-first Century reader is indubitably conversant with digitally 
disseminated texts, and Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an 
oppositional rule is an attempt to explore how the digital book may be 
employed to question the regimes of academic writing. An Arts & Humanities 
Research Council project entitled The Academic Book of the Future emerges 
as an acknowledgement of digital reading and writing practices. 
 
matthews and allen’s collaborative project utilises the iBook as a system to  
pragmatically situate philosophical writing and art practice in the same 
discursive space. Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional 
rule is presented as a digital text that incorporates hyperlink technology and 
multimedia components. The hyperlinks included in this thesis are intended 
to explore the possibilities that electronic links may provide for a reader and 
the connections that may be established between Two is company: Dialogic 
interplay AND the collaborative double and Three is a crowd: A potential 
exception to an oppositional rule. 
 
The hyperlink is employed to perform several functions within the thesis: to 
indicate the location of a textual component (in the prefatory text a reference 
is made to Two is company: Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double 
as a paratext wherein the word paratext relocates the reader to Helen 
Matthews’ thesis), and typically to establish a process of digression from one 
voice to another.    
 
In the introduction to the thesis, the term ‘placeholder’ is used to refer to 
contemporary perceptions of collaborative practice. matthews and allen 
proffer a footnote (2) in response to this term in the form of a definition from 
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the collaboratively sourced internet encyclopedia Wikipedia. The definition 
references the idiom ‘Tom, Dick and Harry’ as a placeholder name for 
multiple unspecified people. The footnote proposes matthews and allen as 
every ‘Tom, Dick and Harry’ (every Gilles, Jacques and Michel) with the 
name Harry forming a hyperlink to Helen Matthews’ thesis Two is company: 
Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double. matthews and allen attempt 
to generate a non-linear reading experience wherein the reader may escape 
the academic text. In Landow’s text, Hypertext 3.0, a parallel is proposed 
between the computer hypertext system and poststructural thinking. Akin to 
the language of the footnote, the hyperlink has the capacity to connect 
distinct areas of inquiry ‘and thus move entirely outside the scholarly article 
itself.' (Landow 2006: 3).  
 
A customary ‘back-button’ is included in the iBook thesis as a device to 
return the reader to the hyperlink’s point of origin and to construct a system 
wherein the voices introduced to the reader are added to the academic 
discourse in a physical and theoretical performance of the parasite. An 
attempt has been made to utilise the hyperlink’s digressive characteristics as 
a method to construct ‘a text which very materially provides and actualises 
the notion of its own performance’. (Bergvall 1996: 94).  
 
Compositional decisions relating to text as a visual component in this 
research include adopting capital letters to connote NOISE and aligning text 
to either the right or left side of the page to infer an aside or paratext. The 
PhD candidate’s use of italics for passages of quotation attempts to 
accentuate the multiplicity of voices incorporated in the thesis, and an 
alternate use of black and grey text in matthews and allen’s footnotes is 
adopted as a stratagem to imply the presence of two characters. The 
implementation of a Times New Roman typeface for the voice of the PhD 
candidate is a subtle gesture toward the antiquated tropes of academic 
writing, whereas the use of a Courier New typeface for the poiesis of 
matthews and allen is a paradoxical gesture which attempts to reference 
both the analogue and the digital; the typewriter and the computer.  
 
The iBooks Author software used to construct the digital text includes a 
widget for a pop-up text system. The title page for The A Potential Third 
(Chapter 6) includes a ‘play-button’ icon. This familiar icon encourages the 
reader to interact with the digital page and, when selected, the play-button 
activates a pop-up text-box in which the voice of William Burroughs is 
introduced; as such, this digital apparatus provides a method for the 
disruption of the printed page.   
 
The digital methods employed in the thesis attempt to unsettle the 
performance of a traditional author/reader paradigm. The field of electronic 
literature incorporates a community of researchers and practitioners that 
explore the affects and effects of digital reading and writing practices. The 
Anthology of European Electronic Literature is an example of networked 
creativity that includes innovative approaches to interactive reading 
practices. BA-TALE, by Zuzana Husárová and Ľubomír Panák, is an 
interactive work that demonstrates how practitioners within the field of digital 
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literature have responded to the author/reader paradigm. BA-TALE 
necessitates that readers/users reposition the cursor on the computer screen 
to encounter keywords wherein fragmented sentences formulate. The textual 
fragments in BA-TALE are determined by the reader’s/user’s interaction and 
therefore each encounter effectively produces a different literary work. BA-
TALE includes an audial component wherein sound is arbitrarily selected 
from a database with the ‘keyword’ from each fragment of text generating a 
corresponding sound from freesounds.org, a Website that conforms to 
Goldsmith's concept of ‘net neutrality’. BA-TALE employs digital methods that 
challenge the expectations of reading and writing practices, methods that 
may be used to extend the parameters of matthews and allen’s research. 
 
matthews and allen adopt the footnote as their modus operandi with the 
intention of unsettling a linear reading of the thesis. matthews and allen’s 
footnotes do not consistently follow the trajectory of a traditional annotation 
system with several footnotes encompassing further footnotes rather than 
returning directly to the academic text. This process of digression from one 
footnote to another and another and another attempts to effect a pluralisation 
of voices; however, it may be noted that ‘a presentation of confusion need 
not be the same as a confused presentation’. (Goldsmith 2011: 114) 
 
A discerning reader might observe that a footnote has been omitted from the 
thesis. Footnote 63 proceeds directly to footnote 65; a response to the 
concept of exception introduced in the scholarly text. The omission of 
footnote 64 is an exception to the rule and thus an anomalous gesture. The 
discourse relating to anomaly within Three is a crowd: A potential exception 
to an oppositional rule is proffered as an oblique reference to matthews and 
allen’s collaborative voice as an anomaly within the PhD system. 
  
This thesis emerges as an experimental inquiry into whether collaborative 
methods can be utilised to disrupt a perceived dichotomy between a noetic 
authorial text and a poetic paratext. The limitations of this research arguably 
reside in the culturally entrenched dualities of major and minor ideologies 
(theory and practice as discrete phenomena) and as such it is possible that, 
upon a cursory reading, the noetic and poetic spaces within the thesis may 
retain their dualistic heritage; however, the discourse proffered attempts to 
challenge a conventional reading of these textual spaces through the 
inclusion of perspectives that resist and problematise an oppositional logic. 
 
The structure of the thesis attempts to remove the reader from the academic 
text and situate them, be it temporarily, within the ludic space of matthews 
and allen’s footnotes; this process is described as a footnote machine. The 
footnote machine proffered in Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an 
oppositional rule is not a literal configuration but a philosophical concept that 
attempts to articulate the act of departing from a major ideology to encounter 
marginal narratives. 
 
At the time of writing Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an 
oppositional rule emerges as one of the first digital iBooks submitted for a 
postgraduate research degree. The digital configuration of this thesis may 
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offer practice-based researchers a method for the dissemination of 
multidisciplinary praxis. It is common practice for universities to create a 
digital repository for the preservation of PhD theses; however, the digital 
book provides scope for the transformation of reading and writing practices in 
a digital age. The decision was taken to adhere to some of the conventions 
associated with printed text; however, as new technologies are encountered 
it is apparent that there is scope for matthews and allen to extend the 
interactive and participatory role of the reader.  
 
matthews and allen’s research paradigm is a response to an apparent 
resistance to collaborative voicing within the regimes of PhD research. Two 
is company: Dialogic interplay AND the collaborative double and Three is a 
crowd: A potential exception to an oppositional rule, while interrelated, may 
be read and evaluated independently, thus equivalent research contributions 
are made by each collaborator. This thesis is an initial gesture toward the 
inclusion of artist-to-artist voicing in PhD research, a gesture that may be 
extended, developed and improved upon. matthews and allen’s encounter 
with the academic establishment has prompted the decision to extend their 
research (this may take the form of a lecture tour and/or a publication) and 
engage relevant academic communities in a discourse relating to 
collaborative research practices. 
  
matthews and allen will continue to play their collaborative game: ‘with regard 
to what is serious and what is not; [for matthews and allen] there is no 
distinction’. (Vain, 2003: 61-62). 
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* 
‘We do not work together we work between the two*’  
 
(Deleuze and Parnet 1977: 17). 
 
 
 
Collaboration between the two is generally considered as seeking to undermine a 
‘singular subjectivity’. Whilst the construction of the self-sufficient artistic figure is 
undeniably highlighted through the presence of multiple authors, the collaborative 
double, popularly viewed as a divisible oppositional dichotomy or/and an indivisible 
imploded ‘third’, may be seen to merely replicate and perpetuate the established 
model of singular artistic authorship. This preoccupation with consolidating the two 
may be seen to negate the potential of the ‘middle’, the space between the two, the 
AND, as a site for multiplicity. 
 
This discourse explores how the dialogic space between the collaborative double 
may function as a ‘stuttering and stammering’ oscillation of possibilities and 
perspectives. These possibilities manifest as misunderstandings, amusements, 
confusions, interruptions, preoccupations and preconceptions that may serve to 
disrupt the authorial voice and resolute meaning; a process that is performed within 
the structure of the document by matthews AND allen.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BOBBIE: Oh – I’ve got two. 
NAT: Two what? 
BOBBIE: Two feet. Give me one more and I’ll have a yard. 
NAT: You’ve got hold of the wrong end of the stick. 
BOBBIE: What stick? [...] 
NAT: ’Oh, let’s – get – on – with –it.’ 
  
(Bradby 2001: 41) 
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The only thing the reader will see marching past him are inadequate means, 
fragments, allusions, strivings, investigations. Do not try to find a well 
polished sentence or a perfectly coherent image in it.  What is printed on the 
pages is an embarrassed word, a stuttering.  
 
(Deleuze 2004: 113) 
 
 
 
Title and Title 
 
What’s in a name?  The titles of the documents, Two is company: Dialogic interplay 
AND the collaborative double and Three is a crowd: A potential exception to an 
oppositional rule draws upon idiomatic cultural expression. Idioms are defined as 
‘tyrannical, capricious and utterly incalculable’ and as ‘manifestations of the 
peculiar’ and as such serve to disrupt the logic and convention of definitive names 
and naming as distinction (Gowers 1987: 35) and (Fowler 1926: 251) .  The use of the idiom 
in two halves alludes to the double and may be seen to generate a site between where 
meaning differs and and and defers. 
 
 
 
Document and Document 
 
As a collaborative project this document contains the thesis of Helen Matthews and 
the thesis of Marilyn Allen as appendix.  The documents also take two forms, that of 
a paper document (that conforms to the requirements of academic submission) and a 
digital iBook.  The documents are intended to be read as digital iBooks in order to 
facilitate a performative and proliferating dialogue between the voices of Helen and 
Marilyn and matthews and allen and reader and reader and. 
 
 
 
Author and Author 
 
Within the documents Helen Matthews and Marilyn Allen superficially assume the 
voices of traditionalish authors and construct the assumptive conception of an 
academic authorial presence: The paradigmatic territory of the academic; the 
methodology, the language, the scholarly pursuit of knowledge, the times new roman 
font, the academic rules of the game.   
 
 
 
Collaborator and Collaborator 
 
The written academic texts provide the context for the multi-media footnotes of 
matthews and allen.  The dialogue between the collaborative double is performed 
within the document by the matthews and allen footnotes and it is the performative 
play of these footnotes that offers the potential to disrupt the notion of an authorial, 
stable and finite meaning. 
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Praxis and Praxis 
 
The theoretical perspectives contained within the document do ‘not express, 
translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice’ (Foucault, as cited in, Bouchard 1980: 
116).  The document is praxial and performative and aims to produce divergent and 
reflexive possibilities rather than formulate definitive conclusions.  
 
 
 
Perspectives and Perspectives 
 
The text and footnotes are sometimes illusive, occasionally allusive and frequently 
elusive, inviting the reader to participate in a dialogic and citational proliferation that 
serves to disrupt the logic of a language in equilibrium. 
 
 
 
Citations and citations 
 
Within the document Helen and Marilyn conform to a standard Havard citational 
system.  matthews and allen do not, however, conform.  We do not do not ‘play by 
the rules’ but play with ‘the game of the [academic] world’ (Derrida 1997: 259). 
 
 
 
Prologue and Epilogue 
 Abe:		 	 You	used	to	be	behind	before	Mawruss:	 Now	I’m	first	at	last		(Abe	and	Mawruss	1936	Another	Misunderstanding)									
 
 
 
 
 
The text has no stable identity, no stable origin, no stable end.  Each act of 
reading the “text” is a preface to the text.  The reading of a self-professed 
preface is no exception to this rule. 
 
(Derrida OG xii) 
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these figures...are irreparably and stubbornly busy collaborating on work 
that is utterly superfluous, not to say indescribable [...] And why should they 
bother to help with anything the world takes seriously? After all, it’s nothing 
but madness.  
(Agamben 2005: 29)  
 
Collaboration between the two within the visual arts takes many forms, but is 
generally considered as that which consists of multiple authors that seek to disrupt a 
‘singular subjectivity’ (Gisbourne 2007: 16).  It is suggested that the precondition of 
history has established a compliant belief in the artist as singular, the individuated 
self-conscious I of subjectivity, the autonomous and authorial artist as the self 
sufficient genius with a unique experience and resolute vision to impart to the world.  
 
It is within this context that collaboration may be seen to seek multiple models of 
arts practice as a strategy to disrupt or displace the dominant figure of the solo artist, 
‘collaboration which emphasizes a critical interrogation of the processes of 
production through artistic practice, the loss of the so-called autonomy of the work 
of art, and the subjugation of the heroic, individual artist to the cultural 
embeddedness of the artwork’ (Rogoff, Production Lines in collaborative Arts: Conversations 
in Collaborative Art Practice).  
 
The collaborative double, as an artistic multiple model, seemingly suggests ‘twice as 
much or many’, supposedly the contrary to the individual or the ‘I’ (Pearsall and 
Trumble 1995: 422).  In this most literal sense the collaborative double may appear to be 
the obvious case to disrupt the solo artist as a site of origination. Whilst the 
construction of the self-sufficient artistic figure is ostensibly highlighted through the 
presence of the two, the collaborative double may be confounded by the assumptive 
and persistent belief in the singular artist, thereby proffering the double artist as a 
problem that requires resolution.  Hence, the problematic collaborative double may 
be perceived as that of a divisible oppositional dichotomy and/or the indivisible 
unified third that may be seen to merely replicate and perpetuate an established 
model of singular artistic authorship and resolute meaning. This research, therefore, 
aims to explore how the collaborative double may be utilized to disrupt the 
hegemonic regime of the either/or or/both, the unified authorial figure of the solo 
artist, the creative originator as a site of reason, surety and truth. 
 
The theoretical premise for this research resides in a cultural, historical and 
philosophical precedence of viewing the double, as two in opposition.  It may be 
suggested that when the two (of the double), are placed in relation, a cultural 
tendency to construct a binary opposition emerges.  The double seen as an 
associative relationship founded on difference and sameness may, therefore, become 
susceptible to the Derridean violence of hierarchy where a struggle to establish order 
and meaning emerges. It is commonly said of the collaborative double that “they 
finish each other’s sentences” / “which one does which bit”, either/or through 
sameness and difference subjugating and conflating the two of the collaborative 
double, the ‘logocentric longing to distinguish one from another’ (Levine 1995: 176).  
The logocentric legacy may be seen to reside in a philosophical, dialectical and 
dualistic stance that predicates that truth or finite meaning resides in the centre or the 
‘I’ and reinforces that all may be reduced, through opposition and division, to the 
unified singular, the one.  
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The associative relation of the two of the double, as double, however, may also be 
seen as inseparable and interdependent.  Thus, the double may proffer that of the 
or/both.  The or/both, however, of the collaborative double may likewise be 
subsumed into the assumptive logic of opposition; the collaborative double as 
cultural anomaly situated in opposition to that of the single artist, the self sufficient 
artistic figure; the creative originator. Thus, the collaborative double as the aberrant 
‘odd couple’ may predicate uncertainty, divisibility, opposition and dichotomy, the 
conflicting situation that invokes resolution. 
 
It is within this context that the visual arts discourse of the collaborative double 
emerges.  The collaborative double is commonly theorized in terms of the creation of 
a third; a third as  ‘indifferent’ phantom identity’ (Green 2001: 155); a ‘third hand’ 
(Green 2001), a ‘third force’ (Green 2001: 179), a ‘third mind’ (Burroughs and Gyson 1978), 
that is purported to supplant the individual identity and disrupt singular subjectivity. 
 
For Green, when artists become a collaborative double ‘[a]nother entity emerges[...]: 
a third artistic identity superimposed over and exceeding the individual artists’; ‘the 
creation of an authorial character exceeding the identity of two collaborating artists’ 
(Green 2001: 179).  Green proposes that the third hand is that which offers a dramatic 
alternative to the dominant ideological figure of the lone artist.  The construction of 
the double as third, as the or/both of collaboration, however, may be seen to merely 
reaffirm the compliant belief in the myth of the unified singular artist as a site of 
definitive and resolute meaning; the focus on resolving the double negating the 
potential to utilize the two in an ‘eternal interplay’ (Derrida 1981: 38), as a double that 
‘does not work together but works between the two’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 17). 
 
We are Helen, Marilyn, matthews and allen, characters and authors and editors, 
present and absent, determined and ambiguous, and agreeable and discordant, equal 
and divergent, compliant and derogatory, we are undecidable differential selves, 
schizophrenic singularities. We are an assemblage of differences. We are all and we 
are either/neither. We are double. This research proposes that it is not, therefore, 
merely the interplay between the collaborative double as anomalous to the logic of 
the single artistic authorial figure, but the interplay of, neither/AND, AND/between, 
the double that offers the potential to incite the play of difference; a stuttering and 
stammering oscillation of dialogic possibilities and perspectives. As Bakhtin 
proposes, dialogue is a proliferating and divergent interplay between social forces 
and meanings. Thus, it is the process of dialogue between, and not a dialogue with 
one and then another, that creates a ‘dialogically agitated environment of alien 
words’, a foreign language, a stuttering, where ‘value judgements and accents, weave 
in and out of complex interrelationships, merg[ing] with some, recoil[ing] from 
others, intersect[ing] with yet a third group: and all its semantic layers, [...] 
complicat[ing] its expression [...]’ (Bakhtin 1981: 276).  This discourse, therefore, seeks 
to explore how the collaborative double may serve to disrupt the hegemonic 
principles of monologic authorialism and resolute meaning through interplay 
between the inclusive polyphony of ‘academic’ voices (Helen and Marilyn), the 
voices of the collaborative double (matthews and allen) and the voices of the reader. 
  
This research will be broadly framed within a constructionist paradigm.  A 
constructionist paradigmatic approach suggests that ‘knowledge is not something we 
acquire but something that we produce’ (Maunter 1996: 111).  As the premise of this 
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thesis is to consider how the dialogic space between that of the collaborative double 
may function as a stuttering and stammering proliferation of possibilities, 
perspectives and voices, this methodological approach provides a structure that 
utilizes ontological and epistemological tenets to question the social construction and 
reconstruction of the origin and production of knowledge and meaning.  
 
The methodological premise for this research is qualitative and dialogically 
reflexive. Qualitative research is generally considered as that which is ‘grounded in a 
philosophical position which is broadly ‘interpretivist' in the sense that it is 
concerned with how the social world is interpreted, understood, experienced or 
produced’ (Mason, 1996: 4).  A qualitative approach, therefore, provides a basis for 
questioning hegemonic authorialism and the production of meaning and allows for a 
multiple, interpretivist, reflexive and dialogic method to be performed. 
 
According to Denzin, texts that are performative are creative, passionate, 
visceral, and kinetic; focus on process over product; are critically reflexive 
on the part of the researcher; and experiment with form including popular 
arts forms—they are open texts with multiple meanings and multiple ways of 
relating to the work, allowing dialogue with [and between] research 
participants (Denzin 2005: 84). 
 
This document, however, seeks to disrupt the belief in a dichotomy between 
producer, product and process and envisages all bound in praxial mode of generative 
and reflexive dialogic production, a production that is performed within the 
documents. ‘Performance creates an open, dialogic space for inquiry and expression 
through an interpretation of events and their contexts. Performance creates 
opportunities for communion among participants, researchers, and research 
audiences’ (Denzin 2005: 75).  The dialogic framework within this document allows the 
research to be performed between all emergent participants in the site between the 
collaborative double; not only, but also, Helen and Marilyn, matthews and allen, text 
and reader, but between academic text and footnotes, past and present, reality and 
fiction, sense and nonsense and; a dialogic interplay of praxis that produces 
divergent and reflexive possibilities rather than formulate conclusions. ‘Reflexivity 
[...] encourages an ironic sense of the ‘said before’, that is the feeling that one 
cannot invent anything new but merely play with the already existent’ (Barker 2004: 
174). 
 
The divergent interplay of dialogue within the documents takes the form of Helen 
and Marilyn, who adopt conventional (ish) academic voices.  The written academic 
texts provide the context for the multi-media footnotes of matthews and allen, and it 
is the performative play of these footnotes that offers the potential to disrupt the 
notion of stable and finite meaning.  matthews and allen appropriate the accepted 
academic format of the footnote system (an established system for clarifying  
meaning) and play with that which is already in existence to create a mutable and 
interpretive dialogue that resists the stability of the academic paper. The documents 
have been produced as digital iBooks; the digital submission facilitating the 
performative premise, where text, image, film and sound interact to disrupt the 
monologic authorial voice of singular subjectivity. Thus the interactivity and 
reflexivity of the texts invite the reader to participate in dialogue; a dialogue that 
differs and defers and disrupts the logic of resolute meaning, challenging you to 
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‘look for a completely different idea, elsewhere, in another area, neither in one no[r] 
the other’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 10). 
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double  1. consisting of two usu. equal parts or things. 2. twice as much or 
many (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 422). 
 
It appears that thought is preoccupied with the ‘double’; double standards, double 
meaning, double-bind, double cross, double consciousness, double truth, double 
negative, double talk, double think, double trouble. Superficially the double alludes 
to the plural: the obverse of the singular or the ‘I’. The double, however, is 
duplicitous.  Fundamentally it contains two, yet through cultural articulation founded 
on philosophical inheritance, the double alludes to a dichotomous either/or 
relationship; a choice between two options that allows for no equivocation.  The 
double in its duplicity becomes one. 
 
The expectation of the two, placed in relation to one another, may be seen to 
establish a culture of comparison; one is different to another, one is the same as the 
other.  ‘As such, difference is not an essence or an attribute of an object but a 
relationship and position or perspective of signification’ (Barker 2004: 53).  It may be 
suggested that the language of sameness and difference (as a product of comparison 
and distinction) introduces a preconceived notion of opposition and opposites, thus a 
binary relationship, ‘the principle of contrast between two mutually exclusive terms’ 
(Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 396). 
 
The double may be said to represent a dichotomy through a tradition of ideological 
contrariety; body or soul, good or evil, true or false.  As Nietzsche poses, ‘What 
really is it in us that wants “the truth”?’ ‘We can hardly go out looking for untruth.’ 
‘We operate in the most fundamental way, with a series of opposites, of which truth-
falsity is the most obvious and fundamental’ (Nietzsche 1973: 11).  
 
The accustomed antinomic relationships of everyday life; on/off, up/down, left/right, 
good/bad, true/false are transformed through cultural hierarchy into the autonomous; 
on or off, up or down, left or right, good or bad, true or false. These oppositions, 
however, are not arbitrary; the doubles allude not only to comparative sameness and 
difference, but also to a resolution, a reconciliation.  The double may be seen to 
evoke a singular choice.  On.  Up.  Right.  Thus an assumptive unity is derived from 
the presence of the two placed within the associative relationship of the double. Two 
becomes One.  
 
This logic (of binary opposition leading to a resolution or reconciliation commanding 
a singular choice) may be seen to underpin Western thought and it could be 
considered that it is almost impossible to conceive of a rational discourse that is not 
in some way dependant upon the logocentric philosophical inheritance of binary 
opposition, hierarchy and the omnipotence that it suggests. Logocentrism is derived 
from the Greek logos. The word logos can simply be translated as word. In terms of a 
philosophical stance, however, the term encapsulates and conveys the ultimate 
principle of a desire for reason and unified truth that is a priori within Western 
ideology; as Derrida suggests, a fundamental repressive philosophical tradition 
founded on the notion of a centre. Inherent within this desire for a central truth or 
surety is the assumptive belief in an articulation of difference and opposition. ‘The 
logocentric longing par excellence is to distinguish one from the other’ (Derrida 1997: 
167).  This philosophical stance predicates that ‘truth’ or finite meaning resides in the 
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centre or the ‘I’ and reinforces that all may be reduced to the unified singular, the 
one. 
 
The first precept was never to accept a thing as true until I knew it as such 
without a single doubt (Descartes, 1637, Le Discours de la Methode) 
 
Pre-Socratic philosophy indicates a varied preoccupation with opposites and has 
been cited in the thoughts of Hippocrates, Parmenides, the Pythagoreans, 
Empedocles, Heraclitus, and Anaximander, among others, including the rhetorical 
use of opposites in the writing of Homer. Oppositions, such as, appearance/reality, 
logos/mythos, inside/outside, good/evil, nature/culture, mind/body, self/other, 
absence/presence, speech/writing, are considered to be inured in thought and the 
production of meaning. The dialectical search for unified truth, according to Derrida, 
has characterized Western philosophical assumptions since Plato’s Form and Matter 
and Descartes Mind and Body dichotomies. Plato supposed that every form has an 
opposite and proposed that, ‘whatever is done in a certain way is done through the 
agency of a certain quality, and whatever is done in the opposite way is done 
through the agency of its opposite?’ (16 Plato, Protagoras, 332 b-c).  
 
The first systematic model of opposites is credited to Aristotle.  Categories outlined 
four classes of opposites, that of: correlatives, contraries, privatives to positives 
(‘affirmatives to negatives’).  Aristotelian contraries may be seen as opposites that 
function as pairs, yet they are not interdependent, ‘the good is not spoken of as the 
good of the bad, but as the contrary of the bad’ (Aristotle 2002: 35).  Contraries, may, 
therefore, be seen as either, or.    Correlatives, however, are described as double and 
half; they are classified in terms of their mutual relationship and their meaning as 
double is reliant upon relational features; the double as relational in that it becomes 
the double of something. Correlatives may, therefore, be seen as either, or maybe 
neither.   
 
The culture of opposition may be said to manifest itself explicitly in the 
philosophical heritage of dialectics. It could be argued that it is the dialectic, as a 
process of ‘argumentation, reasoning and disputation’, that lays the foundation for 
oppositional thought (Mautner 1996: 140).  Generally the dialectic is considered as a 
mode of thought or a philosophical medium that seeks truth through the exchange of 
conflicting or dichotomous views. The term dialectic appears in various guises 
throughout Western philosophy and, historically, suggests a form of reasoning that 
utilizes contradiction as a means of contemplation. For Plato the dialectic was a 
medium through which truth may be attained, whereas for Aristotle the dialectic 
provided that of a ‘half truth’ (Smith 1993: 335-358). Kant associated the dialectic with a 
false or illusory knowledge, and Hegel, influenced by Kant’s discussion of 
antinomies in the Critique of Pure Reason, considered it to be a means of arriving at 
an absolute truth . Fundamentally, therefore, despite various propositions, the 
dialectic may be seen to function as a monistic principle.  For Plato the search for a 
unified meaning lay in testing, through contradiction or opposing viewpoints, the 
‘truthfulness’ of a hypothesis: reductio ad absurdum.  Plato’s Socratic dialogue, as 
the pursuit of moral improvement, thus utilized the rhetoric of the dichotomous 
double to seek innate knowledge, truth and virtue. 
 
Aristotle proposed that the dialectic was a process reliant upon inferior logic.   From 
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Aristotle’s perspective the dialectic did not provide the certainty offered by 
established or scientific notions of proof.  Aristotle proposed an alternate theory of 
logic that sought to utilize oppositional deductive reasoning to arrive at a certain 
conclusion; a singular axiomatic truth. For Aristotle, deductive reasoning was based 
upon a method in which a certain conclusion is drawn from two given and existing 
propositions. Irrespective of the distinctions between dialecticism and that of 
deductive reasoning, it could be suggested that both play a part in the dominant and 
assumptive belief in the logic of opposition. 
 
For Kant, dialectic methodology became a systematic approach founded on the use 
of contradiction to question the existence of pure reason. Kant opposed traditional 
notions 
of understanding and focused on the dialectic as an antinomous state of 
contradiction. Kant proposed that we can never know the ‘infinite’, and as such his 
model of the dialectic may superficially be perceived as evading the ultimate 
collapse of the two into a resolute conclusion or singular entity. For Kant, however, a 
synthesis is a process that ‘gathers the elements for cognition.’  ‘The act of putting 
different representations together, and grasping what is manifold in them in one 
cognition and unites them to form a certain content’ (Guyer 1992: 104).  Thus, the 
Kantian dialectic alludes to a process of associative and differentiative relationships; 
a process that inevitably entreats us to seek sameness and difference when 
encountering the two as double. Whereas Kant’s dialectic fundamentally resided in a 
means to expose illusion, Hegel considered the dialectic as a medium of truth. The 
significance of the Hegelian dialectic  ‘with its progressive leaps and interplay of 
opposites’ denotes a process whereby the thesis, as dominant discourse, is challenged 
by the antithesis and the conflicting elements are reconciled or synthesised; a process 
of regeneration and synthesis which ultimately results in an absolute idea; an all 
embracing whole or totality (Miller 2008: vi).  The emphasis for Hegel was that of 
setting up contradictions and conflicts between the opposing elements, with the 
intention that the two contrary concepts would be absorbed into that of a new 
concept, one that would itself be subject to a new antithetic challenge.  Through this 
process Hegel believed that truth would be revealed. Hegel stated, ‘every synthesis 
will in turn bring forth a new opposite and so on.’ (Maunter 1996: 159).  The Hegelian 
dialectic may give the illusion of fluidity and multiplicity, however, it could  
be considered that through this dialectical process the two in opposition implode to 
form a unity, albeit temporary. Hegel states that ‘truth is found neither in the thesis 
nor the antithesis, but in an emergent synthesis which reconciles the two’ (Hegel).  In 
placing the thesis and the antithesis in an associative relationship the dialectic may 
be considered as a process that distinguishes one from another. Thus, it is the 
emphasis on reconciliation between the two that creates a culture of consensus that in 
turn may perpetuate the desire for resolute singular meaning and truth. 
 
It may be suggested that the legacy of this dominant thought is significant in terms of 
our understanding and conception of the double as reducible unity and one that 
operates on the principle of identifying sameness and difference. Dialectic 
methodology sought to construct a system that utilized the double in opposition as 
‘refutation of a relevant proposition, or of a synthesis, or a combination of the 
opposing assertions’ (Ayer and O'Grady 1992: 484). This philosophical legacy establishes 
a cultural precedence for not only the identification and existence of a singular truth, 
or truth residing in the singular, but one that can be only obtained by viewing the 
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double in opposition; a choice of one or the other, an either/or dichotomy resulting in 
unified thought. The philosophical discourse of the double, however, does not merely 
reside in dialectical opposition. The Cartesian belief in the existence of two distinct 
ontological entities, that of mind and body, created a precedent for the belief in an 
autonomous individual as the site of truth. 
 
Cartesian dualism underpins a host of dichotomies associated with Western thought, 
and it could be considered that this philosophical stance affirms the belief in the 
existence of an innate truth residing in the centre or the ‘I’, predicating that all is 
reducible through reason to the unified singular; the one. The philosophical 
inheritance of dualist thinking is extensive and may be cited in terms of Aristotle’s 
oppositions, where opposites may be seen as cures for opposites and virtue may be 
seen to reside in the mean through the tempering of the complimentary elemental 
extremes:  ‘[A] virtue is a mean between two extremes’ (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics); 
likewise Hegelian synthesis, or Plato’s belief that humans were once whole and that 
Zeus split human beings in two: (Slethaug 1993: 9).   ‘This desire for unity is, according 
to Plato, indicative of a human need to move from the world of halves, material 
forms, and illusions to the realm of wholeness, spirituality, and a perfect reality.’ 
(Slethaug 1993: 9).  
 
Thus dualist thought may be considered as instituting a cultural precedence for 
classification, division and resolution that will allegedly proffer wholeness or unity; 
an either/or.  Nietzsche, however, suggests that, ‘we operate in the most fundamental 
way, with a series of opposites, of which truth-falsity is the most obvious and 
fundamental’ [...]‘between the poles of truth-falsity, good-bad, and so on, there can 
be no fruitful connections’ (Nietzsche 1973: 15).  Thus, the logic of opposition with 
regard to the double may be seen to fall prey to the identification of sameness and 
difference, disparity and dissimilarity, a process of the construction of binary polarity 
founded on comparison and distinction.  Binary opposition as a concept relates to a 
pair of theoretical opposites.  These oppositions often masquerade as intrinsic to 
dominant discourse and Structuralist thought proposed that, ‘binary oppositions 
impose order on the experience of the world’ (Jakobson and Halle 1956: 60).  Lévi-Strauss 
proposed that difference, in the form of oppositions, formed the basis for dealing 
with the complexities of cultural dilemmas or contradictions and suggested that 
oppositions are constructed by societies to resolve conflicting situations.  It is posed 
in Derrida’s Afterword, however, that, ‘unless a distinction can be made rigorous 
and precise it isn’t really a distinction’. (Derrida: 1991: 115).  
 
Difference as distinction may be seen as the non-identical and the dissimilar. 
Difference or differing, derived from Greek diapherein, relates to distinctiveness and 
division and lies at the root of all conceptual oppositions. Derrida suggests, however, 
that there can be no inherent 'logic' to this 'either/or' dualism, since both elements in a 
binary opposition (all oppositions) are interdependent and are, therefore, placed in an 
associative relationship; neither can ‘exist’ without the other. In a determined 
reliance upon the metaphysics of presence as a site of finite meaning, traditional 
Western philosophy has focused on this culture of binary oppositions where good 
opposes evil, truth opposes falsity and absence opposes presence. Binary 
oppositions, however, are not intrinsic and as Derrida suggests, ‘[i]n a classical 
philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-
vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other 
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(axiologically, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand' (Derrida 1981: 41). 
 
Thus it may be suggested that when the two are placed in relation (the double), a 
cultural tendency to construct a binary opposition emerges.  The double seen as an 
associative relationship may, therefore, become susceptible to the Derridean violence 
of hierarchy where a struggle to establish order, surety and finite meaning emerges. 
It is commonly said of the collaborative double that “they finish each other’s 
sentences”/“which one does which bit”, either/or through sameness and difference 
(as distinction) reducing the double to the unified, the one, an assumption of the two 
artists of the collaborative double as the contrary either/or, the Derridean critique of 
logocentrism; the ‘logocentric longing’ (Derrida 1997: 167).  The associative relation of 
the two of the double, as double, however, may furthermore be seen as inseparable 
and interdependent.  Thus, the double may proffer that of the correlative or/both.  
The or/both, however, of the collaborative double may likewise be subsumed into the 
assumptive logic of opposition; the collaborative double situated in distinctive 
opposition to that of the single artist, the self sufficient artistic figure, the creative 
originator as a site of reason, surety and truth. Thus, it may be suggested that the 
collaborative double itself may predicate uncertainty, divisibility, opposition and 
dichotomy, becoming the conflicting situation that invokes resolution; ‘so many 
dichotomies [...] established that there will be enough for everyone to be pinned to 
the wall, sunk in a hole’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 21).  The collaborative double may, 
therefore, be seen to be doomed to the precondition, the historical canon of the 
reductionist logic of oppositional thought. So how can the collaborative double, 
therefore, disrupt the prevailing dominant coherence of the either/or, or/both 
opposition and site itself ‘beyond the civil world and its Yes and No’ ?  (Nietzsche 
1973: 65).  
 
 
Do ‘we [the collaborative double] have to pay dearly for having 
assailed men and things with Yes and No..[?]’ 
(Nietzsche 1973: 62) 
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As Gorman quotes Lehman quoting Kenneth Koch: 
“One of the most wonderful ways in the world to be with someone’s 
sweetness and brilliance is to collaborate with that person . . . I like 
collaborating the way people like drinking —[it] is making a game out of real 
life.” 
(Gorman 2010) 
 
Collaboration within the visual arts is multifarious yet the dominant and persistent 
assumption is that of an alliance of multiple authors that aspires to disrupt a ‘singular 
subjectivity’ (Gisbourne 2007: 16).  Subjectivity can be described as the ‘condition of 
being a person [and/or] the process by which we become persons’(Barker 2004: 194).  
A cultural preoccupation, however, which appears to reside with that of the Cartesian 
subject as the unique person with the capacity of reason, consciousness and action; ‘I 
think therefore I am plac[ing] the rational, conscious individual subject at the heart 
of Western philosophy and thought’ (Barker 2004: 195).  Thus it may be considered that 
the dominant discourse of history has established a precedent as to how we perceive 
the artist as singular, the individuated self-conscious I of subjectivity. ‘The most 
fundamental assumption of modernity [...] is that the social unit of society is not the 
group, guild, tribe, or city, but the person. That the contemporary bourgeois artist, 
as a result of these historical processes, sees his relation to art as an individual, and 
not as a social relation, is inevitable’ (Gablick 1984: 31). 
 
The advent of Modernism saw a shift in perception, upgrading the figure of the artist 
to that of a creative and learned genius with a solitary and unique vision to impart to 
the world.  Thus the term ‘artist’ has become encumbered with a prevailing 
assumption of the ‘ “self-sufficient genius” as a site of origination’; the artist as the 
authorial and autonomous figure, the ‘I’: I speak from the heart, I speak a truth, I 
express my vision, my signature, my style, my eye, my name; an alliance of 
subjectivity, origination and resolute meaning (Roth Collaboration and Originality, 
Collaborative Arts: Conversation on Collaborative Arts Practice n.d.: 198).  
 
Poststructuralist thinking sought to negate the ideological figure of the author as the 
source of finite meaning, suggesting that an acceptance of the author as genius and 
originator may be seen to result in a compliant belief in autonomy. Despite 
assertions that the author is dead, and an acknowledgment that the autonomous 
artist/author is merely a historical construct, the legacy of the individual authorial 
artist as central to both the production of art and meaning may be seen to persist. 
Thus it may be suggested that, ‘the act of artistic production doesn’t come from 
nowhere or start with a blank canvas however, this model of artistic endeavor, where 
the ‘I’ as central to production and meaning is maintained’ (Berry and Moss 2005: 6). 
 
Novelists or painters are largely solo operators. When it is pure art or self-
expression or a deeply original idea that needs to be developed, solitude 
serves. [I]f you're trying to think deeply about something, or you are more 
introverted, as many artists tend to be, having someone yakking in your ear 
isn't always productive (Kelly 2012). 
 
It is within this context that collaboration, as a strategy to disrupt or displace the 
enduring image of the solitary artistic authorial identity, emerges. ‘Artistic 
collaboration is a special and obvious case of the manipulation of the figure of the 
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artist, for at the very least collaboration involves a deliberately chosen alteration of 
artistic identity from individual to composite subjectivity’ (Green 2001: x). 
 
Most arts practice may be seen to involve some form of collaboration; collaboration 
with an audience, with objects, with culture, with curators, with agencies and with 
other artists. The term collaboration, however, is commonly defined as ‘the act of 
working with someone, to produce something’ (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 283). 
Collaborative practice, as working with someone takes many forms and includes 
groups of artists, associations, networks, constellations, alliances, coalitions and 
partnerships. Thus it may be suggested that in contemporary usage the word has 
become an umbrella term for multiple methods in this act of working together. 
Despite the ambiguity of the term, a distinction may be made (for the purpose of this 
discourse) between those that are disparate and transitory and those that deliberately 
and specifically form an alliance as artistic strategy. The artistic strategy of many 
collaborations may be seen to seek a new multiple model of artistic practice to 
‘question issues of authorship and non-hierarchical working’ (Trio Collective n.d.), the 
intention being to redefine the notion of a singular artistic identity and as Gilbert & 
George state, to ‘bring about new understanding’ (Gisbourne 2007:19).  This 
proposition may be seen to proffer collaboration as a recent phenomenon, yet an 
established historical precedent for collaborative practice exists, a precedent that 
includes the phenomenum of the collaborative double. 
 
The history of the artistic collaborative double encompasses couples such as Miller 
& Ray, Tanning & Ernst, hans arp & sophie, yet it was not until the 1970s that artists 
were documented as adopting a considered strategy of joint authorship with a 
‘deliberate intent to relocate the origin of innovation somewhere outside a single 
discreet consciousness’ (Roth Collaboration and Originality in collaborative Arts Conversations 
in Collaborative Arts Practice n.d.:198).  Thus the collaborative double may be seen as 
‘artists that want to subsume the ‘I’ for the ‘we’’; the we as supposedly plural 
(Gisbourne 2007: 15) .  Seemingly the double, therefore, may be seen to suggest 
plurality, ‘twice as much or many’ the contrary to the individual or the ‘I’, and in this 
most apparent sense the collaborative double may appear to be the obvious case to 
disrupt the solo artist as a site of origination (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 422).  The 
double, however, is trouble. 
  
The double is defined as evil precisely because of its difference and a 
possible disturbance to the familiar and the known (Zivkovic 2000). 
 
The double may be considered to personify a cultural preoccupation with 
uncertainty, an equivocation proffered by duplicity and dichotomy that may be seen 
to predicate the reductionist logic of oppositional thought; the double, in its 
ambiguity, instituting opposition and sameness. It may be proffered that we live in a 
world that seeks certainty and resolution, and thus the double may be seen to present 
us with an image of irresolution and incompleteness. ‘It [the double] courts and 
contemplates uncertainty, vacancy, doubt, dizziness, and arrest’ (Miller 1985: 417). The 
collaborative double may, therefore, be perceived as that which is aberrant and in 
opposition to the figure of the solitary artist as a site of origination. 
 
The cultural legacy of the double resides in a spiritual, mythological, psychological 
and philosophical tradition of, for example, twins, doppelgängers, odd-couples and 
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double acts.  For Barth the twin ‘signified whatever dualisms a culture entertained’ 
(Slethaug 1993: 8).  The image of the twin cited in most cultures is often conceived 
through an identification of sameness, as two halves of the same whole. The 
reoccurring theme of the doppelgänger similarly plays a significant role in our 
conception of the double. The doppelgänger is defined as ‘an apparition or double of 
a living person’ (an apparition founded on sameness as distinction) and 
characteristically in myth and literature involves a dualistic battle of the two, a battle 
between the living person and the apparition, resolved in a fight to the death (Pearsall 
and Trumble 1995: 421).  Mythologically it is considered that the death of the 
doppelgänger enacts the successful overcoming of evil impulses, a struggle 
culminating in the rejuvenated, complete and whole individual. 
 
The double further appears in culture as the odd couple (where two in a relationship 
have distinct differences), double acts (where the dynamic or humour is derived from 
an uneven relationship) and the double as lookalike (where two are considered to be 
the same as, identical to, or copies of the original, and thus ‘cause people to doubt 
their senses’ (Schwartz 1996: 27). The double, therefore, may be seen within culture as 
the anomalous other, contrary not only to the singular, the ‘I’, but also contrary as 
the double itself, a cultural play of difference as relative sameness.  
 
Thus, the double as trouble and the trouble with the double is that it does not simply 
suggest plurality. The collaborative double, placed within this social and cultural 
context may be seen as that which is incomplete, the anomalous two that necessitate 
a resolution.  The two of the double may, therefore, be perceived as both different 
and the same to one and another, to either or, or both aberrant to the cultural norm of 
the single, the ‘I’.  For Deleuze, the conception of difference as sameness ‘assumes 
that states are comparable’ and as such, ‘difference becomes merely a relative 
measure of sameness and, being the product of comparison, it concerns external 
relations between things [...] so that they ‘fit’ within the dominant model of unity’ 
(Parr 2010: 74/75).  Thus the collaborative double placed within the comparative 
dominant discourse may be seen as that which is divisible to one and/or yet 
indivisible as a unified third as both. 
 
Within the discourse of the visual arts the collaborative double is, therefore, 
commonly theorized in terms of the creation of a third; a third as  ‘indifferent 
phantom identity’; a ‘third identity’ (Green 2001: Title), a ‘third force’ (Abromovic and 
Ulay as cited in Green 2001: 179), a ‘third mind’ (Gysin and Burroughs 1978: Title), that is 
purported to supplant individual identity and disrupt singular subjectivity (Green 2001: 
186).  For Green, when artists become a collaborative double, ‘[a]nother entity 
emerges[...]: a third artistic identity superimposed over and exceeding the individual 
artists’; the creation of an authorial character exceeding the identity of two 
collaborating artists’ (Green 2001:179).  Green proposes that the third hand is that 
which offers a dramatic alternative to the dominant ideological figure of the lone 
artist. The third becomes the ‘modified’ artist, ‘the personae of the collaborative 
team’ in order to ‘convince an audience of new understandings of artistic identity’ 
(Green 2000).   
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For the collaborative double Gilbert & George the production of a third identity 
manifests itself in matching suits, corresponding gestures and iterative speech, in 
which ‘they fold [...] themselves into an elusive extra identity’ (Green 2001: 180).  The 
elusive third identity of Gilbert & George conceivably echoes that of the prevailing 
assumption of the double; the twins, the rejuvenated doppelgänger, the anomalous 
other of the odd couple, the double act, the lookalike.  Whilst the third hand of 
Gilbert & George, a third that centres on the process of determining sameness, may 
be seen to challenge the broader assumptions regarding the construction of identity, 
the double as third persona or identity may not provide us with a new understanding 
and do little to utilize the potential plurality of the double to disrupt the authorial 
discrete consciousness of the artistic figure as the dominant model of unity; the 
indifferent and indivisible two merely replicating the singular authorial presence or 
subjectivity.  
 
Gilbert: Two people make one artist. 
George: We think that we are an artist. 
Gilbert: Two visions make one vision. 
(Gisbourne 2007: 19) 
 
The double, Ulay and Abramović, defined their collaboration as a third force.  For 
Ulay and Abramović the third is not a deliberately constructed and performed 
identity but that which emerged as a result of the process of collaboration. As Ulay 
and Abramović stated ‘we work from the point of view of the higher self’ which they 
named as a ‘super-self’ (Green 2001: 180).  This higher or super-self was defined by the 
collaborative double as,  ‘a third hermaphroditic force’ a ‘two headed body’ 
conceivably reiterating the double as two halves of the same whole (Green 2000). 
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The collaborative practice of the third force of Ulay and Abramović focuses on the 
associative relation between the two in the collaboration. Ulay and Abramović’s 
performances commonly conveyed the ambiguity of the double, yet ultimately 
resulted in the indivisibility of the two,  ‘we become a kind of polarity’, a polarity, 
however, that sought a unified resolution (Ulay and Abramović li-ma.nl n.d.).  ‘He 
presented the male energy and I presented the female energy and we tried to 
combine them’ (Ulay and Abramović li-ma.nl n.d.).  The collaborative performances of 
Ulay and Abramović may be seen to have created a tension between the double; a 
tension, however, that ultimately sought resolution and unity.  For Ulay and 
Abramović resolution resided in creating a state of harmony between the two, a 
process of performance that homogenized and unified the double. 
 
Conceivably, therefore, the collaborative third becomes not either/or or double, but a 
third that consolidates the associative two into the harmonious figure of the one as a 
resolved whole, a dominant model of unity.  Ulay and Abramović proposed that the 
creation of this third figure absented the collaborators from their individual 
identities, ‘shedding traditional signs of unwanted artistic personality – the 
conventional artistic identities’ (Green Collaboration as a Symptom: Conversations on 
Collaborative Arts Practice n.d.: 4). As Green suggests, the ‘phantom identity’ [was] 
intended to obscure the identities of the individual artists, presenting the artists as 
depersonalized objects’; a perspective that he proposes closes the gap between artist 
and artwork, artist and viewer, artist and artist (Green 2000).  It may be suggested, 
however, that the naming of the third figure of collaboration may merely result in the 
replication of a conventional artistic identity; a discrete identity of the solo artist as 
central to production and resolute meaning; a representative identity that eradicates 
the potential interplay between the double as a means to disrupt the dominant 
ideological assumption of the artistic figure as a site of origination and unified 
meaning.  
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In 1978 Gysin and Burroughs’s text the Third Mind was produced in English. The 
collaborative text explored the possibility of a ‘third author’, created by the 
encounter of the two minds in the double. 
 
The third mind [...] is not the history of a literary collaboration but rather a complete 
fusion in a praxis of two subjectivities, two subjectivities that metamorphose into a 
third; it is from this collusion that a new author emerges, an absent third person, 
invisible and beyond grasp, [...].  The book [The Third Mind] is therefore the 
negation of the omnipresent and all powerful author – the geometrist who clings to 
his inspiration as coming from divine inspiration, a mission, or the dictates of 
language.  
(Gerard Georges Lemaire as cited in Gysin & Burroughs 1978) 
 
For Gysin and Burroughs the production of a third author invalidated the two of the 
collaborative double and negated the omnipresent ideological figure of the author as 
a ‘site of origination’, ‘the voice of a single, person, the author “confiding” in us’ 
(Roth Collaboration and Originality in Collaborative Arts: Conversations in Collaborative Arts 
Practice: 198). They proposed that by eradicating their authorial identity a multiplicity 
of voices and meanings would emerge from that of the fourth author, the reader.  
Gysin and Burroughs suggested that it was with the fourth, fifth, sixth...authors that 
plurality of meaning would emerge; meaning that resided outside authorial 
singularity - a third mind, a fourth mind, a fifth mind of the readers encountering the 
text; the death of the author, ‘facilitat[ing] the birth of the reader’ (Rogoff, Production 
Lines in Collaborative Arts: Conversations in Collaborative Art Practice: 69). As Barthes 
suggested, by excluding or negating the author, a text may be seen as ‘irreducibly 
plural, a weave of voices or codes which cannot be tied to a single point of 
expressive origin.’ (Childs and Fowler 2005: 13). 
Gysin and Burroughs’s emphasis on the text (the product of collaboration) as a site 
of multiplicity, however, may be seen to negate the significance and potential of the 
collaborative double to disrupt dominant assumptions regarding authorial identity as 
a singular subjectivity. Thus, it may be suggested that Gysin and Burroughs’s 
emphasis on negation, invisibility and indifference to both the two (the 
collaborators), and/or the third author/s (the third mind), may not necessarily address 
the potential of the collaborative double itself to resist sameness and generate 
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multiplicity.  
Whilst the historical formation of the ‘I’ and/or a singular subjectivity is, to a degree, 
highlighted through these existing models of multiple authorship, it could be 
suggested that this third identity may not disrupt or bring about a new understanding, 
but ultimately duplicate and perpetuate the established and traditional model of 
singular artistic authorship, ‘a lone artistic originator and creator [...] one that 
originates or gives existence’ (Stillinger 1991:4).  The collaboration double, whilst 
superficially alluding to the plural or multiple, when considered in terms of sameness 
as third, may not necessarily address the broader and more fundamental issues 
associated with plurality, fluidity and instability of the artist, authorship and 
origination.  Through the construction of the third the double may be seen to reaffirm 
the compliant belief in the myth of the unified singular artist as a site of definitive 
and resolute meaning.  
 
So how can the collaborative double resist this persistent cultural preoccupation with 
resolving the problem of the double; the homogenization of the two into the elusive 
extra artistic identity, a unified third that may be seen to replicate the discourse of the 
solo artist?  As Cull poses, ‘what [...] if we acknowledge that the solo artist or author 
was never self-present or self-identical in the first place?’ (Cull 2012).  If we 
acknowledge the authorial figure of the artist, (the individual, the ‘I’, the singular) as 
merely a cultural and ideological construction of a dominant regime, and subjectivity 
as a process that resides outside the individuated self conscious I, then the 
collaborative double need not preoccupy itself with the oppositional premise of 
sameness; sameness as distinction either between that of the supposed singular 
subjectivity of the artist and the collaborative double and/or the sameness of the two 
within the collaboration as the third that mimics the assumptive unity of the singular 
artist (Cull  2012). Thus the collaborative double need not ‘fit within the dominant 
model of unity’ (Parr 2010: 72). 
 
For Deleuze sameness equates to difference as distinction.  Deleuze suggests that 
difference need not merely be seen in terms of distinction and opposition, but also as 
difference-in-itself; difference as that of singularity and the process of individuation 
derived from  ‘multitudinous influences’ (Parr 2010: 73).  As Deleuze and Guattari in 
collaboration suggested, ‘since each of us is several we are already quite a crowd’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 3).  Thus it may be suggested that it is the very interplay of 
singularities that holds the potential to reconfigure the collaborative double, from the 
double as third, (the indivisible and indifferent third) to the collaborative double as 
the production of multitudinous and proliferating possibilities of difference.  
 
less a question of pooling our knowledge than piling up our uncertainties 
(Guattari 2006: 12). 
 
Hence, reconfiguring thought may allow the collaborative double to become an 
inclusive and differential mode of production, a mode of production that is not 
opposed as such to the individual artist, but one that ‘rupture[s] the authority 
previously held by the aura [the myth] of the unique individual known as ‘the artist’ 
without any attempt to reinscribe it in an alternative, expanded group identity, [the 
third]’ (Rogoff, Production Lines in Collaborative Arts: Conversations in Collaborative Art 
Practice: 69).  The collaborative double as a model of proliferative production may, 
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therefore, resist the cultural preoccupation with resolving and unifying the supposed 
anomaly of the double. As Foucault suggests, the double may be seen to ‘evoke 
multiplicity, plurality, and absence; it neither refers to a precise parallel between 
two things nor means ‘two-of’ (Foucault 1998: 198).  Thus the potential of the 
collaborative double may lie in utilizing all of the differences of the double. As 
Derrida suggests, ‘differences, looked at from a certain [different] perspective, may 
instead communicate ideas of fragmentation and plurality’: the interplay of the 
double as ‘less than one and more than two’ conceivably not either/or, nor the one 
and other, but perhaps that of neither and both and many (Slethaug 1993: 23). Thus it is 
possibly the very condition of being double that permits all the voices of the crowd.  
The double as that which ‘consist[s] of two usu. equal parts or things’ as well as that 
of ‘twice as much or [and potentially] many’ (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 422). 
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Either/Neither 
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How, then, in history’s quest for the integrity of the “self”, can such awkward 
remainders, the double among them, be handled? One way is to remove or 
subjugate them in some manner, to “kill” them, as it were.  The double thus 
becomes a kind of scapegoat that must be suppressed-eliminated or 
marginalized, either entirely or in part - if the purity and authenticity of the 
self is to be won’  
(Henning 1988: 125). 
 
Despite an established historical precedence within the visual arts, the artistic 
collaborative double placed within the dominant cultural discourse (as a model of 
unity) may be perceived as disquieting and aberrant to that of ‘the unique individual 
known as the artist’ (Rogoff, Production Lines in Collaborative Arts: Conversations in 
Collaborative Art Practice: 69). In encountering the collaborative double the ghost of the ‘ 
lone artistic [...] creator’, as ‘one that originates or gives existence to’ may be seen 
to endure, imploring us to compliantly seek the authorial voice and unified meaning 
(Stillinger 1991: 4). As Charles Green suggests, ‘we routinely refer to the single 
authorial mind, or personality, or consciousness to validate “meaning” or 
“authority”’ (Green Collaboration as a Symptom: Conversations on Collaborative Arts Practice 
n.d.:4).  
 
In response to Barthes’s Death of the Author, Foucault poses the question “What is 
anauthor?”.  Barthes defined the author as an ideological construct, ‘the voice of a 
single, person, the author “confiding” in us’ and proposed that by excluding the 
author a text may be seen as ‘irreducibly plural, a weave of voices or codes which 
cannot be tied to a single point of expressive origin’ (Roth Collaboration and Originality in 
Collaborative Arts: Conversations in Collaborative Arts Practice n.d.: 198), (Childs and Fowler 
2005: 12).  In response to this proposition Foucault reflected that ‘the function of the 
author is to characterize the existence, circulation, and operation of certain 
discourse within society’ (Foucault 1977: 124).  Foucault’s intertextual reference to 
Barthes’s Death of the Author and more specifically Beckett’s Endgame asks 'What 
does it matter who is speaking, someone said, what does it matter who is speaking?' 
(Foucault 1977: 124).  Foucault may be seen to play with the emphasis on the word 
‘matter’ in ‘what does it matter’ and draws upon Beckett’s use of ‘someone’ as that 
which is unnamed and lacks classification, questioning the significance of the 
identity of the author and ‘tease[ing] us with the possibility of an authorial vanishing 
point’ (Begam 1996: 121).  Foucault proposes, therefore, that the emphasis need not be 
placed on the exclusion of the author, per se, but on the discursive author-function, 
where the dominant assumptions and beliefs with regard to the author and authorship 
are acknowledged in terms of their constructed social roles and positions, the 
‘transhistorical constants that govern the construction of an author’ (Foucault 
1977:124).  For Foucault the author does not vanish, but is acknowledged as a 
participant in a process and mode of production that ultimately reveals the 
complexity of its own discursive practices, ‘who speaks, what is said, how it is said 
and how it is interpreted’  (Costello and Vickery 2007: 172). 
 
The authors name is not a function of a mans civil status, nor is it fictional; it 
is situated in the breach among the discontinuities, which gives rise to new 
groups of discourse and their singular mode of existence (Foucault 1977: 124-
127). 
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Barthes proclaimed the death of the author; the collaborative double, however, need 
not play dead:  they do not have to play at being Barthes’s dead authors. The 
collaborative double may alternatively seek to utilize the potential inherent in the 
dominant beliefs imbedded in the social construction of the author; for example, the 
discursive role of the artist name.  As Foucault suggests, ‘the author's name does not 
refer to a ‘real’, singular individual.  It can give rise simultaneously to several selves 
and to several subject positions that can be occupied by others and is often trans-
discursive’ (Foucault 1977: 127).  
 
Identity may be seen to pertain to cultural description, to categorization and 
classification, to sameness and difference.  This duplicitous term (duplicitous in the 
sense that it implies that which may be both fixed and fluid) is, however, best 
described as a ‘discursive practice that enacts or produces that which it names 
through citation and reiteration of norms or conventions’ (Barker 2004: 93-94).  We	exist	 as	 a	multitude	 of	 fragmented	 identities,	 one	 identity	 never	more	 real,	 or	
fictive	 than	another:	as	Foucault	suggests,	 ‘identity	is	a	discourse	like	any	other.		
There	 can	be	no	 ‘real’	 identity,	 just	a	way	of	 talking	about	 the	 self’	 (Harrison	 and	Wood	 1992).	 The	 prevailing	 assumption	 of	 identity,	 however,	 as	 that	 of	classification	and	distinction,	may	be	seen	as	implicitly linked to the conventional 
and romanticized discourse of the author, and names commonly play a significant 
role in the construction of an authorial identity. 	
 
[...] why have we kept our own names (here)?  Out of habit, purely out of 
habit. To make ourselves unrecognisable in turn...To reach, not the point 
where one no longer says, I but the point where it is no longer of any 
importance whether one says “I”  (Stivale 2008: 94). 
 
Within the visual arts the artist/author name is traditionally and culturally significant. 
‘It is more than a gesture, a finger pointed at someone, it is, to a certain extent, the 
equivalent of a description’ (Foucault 1977: 125).  The assigning of a name may be seen 
as an attempt to define a fixed authorial voice and artistic identity.  
 
What’s in a name?   
 
Frequently we visit a gallery in order to view a particular artist’s work.  We are often 
drawn towards the artist’s name as opposed to the artwork.  How does the artist’s 
name perpetuate a romanticised and ideological notion of the identity of the 
autonomous artist as originator? Picasso, da Vinci, van Gogh, Michelangelo, Monet, 
Cezanne, Raphael, Rembrandt, Warhol, Dali, Matisse?  ‘What a heavy burden is a 
name that has become too famous’  (Voltaire). 
 
[hyperlink] A name, a collaborative name, Harrison and Wood, Gilbert and George, 
matthews and allen, may be seen to allude to classification and distinction. A name, 
however, may alternatively be used as a device to de-emphasize the individual 
author/s. The collaborative name matthews and allen is composed or made-up of two 
common surnames. It is proposed that first names are considered to be specific 
(Gilbert and George), middle names superfluous (Anthony David McPartlin and 
Declan Joseph Oliver Donnelly), and surnames ‘are generally perceived as 
arbitrary’ in that they do not refer to any specific characteristics (Harrison and 
Wood).  (Lodge 2011:36 The Art of Fiction). The name matthews and allen does not 
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pertain to, for example, a particular age or gender, it is to an extent ambiguous. ‘We 
have not assigned clever pseudonyms to prevent recognition’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 
3). [back] 
 
Many collaborations employ pseudonyms in an attempt to free themselves from 
authorial preconceptions, ‘the pleasure of making up names.  At times I had to curb 
my impulse towards the outlandish – the fiercely comical, the pun, the dirty word – 
but for the most part I was content to play within the bounds of realism’ (Auster 1999: 
251).  The name matthews and allen was chosen from within Auster’s ‘bounds of 
realism’ as a deliberate device that would enable the double to play with the 
dominant assumptions of identity (‘the characteristics determining who or what a 
person or thing is’) and ‘the culture in which it [the dominant assumptions] 
circulates’ (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 702),  (Foucault 1977:123).  The name matthews and 
allen may allude to individuals, to (an odd) couple, a double act, a company/to 
companions. The use of two indeterminate names (with the conjunction and) may be 
seen to provoke interplay between fact and fiction  
and as such, through indeterminacy, matthews and allen attempt to resist a fixed 
unified authorial (classifiable and distinctive) identity and thus gains the potential to 
become many. 
 
[hyperlink] Its not easy with you two...How am I going to tell you apart?  The 
only difference between you is your names, otherwise you’re like’...’you’re as 
like each other as two snakes.’ [...]. I can’t see any difference between you.  
So I shall treat you as one single person and call you both Arthur, that’s what 
one of you is called, after all.  Is it you perhaps? (Kafka 2009: 19) [back] 
 
The artistic identity of the collaborative double as aberrant to the individual artist as 
the site of unity and origination, can invoke disquietude.  matthews and allen, unlike 
many collaborative doubles, are not family members, are not the same age, did not 
attend art school together, do not live together and are not a couple. They are very 
different; they are difficult to classify or designate.  They do not look alike but, 
peculiarly, when placed in association, as double, it appears that it is not easy to tell 
them apart. It could be considered that we live in a world that seeks certainty, unity 
and resolution and in encountering the anomalous double we seek to collapse the two 
into a homogenous and unified whole, a third, the collaboration, and/or attempt to 
place the two in opposition; as Caesar’s maxim entreats divide et impera; divide and 
rule.  Thus, it may be suggested, at least in part, that there appears to be a desire to 
distinguish between the two; a game of seek the author. “Which one is which?”  
“Who does which bit?” 
“Which one is good, which one is (therefore) evil?”; the logic of opposition echoing 
philosophical and ideological contrariety.  
 
I really enjoyed the informative article about Ant and Dec (YOU Again? 23 
February), but I am still no closer to knowing which one is which. Gary 
Smith, Langport, Somerset.’ 
(Aitkenhead 2013) 
 
Parallels are often drawn between matthews and allen and other doubles, Gilbert & 
George, The Odd Couple, Ant & Dec.  As a collaborative double it appears that you 
are of ‘indeterminate status among the various forms of social relations’,   
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[hyperlink] the anomalous double, as outsider, grouped with other cultural 
anomalies; the odd couple(s) (Livett 2000). ‘These are [...] odd couples, where 'odd' 
indicates not primarily that each individual in the pair is odd (although that's also 
implied), but that the pairs are odd as pairs. Each twosome has a kind of unity, yet 
the nature of that unity is ambiguous’ (Livett 2000). [back] 
 
Despite a long history of the collaborative double it could be considered that they are 
still seen as the odd couple of the art world, and that which is odd, anomalous or 
aberrant is frequently relegated to the humorous or the absurd.  Comedy is often born 
out of the disparity between ‘what a person is and what he affects to be’ (Bevis 2013: 
39) and the double as two characters may be seen as a literal and exaggerated 
manifestation of this inherent thought. The comedy double act is noted as one of the 
most durable comic formats where humour and meaning is derived from the 
interplay of two identities, personalities or characters.  The tradition of the double 
act is cited in classical dialogues and Shakespearean comedy, where ‘the patter of a 
serious or ‘straight’ man trying to cope with the vagaries of a comic servant set the 
pattern of the principal type of double-act’ (Neale and Krutnik 1990: 187).  The double act 
as we know it today is a comic pairing where humour is derived from the tension that 
is created betwixt an uneven and incompatible relationship between the two. 
Generally these pairings are considered to consist of a straight man (the conventional 
and reasonable character who often plays the serious stooge) and the funny man (the 
unconventional and less conformist character who often appears as the comic).  A 
comparison is often drawn between the collaborative double and the comedy double 
act, where a straight man and funny man are sought. However, the roles enacted 
within the double act are not necessarily fixed and in many instances are 
interchangeable.   As Peter Cook proffers with regard to his collaboration with 
Dudley Moore (a double act with no straight man) ‘for some reason it works, he’s 
short and working class I’m tall and middle class, he’s from Dagenham I’m from 
Torquay, one of us is Jewish I don’t know which one.’ the joke residing in the final 
line, ‘I don’t know which one’ (Fry 2006). 
 
matthews and allen do not intentionally assume specific roles within the 
collaboration, (the straight man, the funny man, the author, the actor, the producer, 
the director, the character); enacting fixed roles may be seen to perpetuate 
dichotomous and unified thought. It appears, however, that there is a prevailing 
assumption that the two of the double will perform specific roles and bring 
individual skills to the collaboration.  As Rogoff suggests, however, ‘this concept of 
collaboration is extremely limited. It assumes a coming together of talents and skills 
which cross-fertilize one another through simple processes, neither challenged by 
issues of difference [...] (Rogoff, Production Lines in Collaborative Arts: Conversations in 
Collaborative Art Practice: 69). Thus, matthews and allen attempt to play (play as in the 
Derridean disruption of presence) with the discontinuities of the dominant 
assumptions, the ideological positions, the paradigmatic territory, the cultural 
expectations inherent in the identities of author, character, and.  
 
The word character is complex, it may be defined as ‘1. the mental and moral 
qualities distinctive to an individual [and] 2. a person in a novel, play, or film’ 
(Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 245).  Thus the word character is contrary, it suggests that 
which may classify and designate through sameness and difference a definite and 
constant identity, yet simultaneously proffering that which is indefinite and transient. 
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With regard to literature, David Lodge suggests, ‘character is probably the most 
difficult aspect of the art of fiction to discuss in technical terms.  This is partly 
because there are so many different types of character and so many different ways of 
representing them: major characters and minor characters, flat characters [those 
which are considered to be two-dimensional and uncomplicated] and round 
characters [those which are considered to be complex and encompass elements of 
ambiguity], characters rendered from inside their minds [...] and characters viewed 
from outside by others [...]’ (Lodge 2011: 67).  However, the general assumption with 
regard to characters is that they are ‘the people who inhabit and take part in a story’ 
(Baldick 1990: 33).  Despite an acknowledgement of these people as authorial 
constructions, characters persist in conveying an expectation of the real.  As the 
caveats frequently found in films and books declare, ‘[t]he events and characters 
depicted in this photoplay are fictitious.  Any similarity to actual persons, living or 
dead, or to actual events is purely accidental.’  (Breaking Away, 20th Century Fox Film 
Corporation, 1979).  Nevertheless as Henry James suggests, ‘characters are based on 
life but are not to be confused with it’ (Lodge 2011: 67).  Despite our transitory 
flirtation with the character as real, ultimately we close the book or leave the theatre 
accepting them as indefinite fictional personae constructed in part by the authorial 
mind, in part by the reader, in part by the viewer. Characters are constructed within 
the discourse of the transitory and illusory, they do not appear to offer a resolved 
point of reference; they belong to a discursive process where meaning and identity 
become subject to a continual process of negotiation and renegotiation. Thus 
characters may be seen to reside in an aporetic space between author and reader, the 
distinct and the indistinct, the real and the imagined, fact and fiction, illusion and 
reality, between presence and absence; thus it is within this space that characters 
present the potential for play (the latitude of participation, performance; the game).  
 
‘[T]he people of fiction, the fictitious beings, will [...] no longer be well-made 
characters who carry with them a fixed identity, a stable set of social and 
psychological attributes - a name, a situation, a profession, a condition etc. The 
creatures of the new fiction will be as changeable, as illusory, as nameless, as 
unnamable, as fraudulent, as unpredictable as the discourse that makes them’ 
(Federman 1981: 12).  If an encounter with a single character presents us with an image 
of undecidability, then conceivably the double character may further offer the 
potential to disrupt the notion of a fixed, stable and unified identity. Despite a 
cultural legacy of the double as the divisible two (the dichotomous either/or as one) 
and the indivisible two (the third as one), the identity of the double-figure character 
in literature may be seen as a metaphor for the ‘the sum of all the contradictions and 
ambiguities [...] [of] an entire situation’ (Collins 1963).  
 
as alike as snakes.  And yet they are attentive observers, “quick” and 
“supple”; they have sparkling eyes and, in contrast to their childish ways, 
and adult faces, “of students almost” with long, thick beards.  Someone, it’s 
not clear who, has assigned them to us, and it isn’t easy to get them off our 
backs.  In sum, “we don’t know who they are” – perhaps they are 
“emissaries” from the enemy. But they look like angels, messengers who do 
not know the content of the letters they must deliver, but whose smile, whose 
look, whose posture “seems like a message”. We learn nothing about them, 
this unclassifiable “crew” to whom, at bottom, the main characters owe 
everything (Kafka 2009). 
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The characters of Jeremias and Artur, The Assistants in Kafka’s novel The Castle, 
highlight the potential of the double to disrupt an expectation of a stable and unified 
identity. [hyperlink] The Assistants, at times named as one, appear as two; a two, 
however, that cannot be identified or classified in terms of sameness and difference; 
a double that may be seen to unsettle the categorical classifiable distinctions and 
offer a proliferation of ‘pluridimensional possibilities and meanings’ (Slethaug 
1993:197). [back] The two characters through their interplay appear unclassifiable, 
indistinguishable, ambiguous doubles; their twoness presents neither, either/or 
consensus or dissensus of meaning. ‘The contradiction that they act out in frantic 
pantomime is the contradiction of existence, the eternal ambiguity of meaning in the 
universe.’ (Collins 1963) 
 
Two men made their appearance.  
One came from the direction of the Bastille; the other from that of the Jardin 
des Plantes. As soon as they reached the middle of the boulevard, they sat 
down, at the same moment, on the same seat.  
(Flaubert 2013) 
 
The characters Bouvard and Pecuchet in Flaubert’s novel, (originally titled The Tale 
of Two Nobodies), similarly propose the potential of the double to disrupt the notion 
of fixed identity and meaning. The sameness and difference between the characters 
are discussed as [hyperlink] ‘[t]he taller of the pair, arrayed in linen cloth, walked 
with his hat back, his waistcoat unbuttoned, and his cravat in his hand. The smaller, 
whose form was covered with a maroon frock-coat, wore a cap with a pointed peak’ 
(Flaubert 2013). [back] The characters are different, but it is difficult to tell them apart. 
They are not the same and their associative relationship is acknowledged. The 
double, the odd couple, in their indeterminate state, presents us with an image of 
incompleteness. The double, as two, in its cultural duplicity and ambiguity, stands 
for opposition and difference, affinity and similarity; it is the play of the double that 
offers the potential and possibilities of not either/or but maybe neither, and.  As 
Slethaug suggests, ‘doubleness and doubling are linguistic and literary devices to 
break down assumptions about logical possibility, reason, powers of discrimination, 
and consistency.’ (Slethaug 1993: 29).  The double, Bouvard and Pecuchet, in an 
unremitting search and relentless failure to find answers, solutions, knowledge, 
parodies a cultural preoccupation with a relentless pursuit of meaning as the 
knowable, the unified, the resolved; our cultural preoccupation with unifying the 
double. ‘What is the point of it all?  Perhaps there isn’t a point. Yet… and Pecuchet 
repeated the word two or three times, without finding anything more to say’ (Flaubert 
2013).  Thus it may be suggested that it is the very interplay of difference between the 
two of the double character that holds the potential to disrupt ‘[t]he logocentric 
longing par excellence [...] to distinguish one from the other’; a cultural 
preoccupation with the singular authorial presence as a site of origination and finite 
meaning (Derrida 1997: 167). As Derrida suggests, ‘Differences, looked at from a 
certain perspective, may instead communicate ideas of fragmentation and plurality’ 
(Slethaug 1993: 23).  Deconstruction, proposed by Derrida as a means to deny a 
logocentric cultural tradition, considers how the binary two may be seen to contradict 
their own logic (the logic of the double as the reducible, the either/or or third) by 
denying the possibility of pure presence and thus finite meaning: ‘Not to synthesize 
the terms in opposition, but to mark their difference and eternal interplay’ (Derrida 
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1981: 41-43).  Deconstruction may, therefore, be seen as doubleness and doubling, a 
double movement of affirmation and negation, where differences and similarities are 
revealed through the process and conditions of their production.  In this image of 
incompleteness no oppositions are revealed, no singular resolutions found, no 
privileged finite meanings or absolute truths established.  For Derrida, the potential 
of the double lies in playing the double game; a game that seeks to expose 
incompleteness operating within the bounds of realism as determinate possibilities 
(possibilities that are ‘pragmatically determined’)to expose ambiguity and 
uncertainty (Derrida 1988: 148).  Thus the ambiguous and undecidable double may be 
seen as the Derridean Pharmakon, resisting resolution, and exposing through its 
interplay the inconsistencies of meaning. The double may, therefore, be seen to 
perform as a subversive device that holds the potential to disrupt the assumption of 
difference (between the two) as distinction; a play of the production of difference that 
assumes all identities and resists stasis and unity.  Not one nor other, but both and 
maybe neither.  Derrida speaks of the double hymen, double invagination, double 
vow, double token, and double affirmation. He playfully repeats himself, doubles the 
rhetoric, and duplicates the typography, conveying that sameness need not 
necessarily be a means of producing uniformity, nor difference necessarily a means 
of producing opposition (Slethaug 1993: 22).  As Derrida, through differánce suggests, 
meaning is that which differs and defers; the difference between difference (e) and 
differánce (a) . Differánce may be seen to suggest both similarity (as opposed to 
Deleuzian sameness) and difference, identity and non-identity; a ‘systematic play of 
differences, of traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are 
related to each other’ (Derrida 1981:  1-28).  Thus differánce may be seen as ‘not just 
the space between ‘a’ and ‘e’ [m and a], but the spacing that makes possible the 
difference between them’ (Niall 2008: 25). Thus it may be the middle voice, a non-
consensual undecidability between, that articulates in interplay the ‘contradictions 
and ambiguities of an entire situation’ (Collins 1963).  It may be suggested, therefore, 
that it is not merely the interplay and relationship between the collaborative double 
as anomalous (the double as metaphorical differánce) to the logic of the single 
artistic originator (as the Derridean foregone conclusion), but also the interplay of 
and between the double itself that may incite the play of difference. It is the play of 
emergent difference between the double that may be seen to hold the potential to 
disrupt the logic of opposition, reason, resolution and unity and thus offer the 
possibility of multiplicity. They are Helen, Marilyn, matthews and allen, characters 
and authors and editors, real and fictive, visible and invisible and good and evil, 
thought and unthought, friends and antagonists; they are differance and 
schizophrenic singularities. They are an assemblage of differences. They are all and 
they are neither. They are double. ‘Neither of us was the madman, and neither the 
doctor: there had to be two of us if we were to uncover a process that would not be 
reducible [...] (Guattari, 2006: 19). 
 
Through difference and undecidability the collaborative double may be seen to resist 
the logic of the divisible oppositional dichotomy or/and an indivisible imploded third 
and resist replication and perpetuation of the dominant and enduring image of the 
single authorial artistic figure as a site of origination and finite meaning. Thus it may 
be the very condition of being double that holds the potential for multiplicity and 
proliferation; the double that is neither defined by collaboration (as indivisible 
unity), nor the parts that may distinguish the two collaborators (as divisible unity), 
but a Bakhtinian unfinalized double (as	an	equivocal	and	 indefinite	 identity)	 that 
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through ambiguity and inconsistency disrupts categorization and classification (Bakhtin	1982:	59).	 The collaborative double as potential multiplicity.  As Deleuze and 
Guattari proffer; 
 
a multiplicity is defined not by the elements that compose it in extension, not 
by the characteristics that compose it in comprehension, but by the lines and 
dimensions that it encom- passes in ‘intension’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 270).  
 
It is the collaborative double as multiplicity, therefore, that can be defined neither by 
the unified summation of the parts nor the one or other, but by the variable 
intensities, the spacing and interplay between (the multitude of differences) as a 
mode of production.  Thus, it is the play of the double that matthews and allen enact 
that offers a ‘determinate oscillation between possibilities’ (Slethaurg 1993: 28); an 
oscillation of difference where the collaborative double may become the unnameable 
of difference, and as such neither; ‘neither absolutely separate nor simply 
inseparable’ (Derrida 2004: 192). 
 
 
 
 
 
NEITHER 
 
to and fro in shadow from inner to outer shadow 
from impenetrable self to impenetrable unself by way of neither 
[hyperlink] as between two lit refuges whose doors once neared 
gently close, once away turned from gently part again 
beckoned back and forth and turned away [back] 
heedless of the way, intent on the one gleam or the other 
unheard footfalls only sound 
till at last halt for good, absent for good from self and other 
then no sound 
then gently light unfading on that unheeded neither 
unspeakable home 
(Samuel Beckett, Complete Prose, 1929-1989) 
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[...] striving for a state of betweeness for a kind of no man’s land between 
opposites of light and darkness, self and unself, starting and stopping, life and death, 
language and silence. 
(Gontanrski as cited in Beckett 1997: 60) 
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[and a] ‘three letter word in English which combines simple statements into more 
complex ones’ (Chopra 2005).   
 
the philosopher Gilles Deleuze is amongst those who are keen that we 
substitute AND for IS.  The sky and some blue and roses and red. ‘Thinking 
with AND, instead of IS...’  This is what Gilles Deleuze is asking me to do.  
Indeed, this is what the theory and practice of relations is asking me to do. 
Include the AND. 
The AND is not a specific relation or conjunction, it is that which subtends 
all relations, the path of all relations, which make relations shoot outside 
their terms and outside the set of their terms, and outside every-thing which 
could be determined as Being, One or Whole  
(Lomax 2000: 152). 
 
And is frequently used in the names of collaborative doubles and as Juliet proffers, 
What’s in a name?  And is defined as that which ‘connect[s] words [...] that are to be 
taken jointly’ (Pearsall and Trumble 2000: 48).  Thus, and is predominantly considered as 
a conjunction and is typically seen to function as a connective, as opposed to a 
disjunctive that is seen to separate and divide. Despite the apparent dichotomous 
function of the two terms, (that of connecting and separating), the introduction of 
either a disjunctive, such as or and/or the conjunctive and into the paired double, 
may be seen to perpetuate the dominant assumption of the collaborative double as a 
divisible or indivisible unity. The inclusion of or, as in Nat or Bobbie, Gilbert or 
George, Ant or Dec, suggests a contrary relationship between the associative pair, 
that of one not the other.  The inclusion of this disjunction may be seen to present us 
with a proposition that requires us to not only select one of the two, but to select the 
right one, the one that is true.  This premise threatens to classify the double as 
merely two discrete entities bound only by opposition and hierarchy; which one is 
the right one? Which one is true?  You cannot have both; it has to be a dichotomous 
either/or.  
 
The inclusion of the conjunctive and placed between the paired collaborative double 
may superficially be seen to dissipate or eradicate such binary oppositional 
hierarchy. In its most literal translation the and (as opposed to the or), may be seen to 
connect and bind the two.  Thus, the and may predominantly be used by 
collaborative doubles in an attempt to communicate a sense of inclusion. The and, 
however, perceived of as a conjunction may be seen to merely join the two into one 
inclusive, third or unified whole; Nat and Bobbie, as one unified double act. The and, 
however, placed between the collaborative double need not function simply as a 
conjunction, but may further offer the potential to create a betwixt and between gap 
for possibility, proliferation and multiplicity. The and is not merely defined as that 
which connects, but also as that which may be ‘used to introduce an additional 
comment or interjection’ (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 48). What may be significant in the 
use of the and in the collaborative name, is not the joining or connecting of the two, 
but the space and spacing that the and may create betwixt and between the two. 
 
 
betwixt and between 1. neither one thing nor the other  
(Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 138). 
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Between commonly suggests a space of consensus and resolution ‘by joint or 
reciprocal action’, a site that is created to unify the dichotomous two that reside on 
either side of the between; the uniting of the divisible two into the imploded third 
(Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 138). 
and 
 
betwixt, defined as ‘informal’ and as ‘not fully or properly either of two things’ 
offers an opportunity to explore the potential of the space between the two as a site 
of oscillation, uncertainty and multiplicity (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 138) . 
 
The prevailing assumption is that the word between relates to the middle or centre; 
the middle ground, middle-of-the road, caught in the middle, smack in the middle, 
playing both ends against the middle, all evoking notions of mediocrity, moderation, 
cultural consensus; the mean. Similarly, centre ground, centre on someone or 
something, take centre stage, all allude to a site of individuality and unity. Despite 
such resolute assumptions the and as the space between, seen from a different 
perspective need not perform as a site of concordance, ‘[a]s what [...] happens in the 
middle, [may] disrupt [...] the security of borders and regulations and unset[le][...] 
the solace of ideal forms.’ (Derrida as cited in Niall 2008)  Derrida suggests ‘the word 
[‘]between[’] has no full meaning of its own.’ (Derrida 2004: 222).  Between, (and 
similarly and) as a syncategoreme, can only exist when ‘something’ is placed either 
side of the between. Thus, it is the double (albeit the double as the undecidable 
neither) that may allow the and between to be conceived of as a Beckettian no mans 
land and as such the and betwixt and between may be allied to Khoric neither.  
 
Khora is neither present not absent, active nor passive, the Good nor the evil, 
living nor nonliving  (Timaeus, 50c). Neither theomorphic nor 
anthromorphic-but rather atheological and nonhuman-Khora is not even a 
receptacle 
(Caputo 1997: 36). 
 
[hyperlink] The unnamable Khora (Chora), the unknowable space and interval and 
gap (with the inherent contradiction of discussing the unknowable and naming the 
unnamable), that is neither being, or non being, neither, nor, and, an interval 
between. ‘The thought of khora would trouble the very order of polarity, of polarity 
in general, whether dialectical or not’ ‘both this and that’ ‘neither this not that’ 
(Wolfreys 1998: 39). [back] 
 
The Khora may be seen as aporetic.  ‘khora is that which troubles interpretation 
while performing a certain opening of the text at its heart’ (Wolfreys 1998: 39).  Thus it 
does not function as the conventionally perceived middle or centre, (not a consensual 
middle, or centre as site of power or unity), but as an aporetic centre, a central 
disrupter, a space for uncertainty and possibility and multiplicity. ‘Chora doesn’t 
look like anything, it doesn’t resemble anything, but if it did it would look a lot like 
stupidity’ (Morgan 2006). 
 
Where now? Who now? When now? Unquestioning. I, say I. Unbelieving. 
Questions, hypotheses, call them that. Keep going, going on, call that going, 
call that on. Can it be that one day, off it goes on, that one day I simply 
stayed in, in where, instead of going out, in the old way, out to spend the day 
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and night as far away as possible, it wasn’t far. Perhaps that is how it 
began. You think you are simply resting, the better to act when the time 
comes, or for not reason, and you soon find yourself powerless ever to do 
anything again. No matter how it happened. It, say it, not knowing what. 
Perhaps I simply assented at last to an old thing, But I did nothing. I seem to 
speak, it is not I, about me, it is not about me. These few general remarks to 
begin with. What am I to do, what shall I do, what should I do, in my 
situation, how proceed? By aporia pure and simple? Or by affirmations and 
negations invalidated as uttered, or sooner or later? Generally speaking. 
There must be other shifts. Otherwise it would be quite hopeless. But it is 
quite hopeless. [hyperlink] I should mention before going any further, any 
further on, that I say aporia without knowing what it means. (Beckett The 
Unnamable 1959) [back] 
 
The use of and in the collaborative double name may be seen to act as an aporetic 
pause, a gap.  The literal meaning of the word aporia is unpassable path and is cited 
in Ancient Greek philosophy as the logic of contradiction. Aporia or the aporetic 
method is considered to be the foundation for Socratic dialogue and was seen as the 
problem to be solved or the truth to be sought. Aristotle utilized aporia to highlight 
the incompatibilities between opposing logical stances, thus reconciling opposing 
elements.  Rhetorically, however, aporia is thought of as a point of uncertainty and 
a pause.  For Derrida, the aporetic pause is an encounter with that which confounds 
the rules of logic, and where undecidability of meaning is performed; ‘a moment of 
self contradiction where the text [the text of the collaborative double] betrays the 
tension between rhetoric and logic, between what it manifestly means to say and 
what it is nonetheless constrained to mean’ (Cuddon 1992: 50).  Thus, when 
encountering the collaborative double, logic may be seen to reside in the figure of 
the singular artist; the logic of the collaborative double as an oppositional 
dichotomy or indivisible consolidated third and the rhetoric of the collaborative two 
as a discursive multiplicity. The and of the collaborative double may, therefore, be 
seen to confound the rules of logic, and enact the tension between the dominant 
assumption of the self sufficient artist as the site of unified meaning and the rhetoric 
of the double as multiple and multiplicity. The and between the collaborative 
double may be seen to hold the potential to become the aporetic pause or gap, not, 
however, as an ‘impasse’, a (full) 
stop 
 
but a stopping point, a pause for thought, a pause for doubt, a pause for the 
proliferation of possibilities.  
 
The potential of the aporetic and, betwixt and between, may further be seen to 
function as a polysyndeton. The word polysyndeton derives from the Greek poly for 
many and syndeton as that which is bound together and typically refers to the 
repetition of words such as and. The use of multiple or repetitious words are cited 
as performing many functions. ‘a. Polysyndeton may be used to create rhythm A 
and B and C and D [...] b. Polysyndeton also regulates the pace of an utterance.  
Inserting extra conjunctions can slow a statement down by drawing out the process 
of saying it.  But it can also speed an utterance up, as when all the conjunctions 
suggest excitability and urgency.  The result depends on the context. c. 
 
 
	 241 
Polysyndeton can create the impression that the speaker is making up the meaning 
as the utterance goes along.  A normal list of items with commas between most of 
them and an and only before the last one requires the speaker to know when the list 
is coming to an end, since just before the end is the one and only place where the 
and goes.  Putting an and after every item suggests that the speaker doesn’t have a 
plan of this kind; each item on the list might be the last or might not, depending on 
how many more things occur to the speaker.  The resulting sound of artlessness may 
enhance the speaker’s credibility. d. In the most common case of the polysyndeton 
the speaker uses “and” to connect items in a series, rather than separating them 
with commas.  The result is to emphasize every one of the items [...]. e. Sometimes 
the repeated use of conjunctions also serves to emphasize the large number of items 
the speaker names. f. polysyndeton  is an important device for building loose 
sentences, an extra conjunction may attach a thought to the end of the sentence 
where it is not expected, thus creating possibilities for surprise and interest’ 
(Farnsworth 2011: 128). 
 
Literally and syntactically the collaborative double ordinarily contains one and (Nat 
and Bobbie, Gilbert and George, Ant and Dec).  However, it may be suggested that 
conceptually the and (even in the singular) communicates a form of polysyndetic 
proliferation.  And by its very definition conveys progression, continuance and 
number (Nat and Bobbie and Gilbert and George and and and). Thus the and hints at 
the possibility of repetition, of the multiple and of the speaker’s artlessness 
associated with stuttering and stammering; a stuttering and stammering as pause for 
doubt and a stuttering and stammering that allows for a site of proliferation to 
emerge betwixt and between the two. 
 
The and as a stuttering and stammering and may be seen to perform within the pause 
or gap as the proliferating and that offers the potential to become the agent 
provocateur; an interlocutor, the ‘[‘]someone[’] who takes part in a conversation; 
the performer in a show [...] placed midway between [and] engages in banter’ 
(freedictionary.com). The and as interlocutor however, does not perform as a unified 
monologic voice; the and performs as the chatter of possibilities, as the polyphonous 
Shakespearean fool who ‘utilises the stuff of the world’ to unravel the ‘dominant 
regime’ (O Sullivan 2005).  Thus, it is the and that may hold the potential to perform 
generative dialogue, dialogue that allows for multiplicity to emerge. [hyperlink] ‘The 
tree imposes the verb ‘"to be," but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, "and. 
. . and.. . and. . .” This conjunction carries enough force to shake and uproot the 
verb "to be" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). [back]  The and, therefore, may perform as an 
agent for proliferation, undoing binaries and extricating the collaborative double 
from the preconceptions of a third as a singular, unified consensual whole; as 
Deleuze states, ‘the conjunction AND is, neither a union, nor a juxtaposition, but the 
birth of a stammering [...]’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007:10).   
 
For Deleuze, stuttering and stammering has the potential to disrupt the logic of a 
language in equilibrium, a language of a dominant regime, a language of 
logocentrism. ‘Stuttering as a [performative] art that no longer selects and affirms 
established sequences but affirms the disjointed terms through their distance, without 
limiting one by the other or excluding one from the other, laying out and passing 
through the entire set of possibilities.’ Deleuze suggests that it ‘is only a particular 
type of speech [and language], a poetic speech, [...] that actualizes these powers of 
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bifurcation and variation.’ ‘Creative stuttering is what makes language grow from 
the middle, like grass; it is what makes language a rhizome instead of a tree’.  
[They] (Kafka, Beckett, Dostoevsky) ‘invent a minor use of a major language.  
[They] minorize this language. [hyperlink] [They] draw [...] out a nonexistent 
foreign language within [their] own language’, ‘grimaces, slips of the tongue, 
screechings, inarticulate sounds, extended liasons, and brutal accelerations and 
decelerations’, a ‘language in perpetual disequilibrium’ (Deleuze 2004: 111). [back] 
Thus, stuttering and stammering between the collaborative double has the potential to 
become the performative ‘hum, the murmurings, the vibrations and reverberations 
within and between speech, [language, thought and meaning]’ (Deleuze 2004: 108).  As 
Bogue states, ‘not so much a stuttering of one’s speech as [...] a conceptual 
stuttering, a stuttering of thought itself’  (Bogue 2004: 24). 
 
and  
the conceptual stuttering and stammering and 
between of the unnameable collaborative 
double may be seen to interrupt the 
equilibrium of the singular artist. 
 
and and 
the stuttering and stammering and between of 
the aporetic encounter may be conceptualized 
as a pause for thought. 
 
 
and and and  
as a pause between, the stuttering and 
stammering vibrations and reverberations of 
possibilities and multiplicities may unfold. 
 
 
and and and and  
the stuttering and stammering of the 
performative dialogue at play. 
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we do not work together we work between the two  
(Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 17). 
 
How one communicates is fundamental to collaboration and dialogue ‘lives a tense 
life on the border of someone else’s thought, someone else’s consciousness’ (Emerson 
1984: 32).  Collaboration, as to work together to produce something requires an 
articulation between; an exchange of thoughts and concepts passed in dialogue 
between one and another. Typically however, the theoretical and discursive emphasis 
for collaborative communication is placed upon either the dichotomous participants 
engaged in dialogue or the outcome arising from the process of dialogue as a means 
to achieve a consensual and conflated resolution; both or either/or monologic, not 
neither dialogic. 
 
Dialogue is commonly defined as to ‘take part in a conversation or discussion to 
resolve a problem’  but what might that resolution entail? (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 
393).  
 
To consider collaborative dialogue between the two as a means to resolution suggests 
the existence of a contentious situation, one that may require a determined and 
definite conclusion, a unified decidable truth to be sought.  Collaborative dialogue as 
a mode of communication is generally conceived of as the act of coming together 
with a specific aim that focuses on the outcome of that dialogue.  Thus dialogue 
between the two in a collaborative double is perceived to be that of a discussion 
which will ultimately result in consensus, a conclusion. A consideration of the 
collaborative double in these terms may, therefore, be seen to perpetuate notions of 
the dialectical two, the binary pair, the contrary, that are engaged in adversarial 
confrontation, a battle of wits, a power struggle.  As Freire suggests, however,  
‘dialogue cannot occur between those who want to name the world, and those who 
do not want this naming; or between those who have been denied the right to speak, 
and those who deny the right’ (Freire 1972: 61). 
 
The etymology of the word dialogue suggests that it is formed from the two words 
dia (through or across) and logos (word, speech, discourse), and despite associations 
with reason and truth, may literally be interpreted as to speak between.  In 
contemporary cultural usage dialogue has become a byword for a process of shared 
thought that may arise from ‘a non coercive relationship of mutual respect’ (Flusser 
2002: xiv).  As Bohm suggests, ‘the key components of dialogue: shared meaning; the 
nature of collective thought; the pervasiveness of fragmentation; the function of 
awareness; the microcultural context; undirected inquiry; impersonal fellowship; 
and the paradox of the observer and the observed’ (Bohm 2004: 20). Thus, an 
expectation of dialogue need not centre on resolution, winning the argument, the 
dialectical one or the other that may implode, unifying thought and meaning, 
dialogue considered from a different perspective may be seen to offer the potential to 
‘advance understanding’ (Habermas 1984: 285-287). 
 
For Habermas, effective dialogue is dependent upon rules of the game, and it is these 
rules that create an ideal speech situation; a situation with no imbalance of power. 
Habermas’s rules of dialogue involve all participants being granted an equal 
opportunity and right to assert, defend or question any statements. They must not be 
constrained or informed by status or difference, (one-sidedly binding norms), and yet 
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‘be motivated solely by the desire to reach a consensus about the truth of statements 
and the validity of norms’ (Warf 2013).  But how do we leave our power at the door? 
Thoughts and language are ideological, imbued with intentions, assumptions, 
meanings and rhetoric.  Language and dialogue are littered with interpretations and 
preconceptions. Dialogue, as such, viewed from the perspective of resolution, may 
be seen to be about distortion; about power and overpowering; about the hierarchical; 
about dominant regimes; about establishing and fixing meaning.  Habermas suggests, 
however, that ‘social and cultural interactions presuppose language and that in the 
very structure of speech we may find the essential grounding conditions for 
interaction’, a communicative interaction where dialogue does not privilege the 
powerful (Barker 2004: 92).  Thus communicative action involves a process whereby 
participants seek a common understanding and coordinate dialogue as reasoned 
argument, consensus, and cooperation as opposed to pursuing their own agendas 
(Habermas 1984: 86). 
 
Whilst for Habermas the process of dialogue purports equality, this model based 
upon a search for universal consensual truth, (albeit one where ‘agreement cannot be 
imposed, but rests on common conviction’) may ultimately merely replicate the 
philosophical culture of dialectics. Habermas’s model may be seen to highlight the 
democratic process involved in the conception of dialogue, yet this method may not 
necessarily address the efficacy of a process that aims to free fixed language and 
meaning from the dominant regime through the stasis of consensual truth. Thus, this 
perspective on dialogue may essentially be seen to idealistically disregard the 
philosophical inheritance of communication. Dialogue is most often entered into 
with a particular and relatively fixed hierarchical stance and views are exchanged in 
order to coerce others to modify their opinion; a game of discursive arm wrestling; ‘it 
boils down to a way of appeasing others in order to hold on to one’s own point of 
view.  Such an attitude does not bring the partners closer to a supposed “truth” but 
serves a political purpose, namely to protect and reinforce their original positions’ 
(Schwartz and Cilliers 2003: 4). As Bohm states, ‘at best this may produce agreement or 
compromise, but it does not give rise to anything creative’ (Bohm and Peat 1987: 241).   
Dialogue for Bohm, like Habermas, involves a form of communication that is free of 
the opinions and assumptions of the one and the other and the both. For Bohm 
creative dialogue, ‘that reveals the incoherence of our thought’ is generated in a 
space, the centre of the circle, a site that offers the potential to discover a common or 
shared meaning, where thought moves from social fragmentation to social 
commonality (Bohm 2004: 7-56). This proposed model of dialogue alludes to the 
centre of the circle as the space between as a site of multiplicity, inclusion and the 
dialogic. For Bohm dialogue is not necessarily about resolving a specific problem, 
yet in an attempt to locate ‘a shared coherent common outcome’, difference and 
fragmentation may become excluded (Bohm 2004: 7-56).  Thus Bohm’s between may 
be seen to perform not as an unnamable space of creativity and possibility, but as a 
coherent monologic centre of consensus and unity. 
For dialogue to pertain to incoherence, possibility and potential, a shift in emphasis 
is required; dialogue as not one or the other, or both as a unified voice, but the space 
between as an inclusive site; a site that includes difference and multiplicity, and and 
and dialogue that disrupts the monologic singular subjectivity of the authorial voice 
as a source of finite truth and meaning; [hyperlink] ‘dialogue [that] purports to free 
itself of the unified authorial voice – or at least, to pluralize it into multiple voices 
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beyond the two – and to do so precisely by creating a discourse entre-deux, between 
and among several interlocutors [...] expanding this exercise toward enunciative 
plurality’ (Stivale 2008:95). [back] 
 
Thus, dialogue between may be considered as dialogic, that which is ‘two 
dimensional or multi accentual’.   As Bakhtin suggests ‘all meaning is essentially 
dialogic; it has been passed from mouth to mouth, as well as been used in different 
contexts and with different intentions’ (Barker 2004: 50).  Bakhtin’s theory of 
communication proposes dialogue as interplay between social forces and meanings. 
For Bakhtin all communication is historically, socially and culturally responsive, 
thus all utterances are multi-voiced and in flux; they encapsulate the difference and 
multiplicity of voices both past and present. The dialogic may, therefore, be seen as a 
process of negotiation and and renegotiation of language that occurs betwixt and 
between as a ‘polyphony of fully valid voices’ (Bakhtin 1984: 6-7).  It is the process of 
dialogue between, and not a dialogue with one and then another, that creates a 
‘dialogically agitated environment of alien words’, a foreign language, a stuttering, 
where ‘value judgements and accents, weave in and out of complex 
interrelationships, merg[ing] with some, recoil[ing] from others, intersect[ing] with 
yet a third group: and all its semantic layers, may complicate its expression [...]’ 
(Bakhtin 1981: 276).  
 
For Bakhtin the dialogic becomes a dynamic process of multiple voiced positions 
where dialogical relations and associations occur; both with and between. Thus 
dialogue for Bakhtin is a process where speech, word, language, culture and meaning 
encounter the oscillation of dialogization; dialogue as a process of tension, ‘moving 
in spheres that are liminal [...] at their junctures and points of intersection’ (Bakhtin 
1981: 281).  For Bakhtin, therefore, the dialogic involves an acceptance of 
contradictions, uncertainties, similarities and differences, ‘it represents the co-
existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, 
between [...] and so forth’ (Bakhtin 1981: 291).  Thus, dialogue may have the potential 
to deviate from an expectation of a unified single utterance, the monologicality of 
certainty and resolute meaning.  For Bakhtin dialogic multiplicity disrupts the notion 
of static meaning.  Bakhtin suggests that meaning is always a battle between the 
attempt by dominant regimes to fix monoglossic meaning and the interplay, 
intersection and fluidity of polyglossic multiple voices, meanings and contexts, ‘a 
plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousness, a genuine 
polyphony of fully valid voices’ (Bakhtin 1981: 281).	
 
The interdependent dialogue of the dialogic between may, therefore, be seen as a 
form of zig zag. [hyperlink] A zig zag that veers, deviates, diverges, and swerves. 
Thus the dialogic zig zag does not perform a dialectical game of ping pong or 
become reduced to the consensual third. [back] Dialogue as an aporetic between may 
be seen to perform as a stuttering and stammering of possibilities and perspectives, 
of assumptions, thoughts, preconceptions, distractions, opinions and preoccupations; 
a dialogue that allows a polyphony of voices to be heard and permits all social and 
cultural interaction and fragmentation.  Thus stuttering and stammering may be seen 
as a generative dialogue that encompasses all the stuff of the world with all its 
interruptions and inconsequentialities; the indeterminate, the stuff commonly 
relegated to the unnecessary, the inconsequential. Dialogue performed through 
‘stutterings and stammerings, moments of indeterminacy operating as a new 
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effectual syntax. In each case it is a question of practices that are capable of 
interrupting’ (O Sullivan 2009). 
 
The practice of dialogue between the collaborative double offers the potential to 
become the polyphonic stuttering and stammering that oscillates in performance 
between the two  ‘we were only two, [Deleuze and Guattari] but what was important 
for us was less our working together than this strange fact of working between the 
two of us’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 17).  The stuttering betwixt and between the double 
in dialogue that permits all voices in ‘enunicative plurality’ (Stivale 2008: 95).  
 
dialogue is never solely between two, but admits other voices necessarily 
[...]’ (Stivale 2008: 90).   
 
Thus dialogue that does not attempt to leave at the door ideology, hierarchy, 
intention, meaning or rhetoric, permits all voices that zig and zag and diverge.  
Dialogue performed between, does not seek a definitive truth or common conviction, 
it differs and defers. [hyperlink] The ‘discursive zig zag’ betwixt and between offers 
the potential to become a multiplicity of cross-sectioned and fragmented thoughts 
and perspectives, ‘as if the stylus or cursor could jump through, crosscutting from 
one conceptual flow to another.’ [back] ‘The zig zag constitutes the fundamental 
encounter of the “in-between” of the fold that is the juxtaposition of thought and 
unthought, art and life, affect and the brain, and the friendship conjoined to 
creativity [...] the spark and leap of creation’ (Stivale 2008: 95). 
 
Deleuze and Parnet’s collaboration Dialogues 1977 was conceived as ‘practice-in-
dialogue’ (Stivale 2008: 86).  In the preface they state that ‘this book aims to highlight 
the existence and action of multiplicities.’  ‘What mattered most was not the points – 
Felix, Claire Parnet, me and many others, who functioned simply as temporary, 
transitory and evanescent points of subjectivation – but the collection of bifurcating, 
divergent and muddles lines which constituted this book as a multiplicity and which 
passed between the points, carrying them along without ever going from one to the 
other.  Hence, the first plan for a conversation between two people, in which one 
asked the questions and the other replied, no longer had any value.’ [...]  As we 
became less sure what came from one, what came from the other, or even from 
someone else, we would become clearer about “What is it to write?’  This really is a 
book without subject, without beginning or end, but not without a middle’ (Deleuze and 
Parnett 2007: ix). 
  
For Deleuze and Parnet in dialogue, the authorial voice of the one or the other or 
both becomes irrelevant.  The dialogue becomes a process, a generative act between 
that permits all voices; ‘dialogue that is populated by ‘encounters’, not necessarily 
with people but with ‘movements, ideas, events, entities’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 6).  
Thus dialogue between for Deleuze and Parnet may be seen as an enunciative 
dialogic encounter of multiplicity. Deleuze describes the process of dialogue as, ‘a 
process that occurs “behind the thinker’s back or in the moment when he blinks” ’ a 
‘set of sounds hammered out, of discursive gestures, of ideas all made of tinder and 
fire, of deep attention and sudden closure, of laughter and smiles [...]’, ‘a sort of wild 
rodeo’, ‘a process of ‘a pick-me-up or pick-up’ (Stivale 2008: 86-97). Thus it may be 
suggested that it is the collaborative dialogue performed between the two that allows 
for this very equivocation, reverberation and oscillation.  As Deleuze suggests of the 
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encounter between the two, ‘it was less a question of pooling our knowledge than 
piling up our uncertainties’ (Guattari 2006: 6). 
 
For Deleuze and Parnet, uncertainty lies in the multitude of difference; difference, 
however, that is not difference as distinction and negation (that of the conventional 
assumption of a collaborative double with different skills united as third) but 
difference as differentiation and affirmation (the proliferation of different and 
differing perspectives within the collaborative double). ‘So this whole way of being 
two, of living their duality, was to conceive production as an assemblage of 
differences. Far from destroying each other, and catching each difference in a 
centrifugal motion that would have taken them apart, they managed to work together 
[...], enabling the conditions for a truly collective enunciation to emerge’ (Guattari 
2006: 20).  The collaborative double in dialogue take flight, through difference, from 
dialectical opposition, ‘what we are engaged in is not about debate or conflict 
resolution.  In a certain sense there never is any opposition’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 
21). 
 
Deleuze writes of the collaboration as ‘a rhizome, as opposed to the unity of the tree 
and its binary logic’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: x).  ‘The rhizome has no beginning, end, 
or unified center.’ ‘The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the multiple [...] 
it is comprised not of units but of dimensions, or rather directions in motion’; ‘the 
inter- and trans-dimensionality of rhizomatic inviting lines of flight’; a line of flight 
that holds the potential to put a system in flight, to leave, to escape, yet not flee a 
static dominant regime (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 21).  Thus, a rhizomatic collaborative 
performance between the two may be seen as both heterogeneous and proliferating.  
A dialogue between that does not exclude perceived consequentialites and 
inconsequentialities, incoherence and coherence, the major or the minor,  ‘a 
collective assemblage of enunciation’, ‘an out of step duet’ , one that deterritorializes 
and reterritorializes with ‘thought [...] flying off in every direction’ (Stivale 2008: 13-22 
154).  For Deleuze and Guattari territory is a conceptual regime, a dynamic 
configuration of intersected assemblages that are in constant flux; and thus a line of 
flight is produced when glitches or interruptions occur in the equilibrium, the 
expected flow, the familiar, the accepted, the perception of the known, truth. The 
stuttering and stammering dialogue between includes the interruptions, the glitches 
and and and of understanding and misunderstanding. The dialogue differs and defers 
and disrupts the resolute meaning, challenging you to ‘look for a completely different 
idea, elsewhere, in another area, [that is] neither in one no[r] the other’ (Deleuze and 
Parnet 2007: 10).   
 
Thus the process of dialogue between the collaborative double may permit all voices 
and perform the oscillating undecidability of language and communication.  As 
Derrida suggests, ‘It follows from this “undecidability” that one’s understanding of 
what the other is saying is never complete.  This lack of pure understanding subverts 
any attempts at unravelling the truth [...]’ (Swartz, C. & Cilliers 2003).  It is, therefore, 
within this continual dialogue of undecidability, of understanding and 
misunderstanding, of stasis and flux, of the expected and the unexpected, of the 
resolute and the irresolute, the interrupted and the uninterrupted that proliferating 
lines of flight may emerge. Thus dialogue between the two may be seen to resist the 
unity of divisible opposition and the indivisible third.  Dialogue performed between 
the two in the collaborative double may, therefore, be reconsidered as, ‘not 
something which would be in the one, or something which would be in the other, 
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even if it had to be exchanged, be mingled, but something which is between the two 
outside the two and which flows in another direction’ (Deuleuze and and and Parnet 2007: 
7). 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Dialogue 
I can’t go on. 
Go on. 
Is there anyone to hear here? 
Who are you? 
You. 
I? 
Aye. 
Then let me see me! 
See? 
A lass! Alas 
 
(Barth 1969 Lost in the Funhouse: 101) 
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Two people are sitting in a room.  They are both silent.  Then one of them 
says,“Well!” 
 (Voloshinov) 
 
Collaboration between the two within the visual arts takes many forms, however, the 
dominant assumption is that of multiple authors who seek to disrupt a ‘singular 
subjectivity’ (Gisbourne 2007: 16).  It is suggested that the precondition of history has 
established a compliant belief in the artist as singular, the individuated self-conscious 
I of subjectivity, the autonomous and authorial artist as the self sufficient genius with 
unique experience and a resolute vision to impart to the world. As Charles Green 
suggests, ‘we routinely refer to the single authorial mind, or personality, or 
consciousness to validate ”meaning” or “authority”’ (Green collabarts.org). 
 
It is within this context that collaboration may be seen to seek multiple models of 
arts practice as a strategy to disrupt or displace the dominant figure of the solo artist. 
Thus the collaborative double, as seemingly plural, may appear to be the obvious 
case to disrupt the solo artist as a site of origination.  However, whilst the 
construction of the self-sufficient artistic figure is ostensibly highlighted through the 
presence of the two, the collaborative double may commonly be confounded by the 
assumptive and persistent belief in the singular artist, thereby proffering the double 
artist as a problem that requires resolution.  The problematic collaborative double 
may, therefore, be perceived as that of a divisible oppositional dichotomy and/or the 
indivisible unified third that may be seen to merely replicate and perpetuate an 
established model of singular artistic authorship. The aim of this research, therefore, 
was to explore how the collaborative double may be utilized to disrupt the 
hegemonic regime of the either/or or/both, of the unified authorial figure and finite 
meaning. 
 
[hyperlink] We are Helen, Marilyn, matthews and allen, characters and authors and 
editors, we are converse and we converse, we are deliberate and we deliberate, we 
are appropriate and we appropriate, we are alternate and we alternate, we are 
contrary and contrary, we are content and content; we are undecidable differential 
selves; schizophrenic singularities. We are an assemblage of differences. [back] We 
are all and we are both, we are many, we are either/neither. We are double. This 
research proposed that it is not, therefore, merely the interplay between the 
collaborative double (the between as a site of conflation), as anomalous to the logic 
of the single artistic authorial figure, but the ‘eternal interplay’, between the two of 
the double, (as a site of proliferation), that holds the potential to generate a stuttering 
and stammering oscillation of dialogic possibilities and perspectives (Derrida 1981: 38). 
As Bakhtin proposes, dialogue is a proliferating and divergent interplay between 
social forces and meanings. Thus it is this process of dialogue between, and not a 
dialogue with one and then the other, that creates a ‘dialogically agitated 
environment of alien words’; a dialogue between the inclusive polyphony of voices; 
an ongoing dialogue of ‘enunciative plurality’ that resists stasis (Stivale 2008: 95).  
 
The research for this document explored how a dialogic premise may be performed 
by all emergent participants in the site between the collaborative double; not only, 
but also, Helen and Marilyn and matthews and allen and academic text and 
academic footnotes, between, truth and fiction, subject and subject, understanding 
and misunderstanding, sense and nonsense and; a dialogic interplay of praxis that 
aimed to produce polyphonic, divergent and reflexive possibilities, rather than 
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formulate monologic and assumptive conclusions; ‘a plurality of independent and 
unmerged voices and consciousnesses’ (Bakhtin 1981: 281). 
 
between 
 Helen and Marilyn 
 
Within the document Helen and Marilyn participate as the academic voices, narrating 
the theoretical premise of the research through the production of two independently 
written texts. Helen and Marilyn superficially assume the position of traditional 
authors and construct the assumptive conception of an academic authorial presence, 
the author as an ideological construct, ‘the voice of a single person, the author 
“confiding” in us’ a logocentric truth (Roth Collaboration and Originality in Collaborative 
Arts: Conversations in Collaborative Arts Practice n.d.: 198). Thus, the academic voices of 
Helen and Marilyn include the ‘transhistorical constants that govern the 
construction of an author’, the paradigmatic territory of the academic, the 
methodology, the language, the style, the coherence, the scholarly pursuit of 
knowledge, the academic rules of the game (Roth Collaboration and Originality in 
Collaborative Arts: Conversations in Collaborative Arts Practice n.d.: 198). Helen and Marilyn, 
however, do not merely assume a definitive and stable monologic authorial presence, 
but perform the academic author-function as participants in a process and mode of 
production that ultimately reveals the complexity of its own discursive practices. 
Thus, the authors enact the orchestration and dissemination of knowledge and 
meaning; they become the author in the Bakhtinian polyphonic novel enabling 
‘objective complexity, contradictoriness and multi-voicedness [...] the position of the 
déclassé intellectual and the social wanderer’; ‘seeing the world in terms of 
interaction and coexistence’;‘the author [...] as an organizer and participant in the 
dialogue without retaining for himself the final word.’ (Bakhtin 1984: 30-72).  Helen and 
Marilyn, therefore, resist dichotomy and conflation, (the dichotomous either/or of 
author/author, author/reader, author/character, author/anti-author) alternatively 
appropriating the discontinuities of the dominant assumptions inherent in such roles, 
to speak with and amongst, not about, the on-going dialogue. 
 
Thus, the authors of these documents become simply participants, in a stuttering and 
stammering dialogue between, where a ‘variety of conflicting ideological positions 
are given a voice and set in play both between and within individual speaking 
subjects, without being placed and judged by an authoritative authorial voice’ (Lodge 
1990: 86).  
 
and 
between 
 matthews and allen 
 
Within the document matthews and allen participate as the collaborative 
unclassifiable crew, the undecidable all and neither and double and, that resist 
definition by author and reader, positioned with and amongst, through their interplay 
of difference. The double characters of matthews and allen engage in a process of 
ongoing dialogue; a practice of polyphonic dialogue between the collaborative 
double that offers the potential to become a dialogic stuttering and stammering that 
oscillates in the performative interplay of the two. The stuttering betwixt and 
between the double in dialogue permits all voices in enunicative plurality, a plurality 
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that includes the stuff of the world, with all its interruptions and supposed 
inconsequentialities, to unravel dominant assumptions and resolute meaning;  
‘dialogue [that] is never solely between two, but admits other voices necessarily [...]’ 
(Stivale  2008: 90).  
 
Dialogue is commonly defined as to ‘take part in a conversation or discussion to 
resolve a problem’ (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 393).  To consider collaborative dialogue 
between the two as a means to resolution, however, suggests the existence of a 
definite conclusion, a unified decidable truth to be sought.  matthews and allen, 
however, do not seek truth or certainty, but engage in a dialogue between that 
furthers the production of multitudinous and proliferating possibilities and meanings. 
 
matthews and allen’s dialogue may be seen to resemble the cross talk of the music-
hall double act. Cross talk is defined as both ‘unwanted signals in communication’ 
and ‘witty repartee’ (Pearsall and Trumble 1995: 341); witty in that the comedy or ludicy 
is derived from the unwanted, the mis of miscommunication, the not necessarily 
welcomed, the unexpected, the interruption, the swerve, ‘comedy [that] comes from 
the deviations from what we would conventionally expect’ (Neale and Krutnik 1990: 193).  
matthews and allen’s dialogic cross talk, however, is not scripted or rehearsed, it is 
performed as an improvised zig zag dialogue betwixt and between the collaborative 
double; ‘an out of step duet’ with ‘thought [...] flying off in every direction’, (Stivale 
2008: 13-21 154); a game of both word association and disassociation, a game with ‘no 
[certain] rules, [and] no general formula’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 16). 
 
matthews and allen’s rules of the game may be seen as that of the Foucauldian game, 
where play emerges from the ‘game exceed[ing] its own rules’; ‘a game that 
invariably goes beyond [...] and transgresses its limits’ (Foucault 1977).  For matthews 
and allen, transgressive mis-behaviour becomes that of a dynamic and proliferating 
dialogue that serves to disrupt equilibrium and stasis; a stuttering and stammering 
dialogue between that includes the and and and and of behaviour and mis-behaviour 
and understanding and mis-understanding and direction and mis-direction.  An 
aporetic dialogue between the two of the collaborative double that differs and defers 
and disrupts and unravels homogeneity, a dialogue that is performed within the 
document by the matthews and allen footnotes that invite you to ‘look for a 
completely different idea, elsewhere, in another area, [that is] neither in one no[r] 
the other’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 10). 
 
and 
between 
the academic text and the academic footnotes 
 
matthews and allen’s dialogic methodology takes as its entry point the assumption 
that critically acclaimed knowledge is a product of hegemonic authorialism; the 
ideological figure of the academic author, as the individuated self-conscious I and 
originator, engaged in the production of unified meaning, knowledge and truth. The 
academic texts with the document, authored by Helen and Marilyn, enact the 
dominant discourse of academia, the monologic voice of decidable truth and 
originality; a text that attempts to conform to the academic rules of the game. 
 
Within the text matthews and allen appropriate the accepted academic format (the 
rules) of footnoting. Footnotes are commonly seen as a means to support or resolve 
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the content of the major text; ‘(a) to cite sources of information, (b) to give 
additional information concerning matters treated in the text, (c) to direct attention 
to supporting, divergent, or conflicting opinions, and (d) to refer to other pages or 
passages in the text’  (Hurt, P., 1992, Bibliography and Footnotes: A Style Manual for Students 
and Writers, University of California Press).  matthews and allen’s foonotes, however, do 
not seek to support or substantiate nor oppose or invalidate the academic text, but 
through performative citationality offer a stuttering and stammering oscillation of 
proliferating possibilities; the possibility of a ‘storyies [that] slips into, or tends to 
slip into, the space between the two’ (O Sullivan 2009).  The multiplicitous dialogue that 
emerges between the text and the footnotes may be seen to resist the either/or 
dichotomous thought in a ‘continual supplementarity of meaning, that is the 
continual substitution and adding of meaning’, ‘a plentitude enriching another 
plentitude’, which serves to disrupt unified, resolute, fixed meaning (Derrida 1997: 144). 
 
[We] live in a world of others' words  
(Bakhtin 1984: 143)   
 
matthews and allen do not use their own words, but draw on the world of plentiful 
words. As Paul Auster suggests, ‘I tried to use certain generic conventions to get to 
another place, another place altogether’ (Auster 1999).  The rules of the footnote game 
include all the generic and paradigmatic conventions, the dominant assumptions, the 
rules of society, the great game of life and world play (Heidegger as cited in Rattoul and 
Pettigrew 2002: 108). Citing, reiterating, repeating, performing and reperforming, the 
footnote game between may be seen as a process of difference and deferral, of 
decidability and undecidability, of contextualization and recontextualization, a 
determinate and continual oscillation of possibilities at play. 	
and 
between 
text and reader 
 
Within this document the reader is invited to join the game, indeed the reader must 
participate since the dialogic interplay ‘provides no support for the [reader] who 
would objectify an entire event according to some ordinary monologic category 
(thematically, lyrically or cognitively)— and this consequently makes the [reader] 
also a participant’ (Bakhtin 1984: 18). 
 
For the reader of this polyphonous text, the footnotes may be seen to perform as the 
aporetic and, an interruption to their search for knowledge and the construction of 
resolute meaning. The footnote interrupts the reader’s journey throughout the 
academic text, from the beginning to the end; the aporetic ‘drive over the road with 
innumerable potholes’ (Zerby 2003: 12).  ‘The footnote [...] interrupt[s]. Simply 
interrupt[s]’ (Zerby 2003: 3), the interruption as a pause for thought; a pause for 
thought, where, for the reader, the footnote may be seen to perform as the stuttering 
stammering and, the proliferating and inclusive and that holds the potential to 
unravel the logic of a language in equilibrium, a language of a dominant regime, a 
language of logocentrism and truth, because as Neitzsche suggests, ‘there are 
[maybe] no facts, only interpretations’ (Nietzsche Unpublished Notebooks).  Thus the 
interplay between the text and the footnote may be experienced as a site of 
undecidability, a site of differance, that invites the reader to participate in a 
determinate (pragmatically determined) oscillation between possibilities, a site in 
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which the text ‘undermines its own rhetorical structure, dismantles, or deconstructs 
itself.’ It is the dialogue, not of truth or fiction, but one of divergence, a dialogue 
between text and reader where ‘difference never comes to a full stop anywhere, 
absolutely’ (Derrida 1988: 149). 
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and 
between 
truth and fiction 
 
 ‘Indeed, what compels us to assume there exists any essential antithesis 
between‘true’ and ‘false’?  Is it not enough to suppose grades of apparentness and 
as it were lighter and darker shades and tones of appearance – different valeurs, to 
speak in the language of painters?  Why could the world WHICH IS OF ANY 
CONCERN TO US – not be a fiction? And he who then objects: ‘but to the fiction 
there belongs an author [an originator]?’ - could  he not be met with the round 
retort: WHY? Does this ‘belongs’ perhaps not also belong to the fiction?  Are we not 
permitted to be a little ironical about the subject [..?]’ 
 (Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 1973: 65) 
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and 
between 
subject and subject 
 
‘Who are you, then? [...] Don’t you recognize me? [...] But you look quite different. 
That’s because I’m on my own...When I’m alone, I lose my youthful high spirits.’  
(The Assistants: Kafka The Castle 2009) 
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and 
between  
understanding and misunderstanding 
 
‘I don’t want any more of it: the famous cogito is a bore. The ideas of things are 
taken for the things themselves. What we barely understand is explained by means of 
words that we do not understand at all!’ 
(Flaubert Bouvard and Pecuchet 2013) 
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and 
between 
sense and nonsense 
 
‘all is well that endes well’  
 
(Heywood, J., 1546, A Dialogue Conteinyng the Nomber in Effect of All the Prouerbes in the Englishe 
Tongue) 
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and  
between 
 
‘Oh, lets-get-on-with-it’ 
(Nat and Bobbie) 
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and 
between 
[hyperlink] ‘But I digress’ [back] 
(Ronnie Corbett) 
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